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Abstract 
The EU has ambitious goals for economic performance. The goals are to be reached in 
combination with social cohesion and environmentally sustainable development. The main 
economic policy instruments to be used by the EU member states are taxes and benefits. The 
economic and political framework for implementing measures in these areas is currently 
delineated, and is both encouraged and constrained by factors such as population ageing, 
globalisation and more intense international competition in tax and social policies. 
The aim of the project “Tax/benefit systems and growth potential of the EU − TAXBEN” 
(SCS8-CT-2004-502639), as outlined in SSP Priority 8, Topic 3.1, Task 4, was to carry out an 
in-depth analysis of tax/benefit policies in five broad areas in which these policies play a crucial 
role with respect to EU goals. These areas are employment, corporate taxes subject to tax 
competition, productivity growth and convergence, macroeconomic policies under a single 
monetary policy, and the environment and climate change. The project was carried out by seven 
European economic policy research institutes of the ENEPRI network. 
The project team used many novel approaches, especially in building new tools that rely on 
general equilibrium models, so that both the direct and indirect effects of taxation could be 
analysed. New applications of existing large-scale multi-country models were also used to 
evaluate the impact of tax policies. In addition, recourse was taken to econometric estimation of 
the relationships between key economic target variables, on the one hand, and tax/benefit (and 
other fiscal policies) and labour market indicators, on the other, using large international 
datasets. A number of theoretical approaches were taken in relation to economic policies under 
the single currency. The analysis covered the EU-15 countries, the new member states and in 
some cases other OECD countries, while some research efforts considered a global approach to 
policy-making.  
Altogether, the project’s output was 24 working papers for the 5 work packages and 5 seminars 
in addition to the final conference. The project delivered a large number of research insights on 
actual behaviour related to tax/benefit systems and reached conclusions that should be taken 
into account in policy-making and reforms to tax/benefit policies in the EU.  
                                                      
∗ Research Director at ETLA, the Research Institute of the Finnish Economy, Helsinki. For further details 
about the project, contact: Kari.Alho@etla.fi.   
Contents 
1. Executive  Summary............................................................................................................1 
1.1  Objectives of the project............................................................................................1 
1.2  Organisation of the project........................................................................................1 
1.3  Research output of the project...................................................................................2 
1.4  Concise summary of the scientific contributions.......................................................2 
1.5  Summary of the key policy findings..........................................................................3 
2.  Background and Objectives of the Project.......................................................................8 
2.1  Objectives..................................................................................................................8 
2.2  Organisation of the project......................................................................................12 
2.3  Overall output of the project....................................................................................12 
3.  Description of the Project Results...................................................................................12 
3.1  Tax/benefit systems and employment in the EU (WP 1).........................................12 
3.1.1 Summary of WP 1..........................................................................................12 
3.1.2 Summaries of the deliverables.......................................................................14 
3.2  The tax/benefit systems in the EU under tax competition (WP 2) ..........................25 
3.2.1  Summary of WP 2..........................................................................................25 
3.2.2  Summaries of the deliverables.......................................................................27 
3.3  Tax/benefit systems and the potential growth (productivity) of the EU (WP 3).....32 
3.3.1  Summary of WP 3..........................................................................................32 
3.3.2  Summary of the deliverables .........................................................................36 
3.4  Macroeconomics of the EU tax systems under EMU (WP 4).................................45 
3.4.1  Summary of WP 4..........................................................................................45 
3.4.2  Summary of the deliverables .........................................................................47 
3.5  Climate change policies and taxation – The abatement of global warming,  
the emissions trade and the need for European coordination (WP 5)......................56 
3.5.1  Summary of WP 5..........................................................................................56 
3.5.2  Summary of the deliverables .........................................................................58 
4.  Conclusions and Policy Implications ..............................................................................71 
5.  Dissemination of the Results............................................................................................75 
References..................................................................................................................................79 
Appendix 1. List of the Project Working Papers ...................................................................81 
Appendix 2. Status of the Agreed Deliverables ......................................................................83 | 1 
TAX/BENEFIT SYSTEMS AND  
GROWTH POTENTIAL OF THE EU 
ENEPRI Research Report No. 55/May 2008 
Kari E.O. Alho, Editor 
1. Executive  Summary 
1.1  Objectives of the project 
The overarching aim of the 26-month project “Tax/benefit systems and growth potential of the 
EU – TAXBEN” (SCS8-CT-2004-502639), financed by the European Commission under 
Framework 6 of Research, was to contribute, in line with the issues specified in SSP Priority 8, 
Topic 3.1, Task 4, to a better knowledge of the functioning and need for reform of the 
tax/benefit systems in the EU and thereby contribute to the Lisbon process. The project studied 
current problems related to the slow economic growth of the EU and the role of tax/benefit 
systems in this process. 
Among the specific goals of the project was to provide policy options to improve the potential 
growth of the EU and the attainment of high levels of employment, taking into account the 
challenges of enlargement and the EU’s environmental aspirations. The extensive use of 
numerical general equilibrium models and econometric estimations permitted the evaluation of 
the impact of various existing tax/benefit systems. Moreover, these approaches yielded 
knowledge about policy options, which was primarily quantitative but to some extent theoretical 
as well, and which should be useful in actual policy-making under different political constraints. 
The project had the objective of analysing five areas relevant to the tax/benefit systems in the 
EU: 
1)  the link between tax/benefit systems and employment; 
2)  the EU tax systems under tax competition and enlargement; 
3)  the growth potential of the EU and its relation to the tax/benefit systems; 
4)  the macroeconomic role of tax systems and promotion of reforms under the single 
monetary policy; and 
5)  the achievement of sustainable growth in conjunction with high environmental quality, 
and the role of green taxes and emissions trading in the energy sector. 
1.2  Organisation of the project  
The project was organised along this division of objectives into five work packages (WPs). The 
sixth WP consisted of project management, organising the final conference and drafting this 
final report.  
The project consortium was composed of the following organisations: the Centre for European 
Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels, as the coordinator; the Research Institute of the Finnish 
Economy (ETLA), Helsinki, as the scientific coordinator; the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et 
d’Information Internationales (CEPII), Paris; the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives d’Economie 
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Mathématique (CEPREMAP), Paris; the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 
(CPB), The Hague; the PRAXIS Centre for Policy Studies, Tallinn; and the Zentrum für 
Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW), Mannheim. 
1.3 Research  output  of the project 
The original plan of the project was to produce 16 working papers, and to organise 5 seminars 
and a final conference. During the work, the research effort widened such that altogether 24 
working papers were produced. The planned 5 seminars on the different WPs were held, as was 
the final conference. In addition, the project team held 3 workshops on the entire project. All the 
material was submitted to European Commission representatives. 
The deliverables were disseminated through website of the project (www.taxben.org), organised 
and managed by CEPS. The seminar material was also made available through this medium. 
Each partner institute further disseminated information on their work through their own national 
networks and websites.  
1.4  Concise summary of the scientific contributions  
The project achieved its goals using relevant existing methods and building new tools for 
quantitative economic analysis. Thus, while seeking to address important policy issues, the 
project added to the scientific arena as well. In general, the quantitative analysis of taxation can 
yield important insights for formulating policies. Computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
models have proven useful tools for policy analysis, when considered as such and when 
complemented with econometric evidence.  
In WP 1 on employment, two CGE models were built along similar lines for an EU-15 country 
(Finland) and a new member state (NMS) (Estonia). This approach enabled comparisons of the 
effectiveness of tax/benefit policies, and an evaluation of the role of labour market institutions 
(through wage formation) and their interaction with policies. An innovative model, based on 
search theory and linked to endogenous productivity as provided by on-the-job training, 
facilitated analysis of the effectiveness and extent of social welfare created by French labour 
market policies and their comparison with those in the UK.  
In WP 2 on tax competition and corporate taxation, a methodological contribution was made by 
the first use of an applied general equilibrium model to investigate tax base consolidation with 
formula apportionment in the EU.  
A scientific contribution was also made by building a multi-country tax model, which goes one 
step further than earlier literature in that notably the savings decision is derived from dynamic 
utility maximisation. Not only does this do justice to the inherently dynamic nature of saving, it 
also enriches the welfare analysis.  
The project additionally carried out a new econometric evaluation of intra-EU foreign direct 
investment (FDI), focusing on the comparison between old and new EU member states. 
In  WP 3 on EU convergence and productivity growth, an econometric evaluation was 
undertaken of the tax/benefit systems and their effects on EU convergence in terms of GDP per 
capita. The originality of the approach was to decompose GDP per capita into productivity and 
labour market factors.  
 TAX/BENEFIT SYSTEMS AND GROWTH POTENTIAL OF THE EU | 3 
The search model built in WP 3 on R&D activity and the labour market structure is a novel 
theoretical tool. The vector autoregressive model (VAR) modelling with the elaboration of taxes 
is an extension of the literature analysing the relationship between productivity and 
employment.  
In  WP 4 on the macroeconomics of the tax systems under economic and monetary union 
(EMU), a new form of theoretical modelling was carried out on tax policy under the single 
currency, and with respect to structural reforms in the EU. The extensive econometric evidence 
produced on the spillovers of fiscal policy under EMU is a further new contribution.  
In WP 5 on tax systems and climate policy designs, it proved useful to combine in a unique way 
various types of modelling approaches to tackle the long horizon of policies needed in the 
analysis of up to 100 years, and to be able to produce the sectoral breakdown of the optimal 
policies simultaneously.  
1.5  Summary of the key policy findings  
The orientation of the project was, in accordance with the research task specified in the 
concerned SSP priority, to produce policy-relevant research for the EU level and that of the 
member countries. Below are the key results and conclusions for policy. These are elaborated in 
more detail in the respective parts of section 3. 
WP 1 (Employment) 
1)  The CGE models that were built in the project imply that wage formation is essential in 
determining the outcome of the tax/benefit policies and their overall effectiveness. The 
apparent efficacy of certain policies reached under fixed wages may be quite misleading, 
because the ensuing reaction of wages may neutralise much of the positive policy effects. 
At the same time, there are also policy measures whose positive effects are strengthened 
by the reaction of wage formation. The former measures include those affecting labour 
demand, such as cutting the indirect labour costs of firms. The effects of measures of the 
latter type, which reduce wage claims, like benefit reductions, are magnified under 
bargaining while with fixed wages their positive effects are only marginal.  
2)  Under decentralised bargaining, wage–wage competition among trade unions may 
undermine efforts to reduce the non-wage labour costs of low-skilled workers. That being 
stated, under a nationwide income policy the effectiveness of this policy is restored. 
3)  CGE model analysis of different wage formations for the Estonian and Finnish economies 
(market-determined wages and bargained wages, respectively) implies that there is a need 
for different labour market and tax/benefit policies in different EU member states. A 
comparison of the policy scenarios for Estonia suggests that market-determined wages 
outperform bargained wages, with the latter representing the more common type of wage 
formation in the EU. Thus, it is not advisable for the NMS to adopt EU-15 approaches to 
their labour market policies.  
4)  The labour supply of low-skilled workers in the NMS under all types of wage formation is 
best increased by lowering the marginal income tax rate. Combining this step with 
strategies for improving employment in general, e.g. lowering employers’ social security 
contributions, could potentially improve the labour market position of those with lower 
skills.  
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5)  Statistical analysis reveals that the quantitative impact of tax/benefit systems on 
employment in the NMS is more vigorous than in the EU-15. 
6)  The French system of a minimum wage and payroll tax reductions for low-wage earners 
is near the social welfare optimum, if endogenous productivity related to on-the-job 
training is taken into account.  
7)  With its fixed benefits, the UK unemployment benefit system is preferable in terms of 
employment to the French and Continental systems, whose benefits are linked to prior 
income.  
WP 2 (Tax competition and corporate taxes)  
8)  CGE model analysis reveals that even a unilateral reduction of the corporate income tax 
rate is not beneficial for all EU countries if they have to finance the tax reduction through 
an increase in the tax rates on labour or consumption. The reduction in the corporate tax 
rate attracts FDI and foreign profits. But the increase in the taxes on labour or 
consumption dampens the impact on employment, GDP and welfare, and might even 
offset it. 
9)  Econometric analysis of FDI reveals that competition in social policies has a more 
powerful effect on FDI than tax competition. This conclusion is based on the observation 
that FDI depends more on differences in employment protection and union bargaining 
coverage than on differences in statutory or effective corporate tax rates.  
10)  The largest gains from a common, consolidated, corporate tax base (CCCTB) might be 
expected if all enterprises, domestic and multinational, are treated equally. Proposals for 
consolidation that exclude some of the firms, such as domestic ones, introduce uneven 
competition. This approach might induce extensive restructuring both within and among 
EU member states. 
11)  CGE model analysis underscores that the full benefits from tax base consolidation can 
only be reaped if all firms participate in a common tax base that applies to them all. If 
domestic firms are excluded, the EU average gains in terms of GDP and welfare from 
CCCTB equal respectively 0.08% and 0.03% of GDP in the long run, with the most 
favourable apportionment formula. The gains would be much larger, with additional gains 
for both GDP and welfare of about 0.10%, if not only multinational enterprises, but all 
firms were to participate. 
12)  Formula apportionment distorts the investment and labour demand behaviour of 
multinational enterprises. The incentives for reallocating production or the production 
factors are minimised if apportionment depends on the share of production by 
multinationals in each EU member country. The largest distortions are introduced if 
apportionment is based on a single production factor, for example employment or capital. 
13)  A CCCTB to which only multinationals may apply creates GDP and welfare gains in EU 
member states with a broad tax base, but harms countries with narrow bases. 
14)  The economic and welfare effects of a CCCTB are unevenly distributed. Simulation of 
the CCCTB, in which apportionment is based on employment, capital and production in 
equal proportions, gives the result that the change in welfare ranges from a reduction of 
0.4% of GDP to an increase of 0.6% of GDP. The change in GDP also ranges from a 
reduction to an increase, both of which are 0.7%. TAX/BENEFIT SYSTEMS AND GROWTH POTENTIAL OF THE EU | 5 
WP 3 (Productivity and catching up)  
15)  According to pooled panel data estimations and cross-country comparisons of the OECD 
countries, the growth rate of labour productivity has been affected positively by the 
following factors: higher fixed investment, lower inflation, higher R&D investment and 
ICT investment as a percentage of GDP, a higher share of young adults with at least upper 
secondary education, reduced product market regulation and increased exports. In most 
specifications, taxes and gross replacement rates have no statistically significant effect on 
productivity growth rates. We found a negative effect from taxes and a positive one from 
gross replacement rates when they appear together with fixed investment or inflation. 
Nevertheless, with this evidence we conclude that taxes and gross replacement rates are 
unlikely to have had an effect on productivity growth. 
16)  At the same time, the taxes-to-GDP ratio has had a significant negative effect on the 
number of hours worked by the working-age population. Furthermore, we find a negative 
correlation between the average number of hours worked, on the one hand, and product 
market regulation and gross replacement rates, on the other. Income inequality and trade 
union density do not correlate with the number of hours worked, but collective bargaining 
coverage has a negative correlation. There is also a negative correlation between the ratio 
of collective bargaining coverage and trade union density on one side, and the average 
number of hours worked, on the other.  
17)  Theoretical analysis shows that powerful trade unions or higher labour costs associated 
with increases in, e.g. unemployment compensation, the payroll taxes paid by employers, 
the taxes paid by workers or the cost of employment protection, cause more 
unemployment and a slowdown of economic growth. A coordinated bargaining process 
increases employment at the price of a lower growth rate.  
18)  These theoretical predictions are consistent with the empirical analysis on convergence 
using data on regions in the EU-15. The tax wedge and unemployment benefits are found 
to reduce the growth rate and increase the unemployment rate. Employment protection 
increases unemployment rates, without a significant effect on the growth rate of GDP per 
capita. The coordination of wage bargaining reduces the growth rate and the 
unemployment rate. The growth rate of total factor productivity (TFP) increases the 
growth of GDP per capita and decreases the unemployment rate.  
19)  Econometric evidence shows that the faster productivity growth rates in the new EU 
member states owe more to catching up from their lower initial levels of output per 
worker than to policy choices regarding the design of labour market institutions.  
20)  Theoretical modelling of an open economy shows that the equilibrium unemployment rate 
depends negatively on labour taxes, but not on the capital income tax, as a higher rate of it 
only leads to a lower level of productivity and income. On the other hand, a permanent 
change in labour taxes only has a long-term negative impact on employment, but not on 
productivity.  
21)  VAR analysis for the EU-15 shows that labour taxes have a marked and statistically 
significant negative effect on employment, while the effects of corporate taxes are more 
neutral with respect to productivity and employment. The results also show that in the 
short term there is a trade-off in the EU between the two key economic goals of 
productivity rises and employment. This tension is less severe in the long run, and while it 
does not fully disappear, over time it becomes statistically insignificant. By contrast, this 
trade-off does not hold for the US, where there is price flexibility. This situation calls for 
more flexibility in the EU labour markets to adjust smoothly to technological changes and 6 | TAXBEN 
possible negative supply shocks. Simulation of an econometric model for the Finnish 
labour market shows that in the medium term, there may be important employment gains 
from the acceleration of productivity, while in the long run there is no connection between 
them. 
WP 4 (Macroeconomics of tax systems)  
22)  Theoretical modelling of the EMU shows that if the economies are mainly hurt by 
demand shocks, then flatter tax systems tend to destabilise output whereas the indexation 
of taxes on prices tend to stabilise it. If the economies are mainly hurt by supply shocks, 
then the progressiveness of taxation has little impact on output stability. On the whole, the 
move towards flatter tax systems would likely lead to more unstable output in the euro 
area. 
23)  Given that i) the European Central Bank smoothes the interest rate, ii) net tax shocks do 
have supply-side effects, and iii) spending shocks may have a declining impact on 
aggregate demand owing to financial liberalisation, we conclude that the positive 
spillovers produced in the euro area today by public spending expansions may be 
decreasing compared with the past, while tax cuts may now be producing negative 
spillovers. 
24)  Estimation of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model shows that a positive 
spending shock in Germany has a positive, Keynesian impact on German GDP and a 
positive but small spillover on French GDP. A positive spending shock in France has 
symmetrical effects. Spillovers among EMU countries are small because of a significant 
reaction of the common interest rate to spending shocks in any of the countries. 
25)  VAR analysis of the EU countries shows that both the domestic and cross-border effects 
of German tax shocks have tended to weaken over time. Even so, they have remained 
positive, i.e. an expansionary shock in Germany has a positive impact on partner 
countries, especially neighbouring ones. The impact on the interest rate was found to be 
weak, however. In empirical research, tax shocks were found to be generally more 
effective in spurring domestic output than government spending shocks in the euro area. 
This result might stem from the fact that tax policies may give rise to potential growth in 
the long run, especially when distortionary taxes are removed, thus increasing economic 
efficiency and competitiveness. When the VAR estimation is performed recursively over 
samples of 17 years of data, it emerges that GDP multipliers drop drastically from the 
early 1990s onwards, especially in Germany (tax shocks) and in the US (both tax and 
government spending shocks). Furthermore, the conduct of fiscal policy seems to have 
become less erratic, as documented by a lower variance of fiscal shocks over time. Fiscal 
‘surprises’ – in the form of unexpected reductions in taxation and expansions in 
government consumption and investment – have become progressively less successful in 
stimulating economic activity at the domestic level. This finding indicates that in the 
framework of the EMU, policy-makers can only marginally rely on these discretionary 
instruments as a substitute for national monetary policy.  
26)  Political myopia has a negative impact on the willingness to reduce labour taxes, and the 
stability and growth pact (SGP) reinforces this pattern since excessive deficits lead to 
sanctions. Political myopia also reduces the willingness to reduce the welfare state, but 
this time the SGP has a positive impact on the willingness to reform. Myopia has little 
impact on the readiness of governments to reform labour and goods markets, but the SGP 
produces the missing incentive. Given that all reforms but those to the goods markets 
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coordinate product market reforms but leave the reforms of the welfare state and of the 
labour markets to peer pressure, with the SGP acting as a positive catalyst.  
WP 5 (Climate change and energy taxation) 
27)  An extension of the Californian initiative of curbing emissions to the whole of the US 
shows that the US would tend to gain from free permit trading with the EU.  
28)  Implicit in the policy goal to limit the rise in temperature to 2°C up to 2100 is that delayed 
action may induce large excess costs of transitional climate policies and the burden-
sharing debate may become substantially more critical over time owing to ‘foregone 
action’. 
29)  In global climate change policies, there is a non-negligible trade-off between limited and 
global coverage from a perspective of 20 core countries taking the lead in moving forward 
with stringent, unilateral emissions-reduction commitments, if the leadership is assumed 
to last forever. If, however, leadership is restricted to a transitional phase – until 2030 – 
the welfare implications might be reduced substantially. 
30)  Using two large-scale models of the global economy in combination shows that in an 
optimal emissions policy over the next 100 years, developing countries reduce their 
emissions considerably more than industrialised countries do. This result is mainly driven 
by the share of coal in the baseline fuel-use mix. The reduction in production differs 
between sectors, with a similar pattern in all regions. Plausibly, the fossil fuel sectors are 
most affected, whereas the non-energy sectors hardly decline at all. 
31)  A unilateral energy tax will not affect EU-wide emissions and always increases abatement 
costs in general, but especially in the country that introduces the tax; thus, it cannot be 
justified from the view of climate change policy. The implication of the analysis is that 
existing energy taxes for installations covered by the EU emissions trading system are 
better removed from the standpoint of abatement efficiency. 
32)  The conversion of existing energy taxes to uniform carbon taxes is a powerful instrument 
in terms of both emissions reduction and economic welfare relative to cap-and-trade. The 
position of the NMS deserves special attention when considering changes to energy taxes. 
Existing energy taxes are highly distortionary, but by the same token, new arrangements 
may provide potentially very powerful instruments within the context of climate change 
policies. 
33)  Revenue recycling is beneficial relative to recycling in a lump-sum fashion. There is 
accordingly a double dividend in climate policies.  
34)  In the endogenous technology case, R&D on less-polluting energy technologies is 
fostered by high permit prices, but it nonetheless requires a large initial subsidy for 
technology. Carbon leakage may entail a substantial extra cost to the EU in terms of 
economic growth. 
Further details on the output of the project, the seminars organised and the related material, 
along with the participants of the research consortium can be found on the project website 
(www.taxben.org) and the website of the ENEPRI network (www.enepri.org). 8 | TAXBEN 
2.  Background and Objectives of the Project 
The overarching aim of the 26-month project “Tax/benefit systems and growth potential of the 
EU – TAXBEN” (SCS8-CT-2004-502639), financed by the European Commission under 
Framework 6 of Research, was to contribute, in line with the issues specified in SSP Priority 8, 
Topic 3.1, Task 4, to a better knowledge of the functioning and need for reform of the 
tax/benefit systems in the EU and thereby contribute to the Lisbon process. The project studied 
current problems related to the slow economic growth of the EU and the role of tax/benefit 
systems in this process. 
2.1 Objectives   
Among the specific goals of the project was to provide policy options to improve the potential 
growth of the EU and the attainment of high levels of employment, taking into account the 
challenges of enlargement and the EU’s environmental aspirations. The extensive use of 
numerical general equilibrium models and econometric estimations permitted the evaluation of 
the impact of various existing tax/benefit systems. Moreover, these approaches yielded 
knowledge about policy options, which is primarily quantitative but to some extent theoretical 
as well, and which should be useful in actual policy-making under different political constraints. 
The project had the objective of analysing five areas relevant to the tax/benefit systems in the 
EU: 
1)  the link between tax/benefit systems and employment; 
2)  the EU tax systems under tax competition and enlargement; 
3)  the growth potential of the EU and its relation to the tax/benefit systems; 
4)  the macroeconomic role of tax systems and promotion of reforms under the single 
monetary policy; and 
5)  the achievement of sustainable growth in conjunction with high environmental quality, 
and the role of green taxes and emissions trading in the energy sector. 
The project was organised along this division of objectives into five work packages (WPs). The 
sixth WP consisted of project management, organising the final conference and drafting this 
final report.  
In WP 1, the objective was to consider tax/benefit systems and the functioning of EU labour 
markets using several novel approaches. First, two similar, numerical, general equilibrium 
models of the labour market were built that distinguish among workers with various skill levels, 
working as distinctive and cooperative labour inputs from the firms’ standpoint, as well as 
together with capital stock. We separated two situations: wage formation and the fixation of 
relative wages in a monopolistic labour market and wage formation in a fully decentralised 
labour market. We then contrasted the results concerning reforms of tax/benefit systems, as to 
their extent and distribution, in these two cases from the viewpoint of employment and the 
equality of the income distribution. We were thus able to analyse the magnitude of the 
consequent wage and non-wage labour cost adjustment and the interaction and trade-off 
between reforms of the tax/benefit system, on the one hand, and wage flexibility in the labour 
market, on the other. We adapted the model to an EU-15 country (Finland) and a new member 
state (NMS) (Estonia) to enable us to determine the optimal course of reform in tax/benefit 
systems. There was also an objective to combine some information on small and medium-sized 
enterprises into this analysis. Yet, this aspect was found to be outside the core line of the TAX/BENEFIT SYSTEMS AND GROWTH POTENTIAL OF THE EU | 9 
approach – firms were not divided into several sectors or firm size categories owing to the 
extensive modelling work already adopted. Nor was this aspect considered vital to the policy 
conclusions.  
A further objective was to analyse the basic role of investment in firm-specific skills and its 
relation to the labour market policies. The goal was to build a numerical equilibrium model 
where wage, productivity and unemployment were endogenous. 
In addition, the project sought to consider whether the EU accession countries should adopt 
similar kinds of tax/benefit systems as those presently operating in EU-15 countries. We gave 
an overview of the current situation and trends in the NMS, identifying the main differences 
with the systems in place in the old member countries of the EU.  
WP 2 had two related objectives. First, a gravity approach was applied to foreign direct 
investment (FDI), using as key explanatory variables the unit labour cost and indicators of 
corporate taxation. The goal was to provide quantitative insights on the scope for tax 
competition and tax harmonisation. The analysis relied on econometric estimations of the semi-
elasticity of bilateral FDI flows to various measures of tax differentials and labour market 
institutions. It was subsequently possible to provide equivalencies between tax differentials, 
differences in unit labour costs (including labour taxes) and distances to the centre of the EU. 
The recent evolution of corporate taxation in the EU as well as the existing level of taxes in new 
member countries was further evaluated from this perspective. Finally, several scenarios of tax 
coordination were studied, following the developments of EU discussions on this issue. 
Second, we sought to develop a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for the EU to 
describe the allocation of international capital flows. This was combined with information about 
institutional details on European tax systems. The model was used to explore the economic 
implications of i) competition and harmonisation in EU corporate income tax rates and ii) 
reforms of tax bases in the EU. We included some of the new member countries in our model. 
In calibrating the model, we could make use of the empirical information from the first leg of 
this part of the project. We considered in this connection a reform that shifts the tax burden 
from corporate to energy taxation, which highlights an important relationship between this part 
of the project and WP 5 on environmental policies. 
In WP 3, the goal was to contribute to the Lisbon process by evaluating the various types of 
tax/benefit systems and EU convergence (or the lack of it) with respect to the US and the 
operation of the labour market. We used, inter alia, the identity decomposing the growth of per 
capita incomes into changes in productivity, hours worked, unemployment, participation and 
age structure. We tried to discern the quantitative effects of reforms to tax/benefit systems, 
ranging from reduced unemployment and enhanced total factor productivity (TFP) growth, to 
acceleration in the catching-up of the EU. We also considered the role of labour institutions in 
the NMS with regard to their convergence on the EU. As high rates of unemployment prevail in 
many of the NMS, this issue is also highly relevant in their convergence towards the EU-15 in 
terms of income levels, and tackling it is essential for future EU coherence.  
The second approach used here to evaluate the quantitative effects of labour market policies – 
especially changes in the tax/benefit systems – on the growth potential of the EU involved using 
VAR models and an econometric model of the labour market. In this context, we simulated the 
effects of an acceleration of productivity growth in the EU on the unemployment rate. Our 
intention was to analyse this reaction using a model built to derive an estimate of the 
equilibrium rate of unemployment in the case of Finland, but the overall pattern should emerge 
in other EU countries as well. All these analyses reinforced the link between WP 1 and WP 3. 
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In WP 4, we strived to obtain a coherent view of reforms to tax systems and macroeconomic 
balance in the EU. We started from the essential dual role of taxes, i.e. that of a demand factor 
and a supply factor through, inter alia, wage-setting. We considered the working of the 
economic and monetary union (EMU) against this background of reforming EU tax policies. 
We also considered the coordination of structural policies aimed at increasing the supply and 
growth potential of the EU in combination with the spur in this direction from the single 
monetary policy, under the constraints of the stability and growth pact (SGP). The purpose was 
to describe the spillovers of fiscal policies within the EMU. The various types of spillovers 
(through trade, imported inflation, monetary policy and FDI) were integrated in a simple, 
theoretical model. Econometric estimations were performed to try to figure out the sign of the 
overall spillovers. 
We also sought to analyse the coordination of structural policies in the EU with the aid of a 
theoretical model. In a third step, vector autoregression (VAR) models were estimated for the 
key euro member countries with four endogenous variables: output growth and inflation in the 
specific country, and eurozone-wide growth and inflation. It was subsequently possible to look 
at the cross-over effects of tax cuts and spending rises among euro countries. 
Finally, we had thought to supplement the results of the theoretical model and the econometric 
analysis with a survey of the existing research on the effects of fiscal and structural policies in 
the EMU countries, paying attention to both country and cross-country effects. The survey was 
to concentrate on the results of large multi-country macro-econometric models and as such 
would have been a natural complement to the theoretical and empirical contribution of the three 
preceding steps. But owing to the current reduced role of existing large-scale econometric 
models in policy analysis, a decision was taken to substitute this effort with the construction of a 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model for the euro area and to estimate it to determine 
the spillovers of fiscal policies and the single monetary policy between Germany and France.  
In WP 5, the intention was to investigate the impacts of alternative climate change policies, 
with an emphasis on current practices of energy taxation in EU member states. The goals were 
to analyse the optimal timing of the abatement of global warming, to assess the post-Kyoto 
policy options and to analyse the scope of emissions trading in the EU vis-à-vis existing energy 
taxes. The analysis compared the economic and environmental effects of different 
environmental instruments and explicitly addressed the revenue raising and revenue recycling 
aspects of climate change policies.  
An integrated assessment model (PACE-IAM) was used to determine optimal responses to 
exogenous long-term targets for temperature (or likewise atmospheric concentrations of 
greenhouse gases). The integrated assessment model combines an intertemporal multi-sector, 
multi-region CGE model of global trade and energy use with a reduced form description of the 
climate system. In order to cope with computational constraints and data limitations (in 
particular with respect to long-term country-specific projections of economic growth and energy 
use), PACE-IAM is aggregated to a few world regions and energy-intensive sectors that are key 
to the greenhouse gas problem. To gain insights that are more detailed on the adjustment 
process triggered by long-term climate policies, the policy (design) output of the intertemporal 
PACE-IAM model as an exogenous input was linked to the more disaggregated dynamic-
recursive WorldScan CGE model. The combination of both models enabled information to be 
gathered for EU policy-makers on the economic implications of climate policies at a sufficiently 
detailed level while keeping an overall coherent view of long-term and cost-effective climate 
policy design. In addition, the combined model system can be used in a ‘pure’ simulation setting 
in which the climate sub-module simply accounts for the climate impacts of exogenous climate-
change mitigation strategies. Thus, various climate policy proposals could be benchmarked   
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against a cost-efficient strategy. The project also sought to carry out a concise analysis using an 
aggregative production function to demonstrate the link between economic growth and climate 
policies.  
The interdependencies of the project are depicted in Figure 1.  
Figure 1. Project interdependencies 
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2.2  Organisation of the project  
The project consortium was composed of the following organisations: the Centre for European 
Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels, as the coordinator; the Research Institute of the Finnish 
Economy (ETLA), Helsinki, as the scientific coordinator; the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et 
d’Information Internationales (CEPII), Paris; the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives d’Economie 
Mathématique (CEPREMAP), Paris; the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 
(CPB), The Hague; the PRAXIS Centre for Policy Studies, Tallinn; and the Zentrum für 
Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW), Mannheim. 
The Coordinator of the project was Daniel Gros, Director of CEPS, and the Scientific 
Coordinator was Kari E.O. Alho, Research Director at ETLA. The work package leaders were 
Kari E.O. Alho, ETLA for WP 1 (employment), Albert van der Horst, Research Fellow at 
CPB, for WP 2 (tax competition), François Langot, Research Fellow at CEPREMAP, for WP 3 
(productivity), Agnès Bénassy-Quéré, Director of CEPII, for WP 4 (macroeconomics of tax 
systems) and Paul J.J. Veenendaal, Programme Leader at CPB, for WP 5 (environment). The 
Steering Committee of the project consisted of the above persons, along with Christoph 
Böhringer, Professor at ZEW and Sten Anspal, Research Fellow at PRAXIS. Administration 
was taken care of by Sally Scott, Head of Finance and Administration at CEPS, and Olivier 
Millard from October 2006 onwards.  
The Scientific Officer for the project at the European Commission was Dr Ian Perry, Principal 
Administrator at DG Research. The key Commission representative who closely followed and 
commented upon the work was Katri Kosonen, Principal Administrator at  DG Taxud. In 
addition, at various stages the representatives of these and other Commission DGs, i.e. DG 
ECFIN and DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, commented on the work 
performed and scheduled in the project.  
2.3  Overall output of the project  
The original plan of the project was to produce 16 working papers, and to organise 5 seminars 
and a final conference. During the work, the research effort widened so that altogether 24 
working papers were produced (see appendix 1). The planned 5 seminars on the different WPs 
were held (see section 5 below). All the material was submitted to Commission representatives 
and disseminated through the website of the project (see section 5). The number of working 
papers that were produced within each of the WPs is indicated below in connection with the 
presentation of the respective WP.  
In addition to the seminars for each of the WPs, a kick-off meeting and 2 joint workshops for 
the entire project were held. The final conference was held in Brussels on 27 November 2006 
(see section 5).  
3.  Description of the Project Results 
3.1  Tax/benefit systems and employment in the EU (WP 1) 
3.1.1 Summary of WP 1 
Introduction  
Against a background of globalisation and population ageing, a key target of the EU is to reach 
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unemployment and inactivity. Other targets are to enhance job quality, productivity, and social 
and territorial cohesion. There have been positive trends in the EU labour market such that 
employment has risen, as has productivity, and in the current revival the rate of unemployment 
has gone down. Yet, there is still some way to go towards a satisfactory balance, with room for 
further policy interventions at the EU and national levels to improve the functioning of the EU 
labour markets.  
The bulk of the approaches of TAXBEN in WP 1 concern the functioning of the labour market. 
The EU and the OECD want to encourage the social partners to set the right framework for 
wage bargaining in order to reflect productivity and labour market challenges. The member 
countries are advised to review the impact of non-wage labour costs and to reduce the burden 
associated with low-paid workers. The goals are to make the labour market more flexible, to 
make work pay by using in-work benefits and to reduce non-wage labour costs, especially for 
low-wage earners. 
Policy interventions have recently focused more on taxation than on benefits, while some 
changes have targeted labour market institutions to make them more decentralised. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that social benefits contribute more to redistribution than taxes 
do. One key task of policy is to consider them jointly.  
Research tasks 
In WP 1, the TAXBEN project adopted three broad research tasks: 
i)  to identify the interaction between the labour market institutions with respect to wage 
formation and the tax/benefit system, in order to help assess the effectiveness of labour 
market and economic policies; 
ii)  to determine the interaction between endogenous productivity (through on-the-job 
training) and labour market policies related to minimum wage and payroll taxes; and 
iii)  to evaluate the impact of tax/benefit policies on employment, especially in the NMS. 
The second task (ii) is closely linked to the research carried out in WP 3.  
Methodological approaches used 
The methodological approaches used in the five papers under this work package can be divided 
into three methods. First, to shed light on task (i), CGE models were built for the Finnish and 
Estonian labour markets, based to some extent on a similar idea and approach, but with some 
modifications and differences. The models also have broader EU relevance, as they enable the 
evaluation of several kinds of institutional settings in terms of wage formation and observation 
of their interaction with policies. 
Both models place workers into three categories based on their level of educational attainment: 
basic, secondary and tertiary. The wage formation hypotheses analysed are fixed real wages, 
market-determined wages with a fixed unemployment rate, and wage bargaining (at either a 
union or national level), with the latter also being called an ‘income policy’. The Finnish model 
in addition draws a line between the short and long term, identifying these alternatives in such a 
way that the short term – or rather, medium term – is determined by a fixed capital stock, while 
the long term is determined by endogenous capital stock, taken from a given (international) 
required rate of return on capital.  
The second approach in task (ii) built a search-theoretical model identifying the search among 
three labour market positions – employment, short-term and long-term unemployment – and 
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through on-the-job training, so that the training decisions made by firms are negatively based on 
the turnover of labour. A firm has a low incentive to train an employee if there is a high risk that 
s/he will leave the firm. Thus, the analysis tackled the question of the impact of labour market 
policies with respect to minimum wage and targeted, indirect labour-cost reductions in the 
French labour market, which extended to a comparison with the UK’s labour market and 
policies.  
The third methodological approach in (iii) involved building an econometric model for the 
labour market performance of the NMS and contrasting the performance with that of the EU-15. 
Key results and policy conclusions  
The CGE models for Finland and Estonia in broad terms confirm the hypothesis specified at the 
outset that there is an important interaction between wage formation and the impacts and 
effectiveness of tax/benefit policies. The results are also dependent on the time span. It may be 
that some policies will lose and some gain in effectiveness over time.  
The study concludes that with respect to wage bargaining, measures (that apply asymmetric 
treatment of various groups in the labour market such as low-skilled workers and others) can 
completely lose their effectiveness owing to wage–wage competition links. On the other hand, 
under bargaining the curtailment of benefit levels may produce incentives for labour supply and 
labour demand, such that labour supply rises simultaneously with a fall in the unemployment 
rate.  
Based on the French search model for the labour market, the analysis concludes that labour 
market policy may have important repercussions through endogenous productivity. The 
structure of benefit systems, whether linked to past income or a fixed sum independent of past 
income, can also have significant implications for the labour market. When endogenous 
productivity is taken into account, the current French employment policy of minimum wages 
and payroll tax relief for low-skilled workers is quite near the social optimum.  
The EU should pay attention to the interaction between tax and benefit policies so that 
contradictory policies are not carried out in the sense that policy measures in one domain 
neutralise those in the other. Furthermore, in the NMS, the tax/benefit systems have a greater 
impact in quantitative terms on employment than in the EU-15. The study concludes that the 
NMS of the EU should not follow the pattern of the majority of the EU-15 in adopting more 
monopolistic labour market institutions.  
3.1.2  Summaries of the deliverables 
Altogether, five working papers were prepared in this WP. 
3.1.2.1  Labour Market Institutions and the Effectiveness of Tax and Benefit Policies in 
Enhancing Employment: A General Equilibrium Analysis 
  Author: Kari E.O. Alho (ETLA) (Deliverable No. 4) 
Introduction 
Taxes and benefits are key policy instruments that affect the functioning of the labour market 
and employment. Thus, these and other instruments of economic and labour market policies 
should be analysed in conjunction with wage formation, the role of which is often neglected 
when considering policies affecting the demand or supply side of the labour market, despite the 
potentially large impact wage formation can have on the effects of these policies. Although 
Finland has been able to markedly improve the imbalance in its labour market since the deep 
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room for adjustment and further policy measures. There are wide and persistent differences in 
the balance in terms of employment of the various skill categories, not only in Finland, but also 
in other EU countries as well.  
Research task 
In this paper, we distinguish among four types of wage formation to shed light on its role in the 
effectiveness of diverse policies for enhancing employment. The first type assumes fixed wages. 
The second assumes market-determined wage formation, where wages correspond to the 
marginal revenue product of labour at the given level of unemployment. The third type assumes 
wage bargaining, where wages are negotiated between the employer and employee trade union 
organisations in an uncoordinated way. The fourth type is that of coordinated wage bargaining 
under a nationwide income policy. The second type, i.e. market-based wages, allows us to 
consider the hypothetical case of a fully flexible labour market and contrast this with the effects 
of various labour market policies. The CGE model built in this study is static, but also makes a 
distinction between short- and long-term equilibria in the labour market, so that in the long term 
the capital stock of firms changes in response to shifts in profitability in the short term. This 
also gives us an estimate of the change in the equilibrium rate of unemployment.  
The motivation behind this extensive modelling is that we wanted to shed light on the 
relationship between policies and the wage formation structures, which, to our knowledge, has 
not yet been studied so thoroughly. In this way, the paper strives to be of wider relevance given 
that EU countries differ in their labour market institutions and wage formation, and the current 
intensive debate in the EU about how to reform the tax/benefit systems and improve labour 
market functioning in order to enhance employment.  
Methodological approach used 
To obtain empirical results, an aggregative, numerical general equilibrium model is constructed 
for the Finnish economy. The approach taken here is to use this single-country model to 
illuminate the effects of policies and how these effects depend on the various possible labour 
market institutions. Of course, data limitations and differences – for example, in tax and benefit 
structures among the EU countries – also justify this kind of approach.  
We distinguish among workers with varying skill levels because they have a different position 
in the labour market and they may be differently affected by a variety of policies. The model 
comprises blocks for labour demand and labour supply, in combination with job flows for the 
recruitment of new workers, assorted approaches to wage formation and a goods market with 
aggregate production. We also identify the key government policy instruments affecting the 
economy and the labour market and the government budget constraint.  
Our model has some features similar to the CGE model of the Dutch labour market by 
Bovenberg et al. (2000), but other elements are quite different. The latter are basically related to 
the importance given to the various assumptions about wage formation and the cooperative 
structure of production combining the different components of labour, allowing for the case of 
subsidised labour recruited under an employment support scheme and the specification adopted 
on how to combine the job flow market with recruitment costs in the model. In the spirit of the 
recent literature on behavioural economics, under bargaining we introduce the wage–wage links 
between the worker categories in such a way that the marginal utility of a trade union also 
depends on the relative wage in relation to that of the other unions.  
We analyse several policy measures, such as reductions in average and marginal income taxes, 
in the indirect labour costs of firms (both uniform and those solely targeted at low-skilled   
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employees) and in unemployment benefits, along with an increase in the employment subsidy 
scheme – all of which, in principle, boost the economy. The ex ante size of the measures is 
0.5% of GDP.  
Key results and policy conclusions 
Wage formation is found to be essential in determining the outcome of tax/benefit policies and 
their overall effectiveness. The apparent effectiveness of certain policies attained under fixed 
wages may be quite misleading, because the ensuing reaction of wages may neutralise much of 
the positive impact of the policies. Yet, there are also policy measures whose positive impacts 
are strengthened by the reaction of wage formation. These measures include those affecting 
labour demand, such as cutting the indirect labour costs of firms. The effects of such measures 
(which reduce wage claims directly or indirectly) are magnified by wage reactions, however, 
while with fixed wages their positive effects are only marginal.  
Among the more specific results, the role of tax policies is problematic under wage bargaining. 
Typically, a reduction of marginal tax rates does not work in a satisfactory manner, as it will 
lead to a rise in wage claims by the labour unions. Under wage bargaining, the tax reduction 
should be targeted at low-income earners. Still, the interaction between a reform aimed at a 
more competitive labour market and tax policy leads to another kind of result. In a flexible 
labour market, the incentives to work created by a reduction of the marginal tax rates, as 
channelled to in-work labour perform best. The situation surrounding the wage negotiations, 
such as the intensity of wage–wage competition among the trade unions, also plays a key role 
with respect to the outcome of some policies. This is especially so if the policy concerned 
affects the negotiation positions of the various worker groups in an asymmetric way, as does a 
lowering of the indirect labour costs of firms targeted at only one group of workers. On the 
other hand, the role of benefit policies merits more attention than perhaps that of tax policies 
because, under bargaining, a very clear expansion in the economy occurs if benefit levels are 
curtailed. Of course, this is quite a harsh policy in social terms. But, combined with tax 
reductions, the policy tool is effective under bargaining and it is more neutral in terms of its 
social consequences. 
Overall, we have found that wage formation has a strong impact on the outcomes of various 
policies aimed at enhancing employment. The case of fixed wages and those instances in which 
wages react to policies yield the most contrasting results. In some cases, the expansionary effect 
on the economy and employment can be even stronger under wage bargaining than under 
market-determined wages, which is important with respect to policy-making in a European 
context and to consideration of labour market institutions.  
The diverse wage reactions and their relationship with the effects of policies should be 
recognised when planning actual policies, e.g. by taking into account that policies may have 
quite different outcomes depending on the labour market institutions and the respective type of 
wage formation prevailing in the EU country. The other angle is that the reactions of wages are 
also different over time, and thus cause variations in the results of economic policies during the 
course of that time. 
As expected, a lowering of firms’ indirect labour costs is not effective under flexible wages. In 
many instances, the effects of policies achieved under fixed wages in directly enhancing labour 
demand are fully neutralised through wage changes over time. One conclusion from the results 
concerning policies seeking to boost labour demand is that, when formulating them, the short-
term gains in employment reached under fixed wages have to be weighed against the long-term 
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As is plausible in connection with the tool built here, policies that boost the supply side of the 
labour market, including wage moderation stemming from these measures, work better and the 
activity of the economy will expand as a result of them. The welfare system, described here by 
the size of the replacement rate, seems to play a rather substantial role in labour market 
outcomes. On the other hand, it is also important to note that these measures lead to a large 
enough degree of wage moderation that the economy and employment expand to an extent that 
the increase in labour supply (induced by changes in incentives) could be absorbed, and thus 
there could be a fall in the unemployment rate, too.  
Wage bargaining turns out to yield quite small impacts – and not always as positive – which is 
notably the case with respect to lowering the marginal tax rates. Nevertheless, centralised 
bargaining could deliver a positive result with respect to the unemployment rate of the targeted 
group of workers, when their indirect labour costs are reduced, which uncoordinated bargaining 
cannot do. It is, of course, a totally different matter whether it is at all likely that a centralised 
wage agreement can be reached in such a situation, where the labour market partners are treated 
in such a mutually asymmetric way by economic policies.  
The best policy is to liberalise wage formation, although it polarises society. We suggest that 
under bargaining there should be a combination of tax policies, namely that of reducing average 
taxes while at the same time curtailing social security benefits by an equivalent amount, which 
is an effective policy under a bargained labour market structure. The results call for the 
coordination of measures in tax and benefit policies, so that incentives to seek employment and 
to stay out of work are not simultaneously generated. 
3.1.2.2  A Comparative General Equilibrium Analysis of the Estonian Labour Market 
  Authors: Alari Paulus, Andres Võrk (PRAXIS) and Kari E.O. Alho (ETLA) 
(Deliverable No. 7B) 
Introduction 
The EU member countries are increasingly concerned about their competitiveness in the global 
market. One of the central issues is related to the functioning of the labour market and social 
protection systems. In comparisons of the US and the EU labour markets, the latter has been 
considered more regulated and rigid, which again has been associated with higher 
unemployment rates. On the other hand, labour in Europe enjoys higher social protection 
standards.  
Under the pressure of global processes, current trends are towards adjustments in tax/benefit 
systems that could increase work incentives and improve the flexibility of the labour market 
without scaling back social protection too much (Carone and Salomäki, 2001). Also, the re-
launched Lisbon strategy and the underpinning integrated guidelines advocate more 
employment-friendly tax/benefit systems. 
The enlargement of the EU in 2004 introduced new member countries, which, having relatively 
decentralised labour markets, also contrast with the EU-15 countries. There are some concerns 
that this could lead to social dumping. In this context, the NMS have a dilemma as to which 
way to proceed – continuing the market-oriented flexible approach or shifting to a more 
centralised bargaining and protective system. There is some empirical evidence that a bell-
shaped relationship exists between the centralisation of wage bargaining and the unemployment 
level (Calmfors and Driffill, 1988), possibly making the choice of an intermediate position 
between the polar cases relatively unfavourable.  
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Research task 
In this paper, we take Estonia as one example of the new EU member states and try to answer 
whether it would be beneficial to implement a tax/benefit system more akin to those found in 
the old EU countries. Estonia is a small open economy conducting a liberal economic and tax 
policy. Recent and current tax/benefit reforms aimed at lowering the income tax burden and at 
increasing unemployment and subsistence benefits represent a good opportunity to model the 
outcome under various wage formation hypotheses.  
Methodological approach used 
We adopt a CGE model initially developed for the Finnish economy as part of the TAXBEN 
project (see Alho, 2006), but with elements from the models of Bovenberg et al. (2000) for the 
Dutch economy and Hinnosaar (2004a and 2004b) for the Estonian economy. 
The main features of the model are as follows. There are two production factors, capital and 
labour, with the latter divided further into three skill groups based on educational attainment. 
Firms are symmetric and produce one homogeneous good. The goods market is characterised by 
monopolistic competition, implying positive profits for firms. The foreign sector is not 
explicitly modelled, domestic firms compete with foreign firms in the international market and 
it is assumed that the domestic price level of goods equals the international price level. 
Households earn labour income, receive distributed profits and unemployment benefits. Their 
utility depends on leisure, private consumption (on which all the income is spent) and public 
consumption. The government has a passive role of spending all tax income on unemployment 
benefits and public consumption. Tax revenue is generated by income taxes on labour and 
capital along with employers’ social security contributions. 
Three different structures of wage formation are modelled. The first is fixed wages, which in the 
case of a tax/benefit policy change would reflect the first reaction in the (very) short run. The 
second is market-determined wages, which may correspond to the Estonian case under current 
circumstances in the medium term. (We do not consider the long run, as capital is held fixed.) 
The third is wage bargaining by each skill group, representing a more EU-oriented hypothetical 
case. 
Overall, labour supply and wage bargaining are modelled in the manner of Bovenberg et al. 
(2000) and Hinnosaar (2004a and 2004b), while the production side and other wage formation 
schemes (fixed and market-determined) are modelled as in Alho (2006). 
The general equilibrium effects of the Estonian tax/benefit system have not been extensively 
researched. To our knowledge, there are no previous studies apart from Hinnosaar (2004a and 
2004b). Compared with the latter, we consider several alternative wage formation systems. We 
also introduce capital as a production factor, although fixed, and employ data that are more 
recent. Additionally, having available a similar model to the Finnish case allows us to compare 
tax/benefit effects on employment in an old and a new member state, where the coverage of 
wage bargaining differs notably: 90% and 20-30%, respectively, in 2003 (European Industrial 
Relations Observatory, 2005). Modelling several skill groups also enables us to separately 
analyse the situation of low-skilled labour, whose employment rate is particularly low. 
Key results and policy conclusions  
There are four policy scenarios evaluated under all three wage systems, altogether up to nine 
different simulations. The following policy changes are considered: 1) lowering the marginal 
income tax rate, 2) increasing the income tax allowance, 3) lowering employers’ social security 
contributions, and 4) increasing the replacement rate. All policy simulations are financed by an 
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The policy simulations considered show that alternative ways to affect the labour market can 
lead to very different outcomes, e.g. on labour supply and unemployment. An initial 
improvement in terms of households’ disposable income might even turn out to be welfare-
reducing in the new equilibrium. The effects of policy changes also vary under different wage 
formation schemes – lowering the marginal income tax rate is for example most effective in 
enhancing private consumption and social welfare under market-determined wages, while a 
reduction in the social tax rate works most successfully under fixed wages. A combination of 
cutting the marginal income tax rate and increasing tax allowances (essentially the 2005 tax 
reform in Estonia) has the potential to increase production and social welfare without increasing 
unemployment rates under market-determined wages. 
Assuming that different wage formations are relevant for Estonian and Finnish economies 
(market-determined wages and bargained wages, respectively), we can stress the need for 
different labour market and tax/benefit policies in different EU member states. Comparing the 
policy scenarios for Estonia under market-determined wages and wage bargaining implies that 
market-determined wages outperform bargained wages, with the latter more closely 
representing the type of wage formation predominant in the EU-15.  
Although no policy scenarios targeted at specific skill groups were carried out, some 
implications could be still noted. The labour supply of the low-skilled is most effectively 
increased by lowering the marginal income tax rate, which is valid under every wage scheme. 
Combining this in turn with strategies to improve employment in general, e.g. reducing 
employers’ social security contributions, could potentially enhance the labour market position 
of those with lower skills. 
3.1.2.3  A Quantitative Evaluation of Payroll Tax Subsidies: A Structural Approach, a 
Reform of the French Tax/Benefit System 
Authors: Arnaud Chéron (PSE-Jourdan, Cepremap and GAINS (Université du 
Maine)), Jean-Olivier Hairault (Cepremap, EUREQua (Université de Paris 1), IUF 
and IZA) and François Langot (PSE-Jourdan, Cepremap and GAINS (Université 
du Maine)) (Deliverable No. 6A)
1 
Introduction 
High labour costs are typically considered the primary cause of high unemployment levels in 
Continental European countries (see Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000). During the 1990s, these 
countries used a large set of policy tools to decrease the unemployment rate, in particular that 
for low-skilled workers. France experimented with an original strategy that consisted of a high 
minimum-wage level compensated by large and permanent payroll tax subsidies for low-wage 
employment. 
Research on the French labour market has extensively pointed out the negative role played by 
the minimum wage legislation in increasing labour costs. In the mid-1990s, the introduction of 
payroll tax subsidies for low-wage workers was meant to compensate for the negative impact of 
the minimum wage on employment without exacerbating wage inequality. The policy is 
specifically designed to avoid a significant job reallocation towards poorly paid jobs. Subsidies 
are not concentrated at the minimum wage level and, instead, consist of a maximum reduction 
of 18.2 points at the minimum wage level and a decreasing reduction in payroll taxes of up to 
1.33 times the minimum wage. Several econometric papers have already highlighted the 
                                                      
1 This paper has been accepted for publication in the Journal of Public Economics in 2008 under the title 
“A Quantitative Evaluation of Payroll Tax Subsidies for Low-Wage Workers: An Equilibrium Search 
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positive impact of this policy on employment. Malinvaud (1998), however, underscores a 
potential negative impact on productivity, owing to a bias in job creation at the bottom of the 
wage distribution. When the wage distribution is strongly interrelated with the productivity 
distribution, payroll tax subsidies that are concentrated at the bottom of the wage distribution 
could shrink productivity, which in turn could dampen the output. Figure 2 shows the 
downward shift and flattening of the wage distribution of manual workers since the 1990s. The 
change in labour cost units during the period 1997–2002 supports this observation: at the 
minimum wage level, unit labour cost increased despite the negative impact of payroll tax 
subsidies.  
Figure 2. Observed wage distributions of manual workers (France) 
 
Source: Chéron, Hairault and Langot (2005). 
Research task 
In this paper, we evaluate the payroll-tax exemption policy and its impact on employment when 
we take into account the productivity channel.  
Methodological approach used  
We build a structural model of the labour market for French low-skilled workers, which enables 
us to quantitatively evaluate the employment-plus-productivity effects of the French labour 
cost-reducing policy. This structural strategy differs from recent econometric exercises and 
allows us to examine several policy experiments.  
We propose a wage posting model with specific human capital investments and a bilateral 
endogenous search, similar to Mortensen (2000), to consistently generate wage and productivity 
distributions and an unemployment equilibrium rate. In this framework, the expected job 
duration determines the extent to which firms invest in firm-specific human capital. In addition, 
we hold that the wage posting strategies of firms and their training investments are strongly 
related, as suggested in Manning (2003). As such, the negative relationship between wage and 
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levels of training and wage offers, which result in endogenous within-market productivity 
differences and, consequently, a dispersed equilibrium wage-offer distribution. Moreover, the 
wage posting approach is incorporated into the search equilibria in order to determine 
unemployment and vacancy rates in a consistent manner. This method leads to a joint theory of 
wage (as well as productivity) and employment, where the effects of labour market institutions 
are not determined a priori by job creation disincentives or the reduction of the monopsony 
power of firms.  
This study also incorporates realistic features to analyse the efficiency of French labour market 
policies. First, we take into account the existence of a minimum wage, which influences the cost 
of labour and the recruiting efforts of firms. Second, we assume the existence of transition 
periods between short-term and long-term unemployment as well as some heterogeneity in the 
search intensity of employees and of the short- and long-term unemployed. As such, we obtain a 
time-varying unemployment benefit system and differences in offer arrival rates as per the 
status of individuals (in employment, short- or long-term unemployment). These features 
generate an endogenous distribution of the unemployed workers’ reservation wage, which 
enhances the evaluation of the minimum wage legislation. 
Our strategy relies on at least two key points: the wage posting hypothesis and the fact that 
productivity is governed by specific human capital investments. The former seems consistent 
with empirical findings for low-wage workers and the assumption that firms have monopsony 
power is not rejected for these workers in the French panel dataset. Regarding the second point, 
Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) show that the productivity differential across firms explains 
about half of the French low-skilled wage variance. The remaining part is entirely owing to 
search friction, leaving no room for individual fixed effects. We interpret this as general human 
capital, which increases with the skill of workers. We estimate key parameters of the model on 
French data using the simulated method of moments. Based on statistical tests, we cannot reject 
the hypothesis that the theoretical wage distribution is generated by the same law as the 
observed one. In particular, because the productivity distribution plays a central role in the 
replication of the observed unimodal wage density, it provides a powerful identification strategy 
to estimate the elasticity of productivity relative to human capital investment.  
Key results and policy conclusions  
We investigate the various implications of a minimum wage on output. The optimal level for a 
minimum wage seems to be slightly lower than the observed one: a decrease in the minimum 
wage leads to an employment boost, but is not totally compensated by a decline in labour 
productivity. The opposite occurs when considering values below the optimal minimum wage 
level. If we remove the productivity channel, we obtain a very different conclusion and find that 
short-term unemployment benefits are binding as to employment. Despite the existence of long-
term unemployed workers who would be willing to work for a lower wage, we show that no 
firms would propose a wage below the reservation wage of the short-term unemployed workers. 
In that sense, the minimum wage legislation is unnecessary. Alternatively, including the 
productivity channel emphasises the importance of a minimum wage. Given that the payroll tax 
subsidies are implemented to reduce labour costs without removing the minimum wage 
legislation, we show that this policy is welfare-improving. It is implemented relatively well 
because it allocates subsidies over a wide range of wages, not only at the minimum wage level. 
Existing exemptions lead to an employment boost, which is offset in part by a deterioration of 
the productivity level. Here again, removing the productivity channel from the analysis leads to 
an opposite recommendation, namely the concentration of exemptions at the minimum wage 
level.  
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3.1.2.4  Why is Unemployment Higher in France than in the UK? A Wage Posting Answer 
Authors: Arnaud Chéron (PSE-Jourdan, Cepremap and GAINS (Université du 
Maine)), Jean-Olivier Hairault (Cepremap, EUREQua (Université de Paris 1) and  
IUF) and François Langot (PSE-Jourdan, Cepremap and GAINS (Université du 
Maine)) (Deliverable No. 6B) 
Introduction  
The French and the UK economies have access to the same technology and use the same 
organisational process of production. In these two economies, there is a high minimum wage. 
Nevertheless, the level of unemployment, and more specifically the unemployment of low-
skilled workers, is higher in France. How can we explain this difference?  
The taxes or the average rate of the unemployment benefits are not the same but the key 
difference is the calculation of the unemployment benefits for an unemployed worker. Indeed, 
in France, there is a system wherein the calculation of the unemployment benefit depends on the 
preceding wage. This approach leads to a large dispersion of unemployment benefits. At the 
opposite end, in the UK, there is an unemployment insurance system à la  Beveridge: 
unemployment benefits do not depend on the preceding wage. In the latter case, the distribution 
of the unemployment compensation is a mass point. The French system allows the smoothing of 
consumption by workers, whereas in the UK, one can observe a large decrease in consumption 
over the life-cycle of the unemployed.  
Research task 
In this contribution, we focus on the costs of the unemployment benefit system based on the 
logic of consumption-smoothing. This difference in the dispersion of the unemployment benefit 
can lead to large differences in the equilibrium, if one focuses on the unemployment rate, 
aggregate production or welfare. Indeed, a large dispersion of the unemployment benefit leads 
those firms that have wage offers that are lower than the higher unemployment benefit to 
encounter unemployed workers who reject the job proposal. Hence, by introducing 
heterogeneity among the workers, the French unemployment benefit system can lead to a large 
inefficient mismatch. This mismatch increases the delays for a firm (worker) to find a worker 
(firm) and thus extends unemployment.  
Without any dispersion of the unemployment benefit, there is no job refusal in the UK and 
hence the unemployment rate is lower. One can introduce a minimum wage in order to reduce 
the number of job refusals. Without any dispersion of the unemployment benefit, the impact of 
the minimum wage on unemployment is trivial in the UK: if the minimum wage is higher than 
the level of the unemployment benefits, then labour costs are higher, the number of vacant jobs 
is lower and the unemployment rate is higher.  
At the other end of the spectrum, in France, the minimum wage has more complex impacts: an 
increase of the minimum wage leads to a reduction of the number of vacant jobs, as in the UK, 
but this policy implies that the number of job rejections decreases. This latter effect can reduce 
the equilibrium rate of unemployment. Nevertheless, in France the minimum wage does not 
ensure that all the wage offers will be accepted in the equilibrium, because any individual has 
access to high unemployment benefits.  
Beyond its impact on unemployment, the minimum wage introduces arbitration between 
employment and productivity: a higher minimum wage leads to reduced turnover and provides 
some incentives to invest in job-specific capital. Thus, in the UK, the decrease in employment 
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France, if the minimum wage increases employment, its positive impact on productivity 
magnifies its first positive effect on welfare.  
Methodological approach used  
The methodology used in the paper involves building a search model for the labour market, 
distinguishing the various labour market positions and thereby being able to derive the 
reservation wages of the workers and to identify the frictional and inefficient unemployment.  
Key results and policy conclusions 
The simulation results for the French economy are as follows. The introduction of a minimum 
wage leads to a decrease in the vacancy rate and then to the frictional unemployment (uf ). This 
increase of the labour costs reduces the number of job offers but also largely reduces the number 
of job refusals. Then the aggregate unemployment falls because there is a large decline in the 
inefficient unemployment (uin). This decrease of the inefficient unemployment can be 
decomposed into two parts. The decrease of uin due solely to the reduction of job refusals is 
from 12.1% to 10%. Indeed, in this simulation, the firms cannot adjust the number of vacant 
jobs after the introduction of the minimum wage: the rate of meeting is the same as in an 
economy without a minimum wage. When the number of vacant jobs is endogenous, it also 
leads to a reduction in the number of job refusals and subsequently the level of inefficient 
unemployment (from 10% to 7.1%).  
In the UK, unemployment benefits do not depend on the previous wage. We assume that the 
distribution of the unemployment benefit is restricted to one point in the UK for the level of 
unemployment benefit, which corresponds to 0.34 of the average wage rate. Given these 
assumptions about the tax/benefit system in the UK economy, the level of inefficient 
unemployment is equal to zero because the lower wage offer is equal to the unemployment 
benefit, which is the same for all the workers. In the case of the UK, the equilibrium rate of 
unemployment is equal to the frictional unemployment. Because we assume that the 
creation/destruction process is the same in the two economies, the equilibrium rate of 
unemployment in the UK is equal to the frictional unemployment rate in France. 
When the minimum wage is fixed at the same level as in the French economy, the introduction 
of a minimum wage leads to a decrease in the vacancies and therefore explains the increase in 
unemployment. With this unemployment benefit system, the aggregate unemployment is largely 
lower in the UK. But the two unemployment benefit systems are different in two respects: the 
level of the replacement rate and the existence of an unemployment benefit distribution. If the 
level of the unemployment benefit in France is reduced in order to have on average the same 
replacement ratio, then the equilibrium rate of unemployment is lower, but the impact of the 
dispersion of the unemployment benefit implies that the unemployment rate is more than two 
times larger than in the UK. In general equilibrium, i.e. when the number of vacant jobs is 
endogenous and is reduced by the increase in the wage costs, the increase in the frictional 
unemployment offsets the large decrease in the inefficient unemployment. This leads to a small 
decrease in aggregate unemployment. 
Moreover, simulations of the model also show that the minimum wage increases production and 
welfare in these two economies. Finally, we show that the minimum wage fosters a significant 
reduction in income inequalities. These results give some support to the adoption of the UK 
unemployment benefit system by European countries. They also underline that there is in each 
economy an optimal minimum wage. Its level depends on the arbitration between productivity 
and employment. 
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3.1.2.5  Tax/Benefit Systems in the New Member States and their Impact on Labour 
Supply and Employment 
Authors: Andres Võrk, Reelika Leetmaa, Alari Paulus and Sten Anspal (PRAXIS 
Centre for Policy Studies) (Deliverable No. 7A) 
Introduction 
The level and structure of taxes and benefits have been the subject of much attention and 
discussion in recent years in EU countries. The existing research suggests that labour market 
institutions matter for labour market outcomes and that disincentives generated by the structure 
of tax/benefit systems are one cause of low employment and slow economic growth in the EU 
(European Commission, 2000). Tax/benefit systems create incentives that influence the 
behaviour of both employees and firms. On the demand side, high tax burdens can increase the 
cost of labour. On the supply side, generous out-of-work benefit payments may lead to reduced 
efforts to seek employment and high marginal tax rates reduce the reward for additional work 
efforts (Carone and Salomäki, 2001).  
The eight new EU member states (formerly planned economies from Central and Eastern 
Europe –NMS-8) that entered the EU in 2004 have had rapid economic reforms since the 1990s, 
but in several NMS the unemployment rates have remained high and the employment rates low. 
Meanwhile, there are considerable differences in labour taxation and disincentives created by 
the tax/benefit systems. The extent to which these differences in the tax/benefit systems can 
explain differences in labour market outcomes is the issue we address. 
A few studies have analysed the labour market institutions, including tax/benefit systems, and 
their impact on labour market outcomes in the NMS or transition countries. For the most part, 
the cross-country studies have covered the four NMS that belong to the OECD countries. The 
dominant conclusion from previous studies is that labour market institutions are less rigid and 
labour markets are more flexible in the NMS than in the EU-15, but still they find that taxes and 
benefits influence employment and unemployment rates. 
Research task 
In this paper, we analyse whether cross-country differences in labour market outcomes, 
especially in activity rates and employment rates, in the NMS-8 can be explained by the 
characteristics of the tax and benefit systems. 
Methodological approach used 
We use macro-level panel data from the NMS-8 over the years 1998–2004. We apply graphical 
analysis and panel-data regression models to investigate whether the variation in the incentives 
created by the tax/benefit systems, measured by the tax wedge and marginal effective tax rates, 
can explain variations in the labour market outcomes. We analyse the impact on activity rates, 
employment rates, unemployment rates, the share of part-time workers and weekly work hours. 
We use pooled OLS and country-specific fixed effects regression models. In our regression 
models, we also control for other macroeconomic variables that may influence labour market 
developments: GDP growth, inflation and openness (trade-volume-to-GDP ratio). 
Key results and policy conclusions  
The NMS from Central and Eastern Europe are characterised by lower overall tax burdens. Still, 
they display relatively high taxes on labour and in all the countries, the tax wedge on labour is 
higher than the average of the EU-15 countries. On the other hand, social expenditures 
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In our econometric analysis, despite the small sample period, we find statistically significant 
effects of the tax/benefit indicators on the labour market outcomes in several of our regression 
models. As tax/benefit systems do not change very rapidly and we have a relatively short time 
period, it is not surprising that there are more significant results in pooled OLS regressions than 
in the models with country-specific fixed effects. 
Our statistical and econometric analysis shows that a higher tax wedge has a significant 
negative impact on labour force participation and the employment rate in the NMS-8. Our 
estimates suggest that an increase of the tax wedge by 1 percentage point reduces the 
employment rate by 0.2 to 0.7 percentage points, depending on whether we include country-
specific effects in the model. A negative relationship exists for both men and women, for older 
workers (the strongest effect) and for those with low levels of education. 
Concerning high marginal effective tax rates, when moving from unemployment to work (an 
unemployment trap indicator), we find that they decrease the activity rate and the employment 
rate of older workers and increase the unemployment rate. We also find some effects of the low-
wage traps on the activity rate of older persons and those with low levels of education.  
Our estimation results suggest that the progressivity of the tax/benefit system, at least at the 
low-wage level and as measured by the size of the trap indicators, is positively related to the 
average of usual weekly working hours and negatively so to the share of part-time workers. 
These results suggest that in the countries where the system is more progressive, those persons 
who work prefer to work tend to do so more hours and not take up part-time employment. 
As both the time series and number of countries in our analysis is small, and in several models 
we have encountered statistically significant coefficients with unexpected signs, the results 
should be interpreted with caution. Still, given that other labour market institutions (e.g. 
employment protection legislation, unions and active labour market policies) are less important 
in the NMS and we observe a high tax wedge and large variations in unemployment traps, our 
general results do not conflict with our expectations.  
In recent years, several NMS have reduced or plan to reduce the tax burden of low-paid workers 
by increasing income tax allowances or decreasing marginal income-tax rates, or both (e.g. 
Estonia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic and Slovenia). Given our results that lower taxes are 
associated with higher activity rates and employment, these policies should lead to increased 
employment rates. In the NMS, where wages are more flexible, a simple reduction of the 
marginal income-tax rate and an increase in the tax allowance might encourage the employment 
of low-wage earners. The tax/benefit systems in the EU under tax competition (WP 2)  
3.1.3  Summary of WP 2 
Introduction 
The Lisbon process also implies that the European social model, which is relatively generous, 
should be preserved through its modernisation. This goal could possibly be endangered by the 
rising mobility of capital and highly skilled labour, which could lead to some tax competition 
among EU member states. The outcome would be either reduced resources for the benefit 
systems or higher levels of inequality for the financing among the various kinds of taxpayers. 
The free movement of capital in the single market is hampered by the existence of separate 
systems of corporate taxation. Consolidating the tax base for multinational firms would reduce 
these tax obstacles enormously. Yet consolidation might also overrule the primacy of member 
states in fiscal policy. Is there a way out of this dilemma? 
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Research tasks 
The focus of WP 2 is on the economic impact of corporate tax policy. Two kinds of policy 
scenarios concerning corporate taxation are studied. The first analyses the implications of 
competition and coordination in statutory tax rates. Specifically, the impact of cross-country 
discrepancies in corporate taxes and in unit labour costs on FDI, gross domestic product (GDP) 
and welfare are investigated. The second focuses on tax base harmonisation and is inspired by 
proposals in the 2002 Tax Communication of the European Commission to consolidate taxable 
profits across member states. Together with consolidation, we study the impact of formula 
apportionment, which is needed to allocate the tax base over the member states. 
Methodological approaches used  
The analysis relies on econometric estimates and model simulations. Semi-elasticities of 
bilateral FDI flows to various measures of corporate tax differentials and of differences in unit 
labour costs are estimated. The economic and welfare implications of both tax rate reforms and 
consolidation of the tax base are simulated with a CGE model.  
Key results and policy conclusions  
The main policy implications of WP 2 are as follows. 
Tax differentials are important determinants of FDI in the EU-15, but not in the new EU 
member states. This conclusion is based on econometric estimates for 22 EU countries between 
1990 and 2002. 
Even a unilateral reduction of the tax rate is not beneficial for all countries if they have to 
finance the tax rate reduction by an increase in the tax rates on labour or consumption. The 
reduction in the corporate tax rate attracts FDI and foreign profits. But the increase in taxes on 
labour or consumption dampens the impact on employment, GDP and welfare, and may even 
offset it. 
Social competition is more powerful than tax competition. This conclusion is based on the 
observation that FDI depends more on differences in employment protection and union 
bargaining coverage than on differences in (statutory or effective) corporate tax rates.  
This conclusion is confirmed by model simulations showing that policies to remedy tax 
competition, such as setting a minimum tax rate or even harmonising the corporate income tax, 
hardly enhance growth and welfare in the EU: the winners just gain enough to compensate the 
losers.  
The largest gains from consolidating the corporate income tax base might be expected if all 
enterprises, domestic and multinational, are treated equally. Proposals for consolidation that 
exclude some of the firms, such as domestic firms, create an uneven playing field. This 
approach might induce significant restructuring both within and among member states. 
Formula apportionment distorts the investment and labour demand behaviour of multinational 
enterprises (MNEs), which are minimised if the apportionment formula reflects the distribution 
of the corporate income of MNEs. The largest distortions are introduced if apportionment is 
based on a single production factor, such as employment or capital. The incentives for 
reallocating production or the production factors are minimised in the simulations if 
apportionment depends on the share of production by multinationals in each member state. 
The economic effects of consolidation with formula apportionment are unevenly distributed. 
Owing to formula apportionment, low-tax countries are attractive for the location of production, 
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base to which only multinationals may apply creates GDP and welfare gains in member states 
with a broad tax base, but harms countries with narrow bases. 
Tax competition is intensified with common consolidated base taxation. All member states, but 
in particular those with relatively open economies, have stronger incentives to reduce their tax 
rate with a consolidated tax base than with separate accounting. If formula apportionment is 
based on an internationally mobile production factor, like capital, tax competition might even 
result in a race to the bottom. If apportionment is based on an internationally less mobile factor, 
like employment, tax rates are likely to be cut, but not to the bottom. 
3.1.4   Summaries of the deliverables 
There are four working papers prepared under this work package. 
3.1.4.1  Who’s Afraid of Tax Competition? 
Author: Amina Lahrèche-Révil (CEPII) (Deliverable No. 9A) 
Introduction 
The tax competition literature has long stated that increasing international integration might 
impose growing pressure on tax policies, as raising taxes creates incentives for mobile taxpayers 
to relocate abroad. Because tax base relocation is proportionally more important in small 
countries than in large ones, this literature further shows that small countries have stronger 
incentives than large ones to cut taxes, which could eventually lead tax rates on mobile income 
to converge towards zero. Such a conclusion has, however, been challenged by a number of 
alternative approaches, pointing for instance to the fact that higher taxes can be the counterpart 
of higher attractiveness, or to the fact that taxation is a second-order determinant of location 
decisions, well behind e.g. proximity to the market. 
As far as corporate taxation is concerned, most existing empirical studies focus on the 
sensitivity of FDI or firms’ location decision to taxation. These show that multinational firms do 
react to tax incentives, be they embedded in tax rules or tax rates. 
While most existing studies focus on the OECD, tax competition may be tighter within the EU 
owing to the single market. In this context, the low rates observed in the NMS are raising fears 
of a race to the bottom. 
Research task 
This paper investigates the impact of tax incentives on FDI within the enlarged EU, using 
bilateral FDI flows from the EU-15 countries to 18 to 22 EU-25 countries (depending on tax 
measures), from 1990 to 2002.  
Methodological approach used 
The empirical investigation relies on two alternative specifications of a gravitational model of 
FDI flows, where the impact of various definitions of corporate taxation (namely, implicit tax 
rates, statutory tax rates and effective average tax rates) is investigated, together with the impact 
of unit labour costs. 
Key results and policy conclusions  
The main result of the study is that, over the period considered, FDI reacts to tax differentials 
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unrelated to tax differentials. Other factors, such as the real exchange rate and unit labour costs, 
also fail to explain to a significant extent the FDI inflows into the NMS. 
3.1.4.2  Do EU Member States Compete on Social Systems? 
Authors: Vincent Delbecque and Amina Lahrèche-Révil (CEPII) (Deliverable   
No. 9B) 
Introduction  
Deepening integration within the EU increases the mobility of firms. While tax competition is a 
well-documented tool for attracting FDI (see, for instance, de Mooij and Ederveen, 2003), room 
for tax competition is progressively vanishing as tax rates converge downwards. The case for 
social competition has been less scrutinised so far, partly because of measurement problems and 
partly because social systems are multidimensional. For instance, a reduction in employment 
protection can be partially offset by an increase in the bargaining power of trade unions, which 
was observed in the OECD during the period 1992–2004. 
Research task 
This paper seeks to measure the impact of social factors on FDI across EU member states within 
a gravity framework from 1992 to 2004. To the extent that they affect labour costs, market 
regulation and the bargaining power of unions may influence location decisions. 
Methodological approach used 
Labour market regulation and employment protection legislation are related to fixed costs, 
whereas centralised bargaining and coordination have an impact on variable costs. Both types of 
indicators are used here through a Heckman methodology that allows us to highlight the impact 
of social systems on the probability of investing in a given country (which should be related to 
fixed costs) based on the amount invested (which should be linked to variable costs). 
Key results and policy conclusions  
We find that both labour market institutions and trade union strength affect the probability of 
attracting FDI and the amount of FDI received. For instance, an increase of the mean 
employment-protection legislation index by one standard deviation reduces the amount of 
investment by 30%, while an increase by 10 percentage points of collective bargaining coverage 
reduces inward investment by 32%, ceteris paribus. Hence, we find no evidence of a positive 
impact of labour protection or unionisation on investment through gains in productivity. 
3.1.4.3  Who Benefits from Tax Competition in the European Union? 
Authors: Leon   Bettendorf, Joeri Gorter and Albert van der Horst (CPB) 
(Deliverable No. 19) 
Introduction 
Capital market integration within the EU has been successful. It brings about a superior 
allocation of capital across member states by linking capital markets. But capital market 
integration also links national capital income taxes. Member states have indeed reduced their 
statutory corporate income tax (CIT) rates in order to attract the highly mobile paper profits of 
multinational firms. Yet effective CIT rates have remained relatively stable. The evidence thus 
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The theoretical tax competition literature provides an abundance of often contrastive tenets. The 
CIT rates of one member state lead to capital flight to other member states, and thus entail a 
positive spillover as capital flight increases foreign CIT bases and labour productivities. The 
domestic CIT bill, however, is picked up by foreigners insofar as they own stocks of domestic 
firms, and thus entails a negative spillover. Moreover, if a member state decides to engage in tax 
competition and reduces its CIT rate, then it must mend the resulting budgetary hole, either by 
cutting public expenditure or by increasing the burden of alternative taxes. In particular, the 
labour income tax carries heavy domestic distortions that make it unattractive to go down this 
route, even in the face of the high capital mobility within the EU. 
Research task 
Economists still grope in the dark regarding the empirical relevance of the contrastive tenets. 
Does the downward pressure on CIT rates dominate the upward pressure, and if so, to what 
extent? And what is the welfare cost of tax competition, or similarly, the potential welfare gain 
of tax coordination? 
Methodological approach used 
Investigating these questions requires an integrated framework, allowing for numerical 
assessments of the economic outcomes of CIT reforms. CORTAX is an applied general 
equilibrium model of the EU tailor-made for the problem at hand. The model captures the main 
features of corporate income taxation in 17 EU member states. It distinguishes between 
domestic and multinational firms in order to simulate the simultaneous impact of capital income 
taxation on FDI, profit-shifting and tax-exporting.  
Moreover, the model allows for a welfare analysis by considering the optimal response of 
households to changes in taxes and factor rewards. This welfare analysis will answer questions 
on the efficiency of the CIT system in the EU and on the distribution of the gains and losses of 
consolidation. 
CORTAX builds on a model presented by Sørensen (2004). Yet CORTAX goes one step further 
in some directions. Notably, the savings decision is derived from dynamic utility maximisation. 
Not only does this do justice to the inherently dynamic nature of saving, it also enriches the 
welfare analysis. With CORTAX, we investigate a wider array of tax coordination proposals, 
starting with unilateral tax rate reductions and then proceed with multilateral and coordinated 
tax reforms. 
Our contribution to this literature is a thorough investigation of the economic and welfare 
effects of unilateral and multilateral tax reforms in Europe, by developing and simulating the 
applied general equilibrium model CORTAX for corporate taxation in Europe. This provides 
insight on how individual member states might be affected by CIT reductions either in the home 
country or in other member states. In addition, we show which countries gain from imposing a 
European minimum tax rate or, similar to Sørensen (2004), from even harmonising their tax 
rates. 
Key results and policy conclusions 
In an integrated Union, member states respond to each other’s changes in corporate income 
taxation – and for good reasons: a CIT rate reduction in one country harms other member states, 
which they offset by reducing their CIT rates, too. 
That is not to say that all countries benefit from playing at leapfrog. Even a unilateral reduction 
of the tax rate is not beneficial for all countries if they have to finance the tax rate reduction by a 
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member state has only a small incentive to unilaterally reduce its CIT rate. Consequently, the 
welfare cost of tax competition is relatively small, and may even be negative for some member 
states. The main reason for this outcome is that if alternative tax instruments are used as 
balancing items, the benefits of a lower CIT are outweighed partly or entirely by the costs of a 
higher labour income or consumption tax. 
If member states take into account that other states may respond, the potential gains from a CIT 
reform are significantly reduced. In this case, the inability to attract foreign profit income 
reduces the benefits from favourable tax planning by multinational firms. A reduction in the tax 
rate is still beneficial for countries with a highly distortionary CIT tax, but not for countries with 
already small tax bases or low tax rates. Therefore, the latter countries will not participate in a 
race to the bottom. 
Even countries that benefit from a tax rate reduction will not completely abandon the tax on 
corporate income. At lower CIT rates, the distortions in the alternative taxes on consumption 
and labour exceed the distortionary effects of the CIT on investment and profit shifting. We 
show that a further integration of European capital markets aggravates the CIT distortions, but 
still will not trigger an abolition of the CIT. 
From an economic point of view, competition in tax rates is hardly worth pursuing at current 
levels of corporate income taxation, and even less so at a lower level of taxation. Policies to 
remedy tax competition, such as setting a minimum tax rate or even harmonising the CIT rates, 
barely enhance growth and welfare in the EU: the winners just gain enough to compensate the 
losers. 
3.1.4.4  Will Corporate Tax Consolidation Improve Efficiency in the EU? 
Authors: Albert van der Horst, Leon Bettendorf and Hugo Rojas-Romagosa 
(CPB) (Deliverable No. 26) 
Introduction  
Companies operating across the internal market are hampered by tax obstacles such as high 
compliance costs for cross-border operations, transfer pricing and the lack of cross-border loss 
compensation. These obstacles are inherent in the current system of separate accounting, 
whereby the corporate income of foreign subsidiaries of multinational firms is treated separately 
for tax purposes. 
In its 2002 Tax Communication, the European Commission proposed consolidation of the tax 
base as an answer to the inherent difficulties of separate accounting and the large compliance 
costs. The consolidated base has to be apportioned to the member states to guarantee their 
ability to tax corporate income.  
Research task 
The aim of the paper is to assess numerically the economic effects of consolidation and 
apportionment formula. Does this approach contribute to employment and GDP in the EU and 
does it improve economic efficiency by reducing tax distortions? How are the gains and losses 
distributed within member states, between say, domestic firms and multinationals, or between 
firms and households, and how are they distributed among member states? 
Methodological approach used  
Investigating these questions requires an integrated framework, allowing for numerical 
assessments of the economic outcomes under different formula apportionment proposals in 
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CORTAX – that is designed to investigate these issues. The model captures the main features of 
corporate income taxation in 17 EU member states and in the US. It includes the investment and 
labour-demand decisions of both MNEs and domestic firms. Moreover, the model allows for a 
welfare analysis by considering the optimal response of households to changes in taxes and 
factor rewards. This welfare analysis will answer questions on the efficiency of the CIT system 
in the EU and on the distribution of the gains and losses of consolidation. 
Our paper is the first simulation study on consolidation and formula apportionment in the EU. It 
is most closely related to Sørensen (2004), who applies a similar CGE model to the 
harmonisation of both the tax base and the tax rate in the EU. In fact, our model builds on 
Sørensen’s OECDTAX model. The crucial extension in CORTAX is the inclusion of 
consolidation and formula apportionment. Sørensen points at the potential welfare gain from tax 
harmonisation, which we confirm in our simulations, but does not investigate the distortions 
introduced by formula apportionment. 
The study by Edminston (2002) is the sole application of a CGE model to formula 
apportionment. He focuses on both the strategic behaviour of the fiscal authorities in the US and 
the tax planning by firms. Yet, the situation in the US, with state-specific formulas and 
relatively small tax-rate differentials, differs substantially from the European environment with 
large tax-rate differentials and presumably uniform apportionment formulae. The contribution 
of our paper is to investigate consolidation and formula apportionment in the EU. 
Key results and policy conclusions 
The economic effects of consolidating the CIT base by applying formula apportionment depend 
crucially on its design. The largest gains from consolidation might be expected if all enterprises, 
domestic and multinational, are treated equally. Proposals for consolidation that exclude some 
of the firms introduce uneven competition and induce significant restructuring both within and 
among member states. Formula apportionment distorts the investment and labour demand 
behaviours of MNEs, which are minimised if the apportionment formula reflects the distribution 
of the corporate income of MNEs. 
The main benefits from the abolition of separate accounting by consolidating the tax base are 
the elimination of paper profit-shifting, the introduction of automatic loss compensation for 
cross-border activities and the reduction of compliance costs. At the same time, consolidation 
also has its costs, as it may create unequal opportunities for different firms. With a common, 
consolidated, corporate tax base (CCCTB), domestic firms might face a different definition of 
the tax base than MNEs. 
We first consider the introduction of a common base at the EU average to which only 
multinationals may apply. In countries with a broad tax base, this consolidation benefits 
multinationals relative to domestic firms, as the latter still have to adhere to the domestic rules.  
In the alternative proposal of home state taxation, where firms have to make their tax 
declaration according to the rules of their home country, domestic firms and multinational 
headquarters are treated equally. Unevenness is now introduced, however, between subsidiaries 
of foreign MNEs. Home state taxation gives preferential treatment to subsidiaries originating 
from member states with a narrow tax base.  
The full benefits from consolidation can only be reaped if all firms participate and adhere to a 
common tax base. If domestic firms are excluded, the EU average gains in terms of GDP and 
welfare from CCCTB equal respectively 0.08% and 0.03% of GDP in the long run, with the 
most favourable apportionment formula. The gains would be much larger, with additional gains 
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Apportioning the consolidated base to the member states leaves them the autonomy to tax 
corporate income at their own desired rate. Nevertheless, the way in which the tax base is 
distributed is likely to distort the investment and production decisions of MNEs. The largest 
distortions are introduced if apportionment is based on a single production factor, such as 
employment or capital. The incentives for reallocating production are minimised if the 
apportionment formula resembles the distribution of the corporate income of MNEs. In the 
simulations with CORTAX, this is achieved if apportionment depends solely on production 
shares. 
The economic effects of CCCTB with formula apportionment are unevenly distributed, both 
among and within countries. With separate accounting, low-tax countries are attractive for the 
location of paper profits. With formula apportionment, however, low-tax countries are attractive 
for the location of production (and production factors): higher production in low-tax countries 
enlarges the apportioned share of the tax base in these jurisdictions and thus reduces the average 
tax payments of MNEs. This expansion of MNEs implies an increase in GDP, employment and 
capital in low-tax countries. In contrast, production in high-tax countries declines. This uneven 
distribution of gains and losses owing to formula apportionment adds up to the unbalanced 
impact of the common consolidated base. In our basic simulation of CCCTB, where 
apportionment is based on employment, capital and production in equal proportions, the change 
in welfare ranges from a reduction of 0.4% of GDP to an increase of 0.6% of GDP, whereas the 
change in GDP ranges from a reduction to an increase of 0.7% in both directions.  
Tax competition is intensified with CCCTB. Relatively open economies and those with low tax 
rates have stronger incentives to reduce their tax rates with a consolidated tax base than with 
separate accounting. If formula apportionment is based on an internationally mobile production 
factor, like capital, tax competition might even result in a race to the bottom: for several 
member states, it is optimal to leave their proportioned share of the common tax base untaxed. 
If apportionment is based on an internationally less mobile factor, like employment, tax rates 
are likely to be cut, but not to the bottom.  
3.2  Tax/benefit systems and the potential growth (productivity) of the EU 
(WP 3)  
3.2.1  Summary of WP 3 
Introduction  
If we focus on productivity dynamics, the EU countries caught up with the US between 1960 
and 1995. Since this period, Europe has been lagging behind the US. On the other hand, relative 
to the US and during the same period, there was a decline in the total number of hours worked 
in the EU. This decrease is explained by a reduction in the average number of hours worked by 
each employed person, a lower participation rate and a higher unemployment rate. In this 
context, is it reasonable for the EU to expect to catch up with the US? 
What are the dynamics of this decomposition of the GDP per capita? Why does the EU remain 
poorer than the US? At the beginning of the 1960s, the low level of GDP per capita in Europe 
was mainly owing to a lag in productivity (65%), but was partially compensated by a larger 
effort at work in Europe (20%) (see Figure 3). In the 1970s, the catch-up in productivity 
continued, with the effort at work the same in Europe as in the US. During the 1980s and 1990s, 
the catch-up in productivity seemed at an end, but the effort at work by Europeans largely 
declined relative to that of Americans. This last fact primarily stems from a large fall in both the 
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an increase in the gap between American and European productivity. Europeans work less and 
are progressively less efficient than their American counterparts are; hence, they are poorer. 
Figure 3. Decomposition of the income gap between the EU-15 and the US  
 
Source: Kaitila (2006). 
 
Research tasks 
During the past few decades, we have observed high rates of unemployment and a slowdown in 
the economic growth of European countries. Are these two phenomena related? There is no 
consensus regarding the sign of the correlation between growth and unemployment, either 
across countries or across time. Yet, theory suggests that the distortions arising from fiscal 
instruments lead to lower growth (endogenous growth theory) or to higher unemployment 
(equilibrium unemployment theory) or both.  
The link between growth and unemployment can be viewed through the simultaneous link 
between growth, unemployment and the labour market institutions present in the EU-15, other 
key OECD countries and the NMS. 
Methodological approaches used  
First, we develop a Schumpeterian endogenous growth model (two sectors, a competitive final 
goods sector and a monopolistic innovation sector) with trade unions. This model explains the 
effects of labour market institutions on growth and unemployment.  
We empirically estimate the model for disaggregated data that comes from the Eurostat’s 
European Regional Database (2005). The statistical regions of Europe correspond to the second 
level of the Nomenclature of Units Territorial for Statistics (NUTS 2). The related countries 
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considered are Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and the UK for the period 1980–95. The originality of the 
approach is to take into account the large heterogeneity between regions within a country. The 
specificity of each European region is measured by the growth rate of its Solow residual. This 
indicator can be viewed as the closest measure of the specific technology available in a 
particular region. 
The second approach is as follows. In the preceding analysis, we focused on the link between 
unemployment and productivity – we neglected the hours worked and the participation margins. 
Next, we investigate the links between all labour margins and productivity. Thus, GDP per 
capita (Y/P) is decomposed into four labour market components and productivity: 
YY H E L N
PH E L N P
⎡ ⎤ = ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
 , 
where Y/H denotes productivity per hour worked, H/E hours worked per employee, E/L the 
employment rate, L/N the participation rate and N/P the dependency ratio. 
We analyse this decomposition using a second dataset, based on a long time series of the OECD 
countries. The countries are Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland, Sweden, the UK, the US, Japan, Canada, 
Switzerland, Norway, Australia and New Zealand. The time period is 1960–2004. The 
originality of the approach is to decompose the catch-up with the US between the long-term 
productivity dynamics and the long-term adjustments of the labour markets.  
The overall joint starting point in WPs 1 and 3, and in the entire TAXBEN project is illustrated 
in Figure 3 above, which decomposes the gap in the income levels between the EU and the US 
into the five components just mentioned.  
Finally, as a fourth research task, the last objective of WP 3 is to analyse the short and medium-
term relationship between employment and growth. It should be recalled that in the long term, 
our results suggest that we can have more growth in Europe with more employment. Still, the 
short-term analysis is important for political leaders. Indeed, the impact of reforms must 
improve welfare before the next election. Today, European political leaders are committed to 
the Lisbon process. This process has two goals: an increase in economic growth and in the 
employment rate. Is there a conflict between the two objectives of the Lisbon process? From the 
viewpoint of traditional theory, summarised by the Okun law, there is no conflict between 
growth and employment in the short term. This traditional view is acceptable if the economy is 
hit by a demand shock. But there is now broad consensus about the large size of the supply 
shock in the explanation of the business cycle. Hence, a conflict between growth and 
employment can arise in the short run. We propose to test this assumption in this last part of WP 
3. We use the approach of the structural vector autoregression (SVAR) methodology and a 
simulation of an econometric model built for the Finnish labour market.  
Key results and policy conclusions 
Using the theoretical endogenous growth model, we show that 1) high labour costs or powerful 
trade unions (or both) lead to higher unemployment and a slowdown of economic growth; and 
2) efficient bargaining implies more employment but less growth. The empirical results, using 
regional data, show that  
1)  Technological progress increases the growth rate of GDP per capita and decreases the 
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2)  Conversely, the tax wedge and unemployment benefits decrease the growth rate of GDP 
per capita and increase the unemployment rate. 
3)  A more cooperative bargaining process, measured by the index of the coordination of 
wage bargaining, decreases both growth and unemployment. 
These initial results are in accordance with the theoretical investigation. Contrary to the 
theoretical predictions, bargaining power (measured by the collective bargaining coverage) is 
not statistically significant. Even so, this variable has the sign predicted by the theory. Finally, 
employment protection is not a significant variable in explaining the growth rate of GDP per 
capita, but noticeably reduces the unemployment rate.  
Using the second approach mentioned above, we first present a thorough decomposition of the 
income gap as discussed. After these descriptive statistics, we estimate the conditional 
convergence of productivity using pooled least squares panel data analysis. Empirical results 
suggest that there is convergence. Thus, countries with lower initial levels of productivity have 
had faster productivity growth than countries closer to the technological frontier. Moreover, 
taxes and gross replacement rates slow the convergence of productivity. But this last result is 
not robust. With other explanatory variables, the impact of the tax/benefit system on 
productivity growth becomes insignificant.  
If we turn now to the average hours worked by the population of working age, it is clear that the 
tax rate has a negative impact. Therefore, the higher tax rate in Europe than in the US is the first 
candidate for explaining the low performance of Europe. Yet taxes are used to finance the 
‘welfare state’. Taxes and social insurance can be correlated. Other regressions show that if the 
tax rate is not included in the vector of the explanatory variables, unemployment benefits and 
employment protection become significant. This indicates that these labour market institutions, 
which reduce flexibility, also explain the decline in hours worked.  
In the preceding empirical analysis, we focus on ‘old’ Europe. What about the NMS? For these 
countries, we are able to reach the following conclusions. 
1)  First, from a brief look at the data it can be seen that these countries are catching up with 
old Europe. Indeed, a higher initial gap in the NMS productivity rate implies a higher 
speed of convergence on productivity. 
2)  Do the labour market institutions in the NMS facilitate catching-up with old Europe? A 
priori, the answer is yes, because in relation to the EU-15, the NMS have lower levels of 
expenditures on passive labour market policies, less employment protection and lower 
union density. But the NMS have the same levels of taxes as the EU-15, which have 
slowed down their catching-up process.  
Empirical results in the fourth part of the WP show that a positive technology shock increases 
productivity but decreases employment in the short run. These results are in accordance with the 
New Keynesian view: indeed, with preset prices, demand is constrained in the short run. 
Consequently, fewer hours are needed to satisfy the demand for goods if efficiency rises. By 
contrast, a demand shock does not have a significant impact on productivity, but increases the 
number of hours worked. This empirical analysis also supports the view that taxes have a 
negative impact on hours worked in the long run. To summarise, the empirical results show that 
there is conflict between the two Lisbon objectives in the short run. This occurs because an 
impulse in the R&D sector that directly increases productivity can lead to a fall in the hours 
worked. 
The core policy conclusions of the WP are as follows. The size of the state, measured by the 
tax-to-GDP ratio reduces the hours worked per employee, the employment rate and productivity 
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share of taxes cannot be cut because they are the counterparts of social insurance programmes 
(welfare state) or public sector R&D. The costs of transition towards an economy with only 
individual insurance and an exclusively competitive R&D sector overstate the costs of steady-
state tax distortions. Therefore, the essential problem is the use of taxes. Non-productive 
expenditures by governments should be redirected towards R&D by the public sector (more 
growth and more employment in the high-tech sector). The second essential problem is the 
profile of taxes: reforms to the tax/benefit systems should give more value to employment for 
medium- and low-skilled workers (payroll tax subsidies and sanctions in the unemployment 
insurance system). See also WP 1. 
3.2.2   Summary of the deliverables 
Altogether, there are four working papers prepared under this WP. 
3.3.2.1  Growth, Unemployment and Tax/Benefit Systems in European Countries: 
Theoretical and Empirical Investigations 
Authors: Stephane Adjemian (Cepremap and GAINS (Université du Maine)), 
François Langot (PSE-Jourdan, Cepremap and GAINS) and Coralia A. Quintero 
Rojas (GAINS (Université du Maine)) (Deliverable No. 16 B) 
Introduction 
The observed high unemployment rate in Continental Europe and the slowdown in economic 
growth in recent decades naturally raise the question of whether these two phenomena are 
related. On the empirical side, there is no consensus regarding the sign of the correlation 
between growth and unemployment, either across countries or across longer periods in the same 
country. The same is true on the theoretical side. Nevertheless, endogenous growth theory and 
equilibrium unemployment theory suggest that the distortions from fiscal instruments lead to 
lower growth or a higher unemployment rate. This conclusion suggests that the link between 
growth and unemployment can be viewed through the simultaneous link between growth, 
unemployment and labour market institutions. 
Research task 
In this contribution, we construct a theoretical model to analyse the effects of labour market 
institutions on growth and equilibrium unemployment and estimate it using regional data on 
EU-15 countries.  
Methodological approach used 
The main hypotheses of our model built in the study are as follows: i) innovations are the engine 
of growth, which implies a creative destruction process generating jobs reallocation; ii) agents 
have the choice of being employed in production or being engaged in R&D activities; and iii) 
there is no full employment because trade unions representing workers’ interests set the wage 
rate above the competitive level.  
Key results and policy conclusions 
In the theoretical model, we show that,  
i)  Powerful trade unions or higher labour costs associated with one or more of the labour-
market variables (e.g. unemployment compensation, payroll taxes paid by employers, the 
taxes paid by workers or the costs of employment protection) cause more unemployment 
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ii)  A coordinated bargaining process increases employment, but at the price of a lower 
growth rate. These theoretical predictions are consistent with our empirical analysis. 
On passive labour market policies, we reach the following key theoretical results. First, we 
analyse the consequences for growth and unemployment of a more generous unemployment 
insurance system, then higher taxes on labour incomes and finally a higher level of employment 
protection.  
The first result is that an increase in unemployment compensation or in payroll taxes, or in the 
taxes paid by workers or in employment protection leads to an increase in unemployment and to 
a decrease in the rate of growth.  
This finding is very intuitive: a higher labour cost implies a higher wage and so a decline in 
labour demand. The total outcome is a contraction of monopolistic profits with the subsequent 
reduction in the expected value of an innovation. This effect, together with the fact that higher 
wages make production more attractive with respect to R&D, tends to reduce the number of 
workers engaged in research. Thus, the growth rate falls, too. Concerning the impact on 
unemployment, since neither wage rates nor labour demands change, the only  effect is a 
contraction of profits. This discourages workers from engaging in R&D activities, with the 
consequent fall in the growth rate and rise in unemployment. 
The impact of the unions can be analysed in two steps. For an uncoordinated wage bargaining 
process, one can derive the implications of higher bargaining power. Subsequently, we can 
compare the outcome of an efficient bargaining process with the inefficient outcome computed 
above. 
Thus, the second key result is that an increase in unions’ bargaining power leads to an increase 
in the unemployment rate and to a decrease in economic growth. 
The economic intuition is that greater bargaining power implies higher wages. Then, as the 
labour demand for production declines, monopolistic profits contract, as does the expected 
value of an innovation. This situation discourages workers from R&D. The total outcome again 
is more unemployment and a lower rate of economic growth. 
If in each sector the monopolistic firm and the trade union bargain jointly over both labour 
demand and the wage rate, the outcome is an efficient one. The third key result is that under 
efficient bargaining, employment levels are higher but economic growth is also lower than 
under uncoordinated bargaining. Yet, the comparison is ambiguous for unemployment. 
Because there are fewer researchers but more workers employed in production, we do not know 
the total effect on unemployment. The gain in employment at the same labour cost is due to the 
coordination in wage-setting and the labour demand for production. But the decreasing returns 
to research induce a contraction of the monopolistic profits while the opportunity cost of R&D 
is unchanged. Consequently, there are fewer researchers under efficient bargaining. 
The empirical analysis produced some key results. The observed high unemployment rate in 
Continental Europe and the slowdown in economic growth in recent decades have naturally 
given rise to the question of whether these two phenomena are related. Our theoretical 
framework clearly shows that labour market institutions may imply high unemployment and 
slow growth. Equipped with these results, we then explore if the heterogeneity of growth and 
unemployment experiences across European countries prevails at a regional level and, if that is 
the case, how much of this is accounted for by labour market institutions. 
The disaggregated data we use comes from Eurostat’s European Regional Database (2005). The 
statistical regions of Europe correspond to NUTS 2 regions. The average population size of the 
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regions considered are Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Ireland, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and the UK, for the period 1980–95.  
In summary, these empirical results confirm our theoretical approach: 
1)  The tax wedge and unemployment benefits reduce the growth rate and increase the 
unemployment rate. 
2)  Employment protection increases unemployment rates, without a significant effect on the 
growth rate of GDP per capita. 
3)  Coordinated wage bargaining reduces the growth rate and the unemployment rate. More 
than a validation, this last result indicates the link between unemployment and 
coordination, which is ambiguous in our theoretical model. 
4)  The growth rate of TFP increases (decreases) the growth of the GDP per capita (the 
unemployment rate). In our model, a higher TFP stems from a more efficient R&D sector.  
Nevertheless, the links between bargaining power and the endogenous variables are not 
significant, whereas our theoretical model suggests unambiguous relationships. These results 
can be explained by the poor approximation of the bargaining power by our statistical measure 
(collective bargaining coverage). 
3.3.2.2  Productivity, Hours Worked and Tax/Benefit Systems in Europe and Beyond 
Author: Ville Kaitila (ETLA) (Deliverable No. 16A)  
Introduction  
The EU-15 countries were catching up with the US in terms of labour productivity up until 
1995, but since the Europe has on average been losing ground. There are, however, considerable 
differences among the European countries in this respect. Meanwhile, the average number of 
hours worked by the working-age population declined in the EU-15 countries relative to the US 
up until the mid-1990s, but started recovering shortly thereafter. As a result of the developments 
in productivity and hours worked, there has been very little change in relative GDP per capita 
between the EU-15 and the US since 1970. Even so, owing to Europe’s slower population 
growth, total GDP reached a peak relative to the US in the mid-1970s and has been falling 
behind ever since. 
Research task 
We put special emphasis on tax and benefit variables when we analyse factors that may have 
affected the relative performance of the EU-25 and other OECD countries in 1960–2004. We 
decompose GDP per capita into two parts (see above): i) how much value added in purchasing 
power terms is produced on average in one hour worked (labour productivity) and ii) how many 
hours the working-age population (aged 15-64) work on average. The latter variable merges 
three labour market indicators into one – the number of hours worked by each employed person, 
the participation rate and unemployment. Yet, from our point of view the important issue is the 
total number of hours worked. We do not discuss whether the different factors influence the 
supply of or the demand for labour. 
To the extent that the analysis is also based on the developments preceding the early 1990s, the 
new EU member countries that joined the Union in 2004 are not included. At the same time, 
some industrialised countries outside the EU-15 are included because they can give us further 
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Methodological approach used 
We approach the research task from several angles. On the one hand, we use panel data 
econometrics for 21 OECD countries in 1960–2004 to explain the growth rate of labour 
productivity and the number of hours worked. The data are in non-overlapping five-year 
averages. This should largely remove the influence of business cycles. The estimation method is 
pooled least squares estimations with White heteroskedasticity-consistent covariances for the 
cross-sections, corrected for the degrees of freedom. We use both country- and time-period 
fixed effects. In addition to this, we use cross-sections to analyse the 1995–2004 period. We 
concentrate on different kinds of tax and benefit variables but also take into account variables as 
diverse as investment into R&D and inflation. Productivity and hours worked are mostly 
analysed separately. Even so, their possible interaction is also discussed.  
Key results and policy conclusions  
The first key finding is that the development of productivity does not seem to be influenced by 
tax/benefit variables. While there surely is a problem with productivity growth in the EU-15 
countries, there are some points that need to be taken into account before criticising the EU 
countries too harshly. Although slower productivity growth is true on average, there are several 
EU-15 countries with growth rates in 1995–2004 more or less equal to those in the US. 
Meanwhile, Spain and Italy, and to a lesser extent the Netherlands, suffered from low 
productivity growth during this period. In fact, the average growth rate of productivity in 1995–
2000 in the EU-15, excluding Spain and Italy, was the same as in the US. Whereas Spain 
experienced negative productivity growth, employment grew very rapidly and GDP growth has 
equalled that in the US. Simultaneously, Italy and to a lesser extent the Netherlands saw a loss 
of competitiveness owing to a rise in unit labour costs that was far too rapid. 
In the cross-section analyses for the averages of 1995–2004, we concentrated on ‘high-
productivity countries’ with productivity exceeding 70% of the US level in 2004. This is 
because the growth strategy of the least wealthy countries can be based on very different 
foundations than in countries that are closer to the technological frontier. We found that there is 
a statistically significant positive correlation between the growth rate of productivity, on the one 
hand, and higher R&D and ICT investment as a percentage of GDP, a higher share of young 
adults with at least upper secondary education and lower levels of product market regulation, on 
the other. Often this result requires that we exclude Ireland, which has had a very high 
productivity growth rate with little investment in ICT or R&D. No correlation was found 
between productivity growth and the taxes-to-GDP ratio or the degree of unionisation. 
The results from our pooled least squares regression analysis show that productivity 
convergence has occurred. The results also largely confirm those from the cross-section data 
analyses. The growth rate of labour productivity has been positively affected by higher fixed 
investment, lower inflation, higher R&D investment and increased exports. In most 
specifications, taxes and gross replacement rates had no statistically significant effect on 
productivity growth. We found a negative effect from taxes and a positive one from gross 
replacement rates when they appeared together with fixed investment or inflation. With this 
evidence, however, we conclude that taxes and gross replacement rates are unlikely to have had 
an effect on productivity growth. 
The second key finding is that tax/benefit variables do affect the development of the number of 
hours worked. The average number of hours worked by a person of working age was the same 
in the EU-15 area as in the US in 1970 but declined thereafter to just 73% of the US level by 
1997. After that, it recovered and rose to 79% by 2004. The faster ageing of the European  
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population increases healthcare and other costs to these societies. The costs would be easier to 
finance from a larger GDP, and GDP would be larger if Europeans were to participate more in 
production. 
In many studies, the lower number of working hours in Europe has been attributed to higher 
taxes and social benefits or to a relatively stronger influence of trade unions (or to all of these 
factors). Higher taxes mean that the opportunity cost of leisure time increases and it becomes 
less profitable to work. According to our cross-section analyses, there was a strong negative 
correlation in the OECD countries between the average number of hours worked by the 
working-age population and the taxes-to-GDP ratio in 2000–04, although this requires the 
exclusion of Denmark, Finland and Sweden from the analysis. Also, looking at historical time 
series the rise and then stabilisation of taxes at some new higher level seems to have often 
resulted first in a decline in the number of hours worked and then their stabilisation at some new 
lower level. 
We further find a negative correlation between the average number of hours worked and product 
market regulation, gross replacement rates and the strictness of overall employment protection 
legislation. Income inequality and trade union density do not correlate with the number of hours 
worked, but collective bargaining coverage has a negative correlation. There is also a negative 
correlation between the ratio of collective bargaining coverage and trade union density, on the 
one hand, and the average number of hours worked, on the other. This ratio can be thought of as 
a proxy of how ‘democratic’ the trade unions are. If the ratio is very high, a relatively small 
number of trade union members or their representatives negotiate wages for almost every 
employed person. At least in principle, it is possible that this leads to a radicalisation of trade 
union policies. 
According to our pooled least squares panel data estimations for the 1960–2004 period, the 
average number of hours worked by the working-age population seems to depend negatively on 
the taxes-to-GDP ratio. Also, as the only independent variable, gross replacement rates have had 
a negative effect, collective bargaining coverage has had a positive effect, and the ratio of 
collective bargaining coverage and trade union density has had a negative effect on the number 
of hours worked. At the same time, trade union density and our measure of employment 
protection, which is different from the one used in the cross-section analysis, fail to explain the 
number of working hours.  
It has to be noted that leisure time is valuable in itself. If we work less, however, GDP will be 
lower because higher productivity growth can no longer compensate for less working time as 
had been possible in the past. And here we do find evidence that higher taxes with respect to 
GDP have had a negative impact on the number of hours worked. This can of course arise either 
through lower demand for labour or lower supply of labour, or both. Taxation, benefits and 
income transfers potentially have a significant impact on the labour market through incentives. 
The key policy conclusion is that more emphasis should be put on education, investment and 
incentives to work.  
3.3.2.3  Labour Market Institutions and Productivity in the New EU Member States 
Authors: Sten Anspal and Andres Võrk (PRAXIS) (Deliverable No. 18) 
Introduction 
Prior to accession to the EU, the Central and Eastern European candidate countries adopted a 
range of labour market institutions similar to those in the Western European countries (Riboud 
et al., 2002). Since the period of transition from planned to market economies, many of these 
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makers have justified the changes by the need for greater flexibility in the economy, in order to 
accommodate a dynamic process of growth and catching-up with Western European income 
levels, in relation to which the NMS levels are just a little more than half. In this study, we 
consider the possible role of labour market institutions in fostering or hindering growth and 
convergence towards Western European income levels. 
When speaking of the influence of labour market institutions on growth and output 
convergence, a relevant question is also whether and to what extent the institutions themselves 
are subject to convergence in the process of integration into the EU. There are several channels 
through which labour market institutions may be influenced in this process. Directives and 
transnational agreements may directly help to shape national institutions of social protection or 
employment regulation. Labour unions in the NMS collaborate with and receive assistance from 
their EU counterparts and EU-level organisations. Another channel through which convergence 
might occur is imitation, whereby a country adopts institutions similar to those of a 
neighbouring Western country.  
Research task 
The two questions posed in our paper are, first, how the labour market institutions in the NMS 
have developed in comparison with those of the EU-15, and second, whether these 
developments have contributed to their productivity growth. In other words, we ask whether 
there is evidence of convergence in labour market institutions between the new and old member 
states, and whether these institutions have had an effect on convergence in their levels of output 
per worker. 
Methodological approach used 
In outlining the trends in the development of the labour market institutions in the NMS, we try 
to compare these with those in Western European countries. As for the time period, we consider 
the period from 1995 to the latest period for which data is available, thus concentrating less on 
specifically transition-related reforms than on more recent trends in the decade prior to EU 
accession. Using indicators from Eurostat, the OECD and other sources, we try to identify 
which labour market institutions converge and which diverge with respect to the EU-15 average. 
As labour market institutions, we consider the taxation of labour (implicit tax rates on labour), 
unemployment benefits (expenditure on passive labour market policies), union density and 
coverage of collective bargaining, employment protection (employment-protection legislation 
indexes) and expenditure on active labour market policies.  
After giving background data on the developments of labour market institutions in the NMS, we 
then estimate the relationship between labour market institutions and productivity growth based 
on a panel of OECD countries over the period 1970–99 (using averaged data over non-
overlapping five-year periods). We also try to examine the effects of these institutions 
empirically in a dataset for 1975–2004, which also includes the NMS. The data on labour 
market institutions are from the dataset by Belot and van Ours (2004), supplemented with data 
on the NMS as much as possible.  
Key results and policy conclusions 
Examining the developments of the labour market institutions in the Central and Eastern 
European NMS during the decade prior to accession, we find that the trends shared among the 
countries in this group are declining rates of unionisation and coverage of collective bargaining. 
In most countries, the taxation of labour also declined. In the majority of countries, expenditure 
on active labour market policies did not keep up with GDP growth. The relative decline of 
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the background of substantially increased unemployment rates in some countries. Spending on 
passive measures was also lower in most countries towards the end of the period under review 
in comparison with the mid-1990s.  
The situation is more varied concerning indicators of the strictness of employment protection 
legislation. Regulations were relaxed in Slovenia and Slovakia; employers’ assessments of 
hiring and firing procedures also became more favourable in the Baltic States. The more flexible 
countries, Hungary and Poland, on the other hand, tightened their regulations somewhat with 
regard to temporary work.  
Some of these trends were in the same direction in the NMS and Western European countries. 
Trade unions weakened in both groups of countries, although the NMS moved more rapidly 
towards lower unionisation and less decentralised bargaining systems, such that divergence 
occurred in this regard. Taxation of labour remained mostly stable in the EU-15, whereas it fell 
in most NMS; however, the latter development has to be viewed in light of fairly high levels of 
labour taxation in Central and Eastern European countries. There was also divergence in 
spending on both active and passive labour market policies. One can perhaps speak of 
institutional convergence on the EU in the sense that largely similar institutions have been 
adopted in the NMS, but the parameters of the systems differ in important ways.  
When estimating a regression using panel data on OECD countries for the period 1970–99 with 
labour market institutions as explanatory variables, the results confirm the negative effect of 
taxes on productivity growth. Still, the variable becomes insignificant when hourly productivity 
is used as the dependent variable, indicating that taxes may affect productivity through the 
effects on hours worked. In the cases of employment protection, union density and the 
centralisation of bargaining, the effects seem to depend on the particular combinations of these 
institutions analysed and their interactions. For active labour market policies, positive effects on 
productivity growth were not found. 
In a sample that also included the NMS, the convergence term explained most of the differences 
in growth rates. Labour market institutions were generally insignificant, with the exception of 
the negative effects of active labour market policies, union density and centralised bargaining in 
some specifications. The results indicate that the faster productivity growth rates in the NMS 
stem more from catching up from their lower initial levels of output per worker, than from their 
policy choices in the design of labour market institutions.  
3.3.2.4 Productivity, Employment and Taxes – Evidence on the Potential Trade-offs and 
Impacts in the EU 
Authors: Kari E.O. Alho and Nuutti Nikula (ETLA) (Deliverable No. 16C)  
Introduction  
A quick look at the cross-section data for the EU countries in relation to the US suggests that 
two goals – productivity, being the key determinant of long-term economic growth, and 
employment – would be in sharp conflict with each other (see Kaitila, 2006). If the objective is 
to employ more of the EU labour force, it can only be met through a lower level of productivity 
and vice versa. This is an important policy issue and therefore information on this link, 
illuminating either a trade-off or a mutually positive relationship between these two key goals in 
the short and long run, can deliver essential insight on the internal consistency of the Lisbon 
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Research task  
The relationship between productivity and employment is a long-standing issue in 
macroeconomics, with a fierce debate between the New Keynesian and Real Business Cycle 
schools, focusing on whether productivity and employment are negatively or positively linked 
in the short run. Aside from the theoretical and empirical controversy of a proper business cycle 
model, there is an important policy question connected with this dispute. Accordingly, our main 
interest here lies mostly in the question of the long-term effect of productivity gains on 
employment and thereby we shift the focus to consider the possible long-term structural rigidity 
in this connection. We also analyse the role of tax policies, which can have an essential impact, 
and which has so far received only limited attention in the related SVAR literature.  
Methodological approaches used 
The basis for the SVAR analysis is a theoretical model describing technical change, average 
hours worked per employee and the aggregate unemployment rate. We identify technology, 
demand and tax shocks. Positive demand shocks lead to an expansion in employment, but have 
no long-term effect on productivity. In the long run, we also allow for the possibility of 
structural rigidity so that a positive technology shock may possibly lead to a cut in employment.  
We also allow for nominal price rigidity vs. flexibility. In the former case, the wage rate is 
bargained and the price set before the shocks are realised and the firms supply all the output 
demanded. If there is a positive productivity shock, the demand for labour is reduced as the 
firms can meet the output demanded by fewer production factors (i.e. labour), and thus there is a 
negative short-term effect on employment from the shock. If there is price and wage flexibility 
in the economy, output is determined by equilibrium between aggregate supply and demand. In 
the event of a positive technology shock, the real wage rate and labour demand will rise in the 
short term as a result of the shock. This issue of diversity of short-term effects of technology 
shocks can only be settled in an empirical analysis. In the long term, there can be neutrality 
from productivity shocks with respect to employment, but not necessarily if the labour market is 
rigid.  
In the empirical part of the paper, we use two approaches. Both are based on a similar 
theoretical methodology describing the equilibrium in the labour market, but diverge in the 
method of empirical application. We first build a theoretical open economy model and identify 
within it a technology, non-technology and tax shock along with their effects. In the empirical 
part, the first approach is to build structural VAR models and empirically determine the impacts 
of the structural shocks in the short and long term for all the EU-15 and some OECD countries. 
Second, we use an aggregative econometric model built by Alho (2002) for the Finnish labour 
market, based on the idea of the equilibrium rate of unemployment, and simulate it under two 
types of productivity gains that differ in their origin. This allows us to provide a complementary 
view on the nature of the productivity shocks and their effects. In addition, we also consider a 
change in the tax/benefit system.  
Key results and policy conclusions  
The theoretical model shows that the equilibrium unemployment rate depends negatively on 
labour taxes, but not on the real interest rate, as a higher rate only leads to lower levels of 
productivity and income. This means that a permanent shift in the capital income tax rate does 
not have an effect on employment in the long run. On the other hand, we come to the conclusion 
that a permanent change in labour taxes only has a long-term negative impact on employment, 
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The SVAR model analysis shows that in the short term (but less so in the long term), there is a 
negative trade-off between employment and productivity in most EU countries (although not in 
all of them), unlike in the case of the US. The results of the simulations of the econometric 
model show that, while not in the short term, in the medium term there may be important 
employment gains from the acceleration of productivity; that being stated, in the long term there 
is no connection between them. 
The results underline that in the short term there is indeed a trade-off in the EU between the two 
key economic goals of productivity rises and employment. This trade-off is less severe in the 
long run, and while it does not fully disappear, over time it becomes statistically insignificant. 
In the short term, a positive non-technology shock has a positive effect on productivity.  
The results by country clearly differ in some important respects. Quite uniformly, there is a 
short-term trade-off between employment and productivity, such that a positive productivity 
shock leads to an immediate reduction in employment in the EU countries. We can interpret this 
as productivity gains having largely been linked in the short term to simultaneous labour 
shedding, i.e. we have the basic case of price stickiness in the short term. In the long term, this 
trade-off occurs in some cases, but is of a smaller magnitude and is not so significant in 
statistical terms. Nor is the effect as uniform as it is in the short term. Thus, most of the EU-15 
countries do not reveal a long-term trade-off between productivity and employment, with the 
exception of the Netherlands and Italy. What is interesting is that, by contrast, the US economy 
does not reveal this characteristic – there is virtually no trade-off of this kind, even in the short 
term, which confirms the situation of price flexibility there.  
As to the effects of aggregate tax shocks, the pattern of impulse responses is less uniform 
among the countries than between employment and productivity, and the majority of the effects 
are not statistically significant. Overall, it seems that the negative impact of aggregate taxes is 
stronger on productivity than on hours, which is a somewhat unexpected result. 
In order to analyse the effects of taxes more accurately we modified the VAR model so that it 
includes two different kinds of taxes (corporate taxes and employee taxes) in relation to GDP. 
We carried out this analysis solely for the aggregate EU-15 countries. The results show that the 
labour tax shock has a statistically significant negative effect on employment and not on 
productivity, which is line with the theoretical model. Corporate taxes are fairly neutral with 
respect to employment, which is also in line with the reasoning above. Nevertheless, they also 
have a negative effect on productivity, as should be, although the impulse response is not 
statistically significant in the long term (see also Alho and Nikula, 2007).  
Finally, we use the econometric model for the labour market that was built and estimated for the 
Finnish economy by Alho (2002). The general policy conclusion of these simulations is that, 
irrespective of the fact that in the long term employment and productivity are not correlated, 
over the medium term important gains in employment can be achieved through productivity-
boosting measures if the real wage is capable of adjusting to and assisting in the absorption of 
the shocks. In this sense, we could take a positive position as to the widespread public 
conception among policy-makers about the positive relationship between productivity and 
employment, as exemplified here at least with respect to the case of a single EU country.  
Another broad policy conclusion is that EU countries should make their labour markets more 
flexible to enable them to adjust smoothly to negative supply shocks and to the introduction of 
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3.3  Macroeconomics of the EU tax systems under EMU (WP 4) 
3.3.1  Summary of WP 4 
Introduction  
Since the launch of the common currency, the euro area has experimented with a number of 
uncoordinated tax reforms, mainly tax cuts for personal and corporate income, changes in VAT 
rates and a reduced number of income tax brackets. In addition, governments have been striving 
to reform their benefit systems. Although tax policy has been the core business of governments 
for decades, the new monetary regime and the scheme chosen for economic governance in the 
eurozone have given rise to new questions: 
•  The stability and growth pact leads to a higher reliance on automatic stabilisers, as 
opposed to discretionary fiscal policies. If euro-area countries are to move towards flatter 
tax systems, what can be expected in terms of automatic stabilisers? 
•  Monetary union changes the short-term impact of tax policies, both at home and in other 
EMU countries. Yet several other evolutions, such as real integration and financial 
liberalisation, may have also affected tax multipliers. What is the impact of a tax cut on 
the domestic economy as well as on euro-area partners nowadays? Cross-border 
multipliers are especially important as they define the needs for fiscal coordination in the 
euro area. 
•  The very existence of the SGP changes the incentives of euro-area countries to reform 
tax/benefit systems. The question is thus whether the SGP has been powerful in 
countervailing political myopia and fostering structural reforms, or whether it has reduced 
the incentive to cut taxes.  
Research tasks 
WP 4 addresses these three issues through five research papers, three of which are theoretical 
and two empirical. These papers aim at 1) studying the impact of tax progressiveness on 
automatic stabilisers, 2) analysing tax and spending direct and cross-border multipliers in the 
monetary union, and 3) evaluating the impact of the SGP on the incentives of governments to 
reform tax/benefit systems. 
Methodological approaches used  
The first theoretical paper, addressing the first policy issue (1), considers the stabilising 
properties of the tax systems with respect to various shocks hitting the economy. The paper uses 
a Mundell-Fleming type of model with a supply curve and a Taylor rule. Taxation can be 
regressive, proportional or progressive. Taxation and public spending can be fully indexed on 
prices, partially indexed or unindexed. Three kinds of macroeconomic shocks are successively 
scrutinised: a demand shock, a tax shock and a supply shock. 
The second theoretical model addressing issue (2) involves two identical EMU countries in a 
static setting. Each economy is described by an IS curve and a Phillips curve. The single central 
bank sets the single nominal interest rate through explicit optimisation of a loss function that 
depends on aggregate inflation and on the aggregate output gap of the ‘area’. Hence, it reacts 
endogenously to public spending and net tax shocks that are exogenous. 
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In the first version of the model, the central bank does not accommodate fiscal shocks: in the 
case of an expansionary shock in one country, it raises the interest rate until the aggregate 
inflation rate and output gap of the area are stabilised. This means that output declines in the 
other country, unless the shock has large supply-side effects, in which case perfect stabilisation 
by the central bank is unattainable. 
In the second version, the central bank smoothes the interest rate, i.e. it is reluctant to move the 
interest rate too suddenly after a shock. In this case, a fiscal expansion in one country has a 
positive impact on the other country’s output gap, unless the shock has large supply-side effects. 
The empirical analysis addressing issue (2) above involves two distinct methodologies leading 
to mostly convergent results. 
In the first of these papers, a two-country, dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) 
model is estimated in order to evaluate the impact of a public spending shock occurring in one 
economy. The two countries chosen are Germany and France. Like the theoretical model 
described above, the setting includes a Phillips curve and an IS curve in each country, and a 
single Taylor rule. Fiscal policy is exogenous. The model is estimated through a Bayesian 
methodology (using priors from related studies) with quarterly data covering the period from 
1991 to 2005. 
In turn, the second empirical paper provides a factor-augmented VAR (FAVAR) analysis of 
fiscal multipliers and fiscal spillovers. First, domestic multipliers are analysed through the 
estimation of a FAVAR model of net taxes, public spending, output, inflation and interest rates 
for Germany, the UK and the US, successively, based on quarterly data from 1971 to 2004. The 
world business cycle is controlled for by the inclusion of factors representing developments in 
the world economy. Fiscal shocks are identified using an identification scheme à la Blanchard 
and Perotti (2002) and Perotti (2005). In order to see whether fiscal multipliers have evolved 
over time, each model is then re-estimated on a rolling window of 17 years. 
In a second step, the cross-border effects of fiscal policies are analysed by adding the GDP and 
real effective exchange rate of seven EU countries in the German FAVAR model. This extended 
model is estimated across the whole period as well as on 17-year rolling windows. 
The last question above (3) is addressed by building a dynamic, two-country model where the 
two periods are linked by investment. Imperfect competition and distortions materialise through 
mark-ups in goods markets and in the labour market, influenced by capital and income taxes. 
Several kinds of governments are successively studied: a social planner, a myopic government 
and an unelected body. The sanctions incurred by violations of the SGP are introduced in the 
model. Finally, four types of reforms are studied: a reduction in labour taxes, a reduction in the 
welfare state, a reform of the labour market and a reform of product markets. 
Key results and policy conclusions 
The main results of the first theoretical study are that,  
•  If the economies are primarily hurt by demand shocks, then flatter tax systems tend to 
destabilise output, whereas the indexation of taxes on prices tends to stabilise it. 
•  If the economies are principally hurt by supply shocks, then the progressiveness of 
taxation has little impact on output stability. 
On the whole, the move towards flatter tax systems would likely lead to more unstable output in 
the euro area. 
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The key results of the second theoretical study on issue (1) are as follows. Considering that a) 
the European Central Bank (ECB) does smooth the interest rate, b) net tax shocks do have 
supply-side effects and c) spending shocks may have a declining impact on aggregate demand 
owing to financial liberalisation, the positive spillovers produced in the euro area today from 
public spending expansions may be decreasing compared with the past, and tax cuts may now 
be producing negative spillovers.  
The first empirical paper, addressing issue (2) above, finds that a positive spending shock in 
Germany has a positive Keynesian impact on German GDP and a positive but small spillover on 
French GDP. A positive spending shock in France has symmetrical effects. The main finding of 
the paper is that spillovers are small because of a significant reaction of the common interest 
rate to spending shocks in either country. 
The central conclusion of the second empirical paper on issue (2) is that both the domestic and 
cross-border effects of German tax shocks have tended to weaken over time. But they have 
remained positive, i.e. an expansionary shock in Germany has a positive impact on partner 
countries, especially neighbouring ones. Still, the impact on the interest rate is found to be 
weak. 
The main results of the last study, addressing issue (3), can be summarised in that political 
myopia has a negative impact on the willingness to reduce labour taxes, a pattern reinforced by 
the SGP because excessive deficits lead to sanctions. Political myopia also reduces the 
willingness to reduce the welfare state, but this time the SGP has a positive impact on the 
willingness to reform. Finally, while myopia has little effect on the willingness of governments 
to reform labour and goods markets, the SGP provides the missing incentive. 
Given that all reforms but those of goods markets have a negative impact on neighbouring 
countries, the paper concludes that EU countries should continue to coordinate product market 
reforms but leave the reforms of the welfare state and the labour markets to peer pressure, with 
the SGP acting as a positive catalyst. 
3.3.2   Summary of the deliverables  
There are five working papers prepared in this work package. 
3.3.2.1  Economic Shocks, Progressiveness of Taxation, and Indexation of Taxes and 
Public Expenditure in the EMU 
Author: Markku Kotilainen (ETLA) (Deliverable No. 11A) 
Introduction 
Progressive income taxation is common practice in the old member states of the EU. The NMS, 
however, have challenged this practice. Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Slovakia currently have 
proportional income tax systems, as does Romania.  
Proportional income taxation has microeconomic advantages, which are related to incentives to 
work. Also, arguments are often made that inefficiencies can arise from differences between 
proportional capital income taxes and high marginal income taxes. Furthermore, there is some 
evidence of positive growth effects from proportional taxation. The counterarguments to 
proportional income taxation are usually based on income distribution. In addition to the above-
mentioned viewpoints, there is a macroeconomic aspect that also deserves attention. This aspect 
is how different tax systems affect the stabilisation of an economy facing diverse kinds of 
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Research task 
We study the properties of various kinds of income tax systems in the context of the EMU 
countries. The emphasis is on the progressiveness of taxation and on the indexation of taxes and 
public expenditure. 
We examine economies facing three unanticipated shocks: demand, tax and supply shocks. 
Demand shocks can be exogenous changes in foreign demand, consumer preferences, etc. 
Policy-related demand shocks are typically changes in public expenditure. Changes in taxes 
have both a demand and a supply component. A typical supply shock is an exogenous change in 
productivity, oil prices or other factors affecting producer prices. If supply shocks are 
temporary, automatic stabilisers to cushion the effects can easily be justified. If, however, the 
shocks are permanent, it can be argued that the stabilisers delay the necessary adjustment. When 
the (temporary) shocks originate in the market, we would like to stabilise them to some extent. 
In the case of policy-induced shocks, the focus is usually on the effectiveness of the policy tool 
in question. In this situation, automatic stabilisers reduce some of the effects of the measure.  
Methodological approach used 
We use a Mundell-Fleming-based, two-country, theoretical macroeconomic model with a rather 
rich supply side. The bilateral exchange rate between the countries is fixed. The model tries to 
depict the situation in the larger EMU countries. We also use a single-country model, which is 
more relevant in the case of small EMU countries. 
In addition to the extent of tax progressiveness, the authorities have to decide on the inflationary 
adjustments to be made on taxation and public expenditure. In extreme cases, inflation can be 
totally neglected, or taxes and public expenditure can be fully indexed to changes in prices.  
The tax shock is a mixed shock including demand as well as supply effects (through wages and 
prices). All shocks are assumed to occur in country 1 (‘Germany’). But they have effects on 
country 2 (‘France’) through output and price spillovers as well as through changes in 
competitiveness. Because the model is too complicated for obtaining a priori results, we 
calculate the solution by using realistic estimates for the parameters. In the single-country 
model, however, a priori results are obtained. 
Key results and policy conclusions 
We first present the effects without any monetary policy reactions. A positive demand shock in 
country 1 increases the output and prices of both countries, although more so in the country 
where the shock originates. In the event of a tax cut, the output effect in the country where the 
shock originates is clearly positive, whereas in the foreign country it is relatively smaller than in 
the case of a demand shock, because that country’s competitiveness deteriorates. Prices change 
only marginally because the effects through lower costs and through increasing economic 
activity work in opposite directions. A pure supply shock has, in the short run, a ‘beggar-thy-
neighbour’ nature.  
When studying Taylor-type monetary policy rules, we notice that in the case of a demand shock, 
following a price or output target tends to stabilise both union-wide output and prices. In 
relation to a tax shock, strict adherence to a price target does not tend to stabilise output, 
because prices change only marginally. After a positive supply shock, prices decline in both 
countries, whereas union-wide output remains rather stable because of opposing effects in the 
two countries. Following the price target would thus destabilise the output.  
When studying the effects of progressive taxation in the single-country model, we notice that 
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a supply shock, progressiveness tends to stabilise output if taxes are fully indexed. If they are 
not, the outcome depends on the relative magnitudes of the parameters of the model. In 
particular, the smaller the demand effect of taxes, the more likely it is that progressiveness will 
tend to stabilise output even with a low indexation of taxes. 
Progressive taxation definitely stabilises prices only with respect to a tax shock. In the case of a 
demand shock, progressiveness tends to stabilise prices when the supply effect is weak, and in 
the case of a supply shock when the demand effect is weak. 
In the two-country investigation, we use the model version without monetary policy reactions. 
The motivation for this is that we want to keep the effects of the tax parameters transparent. 
Monetary policy often takes time, and we do not know the policy rules very well. Because the 
monetary policy of the central bank is based on discrete decisions, the reaction can also vary 
over time. We research two scenarios: 1) where the reaction of wages and accordingly of prices 
to taxes is rather weak, and 2) where wages and prices respond strongly to changes in taxes. The 
first assumption may be founded on the short-term nature of the model (wages are sticky owing 
to contracts that are often for one or two years) and by the supposition that employees value the 
public expenditures financed by taxes. The second scenario is relevant in countries whose 
citizens strongly dislike taxes and where wages are flexibly determined at short notice. 
When prices react strongly to changes in taxes, the output stabilisation property of increasing 
progressiveness holds in both countries in relation to a demand shock. But now the deviation of 
prices in both countries tends to rise. This is because increasing taxes tends to raise prices. Here 
we have a clear case for restrictive monetary policy. In the instance of a tax shock, increasing 
progressiveness tends to stabilise the output of both countries by dampening some of the 
shock’s effect. When prices react strongly and quickly to changes in taxation, higher 
progressiveness tends to dampen the original decline in taxes, and accordingly the decline in 
prices in country 1. In country 2, taxes increase more with progressive taxation and the decline 
in prices in this country is also smaller. In the situation of a supply shock, output and prices are, 
again, not very sensitive to progressiveness. Output in both countries tends to deviate slightly 
less with higher progressiveness. Also, prices in country 1 deviate slightly less with progressive 
taxation. Prices in country 2, however, deviate somewhat more. When taxes are less than fully 
indexed, the effects of progressiveness on output deviations are about the same as in the case of 
a weaker supply reaction to taxes. Nevertheless, prices become more sensitive to 
progressiveness. Price deviations are enhanced when progressiveness increases. 
About the role of progressiveness in economic stabilisation after various shocks, in the two-
country model it can be concluded that progressive taxation tends to increase the stability of 
output in both countries in the face of a demand shock. Progressiveness stabilises prices if 
wages and prices react only modestly to changes in taxes, but destabilises them when these 
reactions are strong. In the event of a tax shock, progressive taxation tends to stabilise the 
output and prices of both countries in both cases. From a policy point of view, progressive 
taxation partly offsets the output effects of a tax cut. Following a supply shock, output and 
prices are not very sensitive to progressiveness. This result is consistent with studies using the 
INTERLINK, QUEST, NiGEM and FRB/US models (where, however, the full operation of all 
types of automatic stabilisers is assumed). Sensitivity increases when taxes are less than fully 
indexed to prices. In this circumstance, output deviations are slightly greater than with 
proportional taxation in the country where the shock originates, but slightly smaller in the other 
country. 
We can roughly summarise the results obtained in the single- and two-country models by saying 
that progressive taxation tends to stabilise output or has a neutral effect in most cases. The  
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effects on price stabilisation are more controversial, however, since they can be stabilising, 
rather neutral or destabilising depending on the situation at hand.  
In the event of a positive demand shock occurring in one country, the deviation of output and 
prices in both countries increases when the indexation of taxes or public expenditure increases. 
This is because deflating the effect of rising prices tends to enhance the real effect. After a tax 
shock, the price effect is so small, owing to the conflicting demand and supply effects of taxes, 
that indexation does not matter much. Following a supply shock, taking into account the effect 
of declining prices in one country tends to lead to heavier taxation, which in turn is likely to 
stabilise the output of that country. The effect is similar in the other country up to some medium 
degree of indexation. The effects of tax indexation on prices are small. Yet increasing the 
indexation of public expenditure tends to destabilise prices.  
3.3.2.2  Short-term Fiscal Spillovers in a Monetary Union 
Author: Agnès Bénassy-Quéré (CEPII) (Deliverable No. 11 B)  
Introduction  
One popular view concerning macroeconomic policy in the EMU is that the ECB should deal 
with aggregate shocks whereas national governments should concentrate on idiosyncratic 
shocks. Still, this simple division of labour encounters several difficulties. First, the ECB will 
react to aggregate shocks only to the extent that this does not contradict the objective of keeping 
inflation close to 2%. Second, monetary policy is not a perfect substitute for fiscal policy. Third, 
a fiscal impulse in one country may impact on output and prices in another country, owing to 
higher imports (the trade channel), reduced price competitiveness (the relative-price channel) or 
a rise in the common interest rate (the interest-rate channel). Whatever their net sign, the very 
existence of a fiscal spillover asks for some form of coordination among member states. Finally 
yet importantly, the effectiveness of fiscal policy is a much-debated issue. This raises the 
question of the need to coordinate tax and benefit reforms in the eurozone in relation to business 
cycles. 
Research task 
This study seeks to analyse the sign of short-term fiscal spillovers in a monetary union 
depending on i) the way in which fiscal policy is implemented (expenditures versus taxes), ii) 
the strength of the supply-side channel of tax policies, and iii) the extent of central bank 
accommodation. The recent evolution of prices in the eurozone has been shown to be very 
sensitive to tax policies in the large economies of the area, which have not resulted from fiscal 
cooperation. Simultaneously, the ECB has proven relatively flexible concerning short-term 
movements of aggregate inflation, especially with respect to one-off variations stemming from 
oil hikes or tax shocks. Hence, it is necessary to reconsider fiscal spillovers in the context in 
which a tax increase in country 1 may impact positively on country 2 just because price 
competitiveness is improved in country 2 as a result of higher prices in country 1, while the 
central bank reacts smoothly to higher inflation. 
Methodological approach used  
A simple, two-country, static model is developed. It relies on two IS curves, two Phillips curves 
and an optimisation behaviour by the central bank. Fiscal policy consists of either a spending 
shock, which impacts on demand, or a tax shock, which impacts on both demand and prices. 
Fiscal shocks are assumed to be exogenously implemented in country 1, and their effect on 
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Key results and policy conclusions  
The analysis shows that both a spending expansion and a tax cut produce positive spillovers on 
foreign output, provided the central bank accommodates the shock, unless tax cuts have large 
supply-side effects. In this case, the foreign country does not benefit from a fall in the interest 
rate (because of interest-rate smoothing), whereas it suffers from a loss in price competitiveness. 
If the central bank does not accommodate the shock, the spillovers of a fiscal expansion are 
generally negative: the common interest rate rises until aggregate demand is perfectly stabilised, 
which entails an output loss in the foreign country. But fiscal spillovers can be positive in the 
case of a tax cut, because induced disinflation reduces or even reverses the reaction of the 
central bank. 
Owing to financial liberalisation, it is possible that demand-side channels of fiscal policy have 
become less powerful compared with supply-side channels, because of the increased ability of 
households to disconnect consumption from current disposable income. This has important 
implications for fiscal spillovers. For a spending expansion, the spillover effect is likely to 
become less positive. In turn, the rising importance of supply-side effects relative to demand-
side effects is likely to turn positive spillovers into negative ones after a tax cut, at least if the 
central bank adopts interest-smoothing behaviour. 
3.3.2.3  Changing Patterns of Domestic and Cross-Border Fiscal Policy Multipliers in 
Europe and the US 
Authors: Agnès Bénassy-Quéré and Jacopo Cimadomo (CEPII) (Deliverable   
No. 24)  
Introduction  
The way in which fiscal policy influences domestic and foreign economies depends on several 
factors. In particular, the presence of factors such as excess capacity, an accommodating 
monetary policy, distortionary taxation and liquidity-constrained consumers play a prominent 
role in determining how fiscal policies affect economic activity in the home country. The impact 
on foreign output depends crucially on the importance of trade links, on real exchange rates and, 
in a monetary union, on the sensitivity of private investment and consumption to the interest 
rate. The last 30 years have witnessed frequent changes in the economic environment. For 
instance, in most OECD countries during the 1980s, the monetary policy stance was less 
accommodating compared with the 1970s, and more accommodating again in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s. Moreover, financial markets have been heavily deregulated. Hence, fiscal policy 
might have lost (or gained) power as a stimulating tool in the hands of policy-makers. 
Research task  
This study attempts to shed more light on the time evolution of domestic and cross-border tax 
and spending multipliers. We analyse the domestic impact of fiscal shocks in Germany, the UK 
and the US and cross-border fiscal spillovers from Germany to the seven largest EU economies.  
Methodological approach used 
The study combines a FAVAR approach with the identification strategy proposed by Blanchard 
and Perotti (2002) and Perotti (2005) to provide new evidence of the domestic impact of fiscal 
policy in three OECD countries: Germany, the UK and the US. In the two former cases, three 
‘global common factors’ (representing worldwide co-movement in business cycles, credit 
conditions and fiscal policies) are included in a baseline VAR model to control for a possible 
bias in multipliers estimation owing to the fact that worldwide phenomena may affect 
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fiscal shocks. We then extend our workhorse FAVAR model to study fiscal spillovers from the 
largest euro-area economy (Germany) to five neighbouring countries (France, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Belgium and Austria) and to two more remote countries (Spain and the UK).  
After analysing a period ranging between 1971 and 2004, we perform recursive estimations and 
shocks identification for single-country and two-country models based on rolling windows of 
data to assess whether, and if so how, spending and tax multipliers have changed in the last 34 
years. 
Key results and policy conclusions  
The analysis finds that tax shocks are generally more effective in spurring domestic output than 
government spending shocks. This outcome might be owing to the fact that tax policies may 
increase potential growth in the long run, especially when distortionary taxes are removed, thus 
increasing economic efficiency and competitiveness. Government spending shocks, on the other 
hand, are more likely to crowd out the private sector. When the estimation is performed 
recursively over samples of 17 years of data, it emerges that GDP multipliers have dropped 
drastically since the early 1990s, especially in Germany (tax shocks) and in the US (both tax 
and government spending shocks). Moreover, the conduct of fiscal policy seems to have 
become less erratic, as documented by a lower variance of fiscal shocks over time. This trend 
might help to explain the diminishing volatility in business cycles in the countries under 
examination. 
Expansionary fiscal policies in Germany do not generally have beggar-thy-neighbour effects on 
other European countries. In particular, when shorter subsamples are analysed, our results 
suggest that tax multipliers have been positive but diminishing for neighbouring countries 
(France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Austria). They have been weak and mostly 
insignificant for the more remote neighbours (the UK and Spain). Cross-border government 
spending multipliers are found to be monotonically weak for all the subsamples considered. Yet 
foreign output seems to react positively in the short run and when the 1970s are dropped, but 
that is just the case for the Netherlands, Belgium and Austria. 
Overall, these findings suggest that fiscal ‘surprises’ – in the form of unexpected reductions in 
taxation and expansions in government consumption and investment – have become 
progressively less successful in stimulating economic activity at the domestic level. This finding 
indicates that, in the framework of the EMU, policy-makers can only marginally rely on these 
discretionary instruments as a substitute for national monetary policy. Furthermore, the positive 
sign of cross-border multipliers suggests that the interest-rate channel of transmission of fiscal 
policy is offset by the trade one. 
3.3.2.4  Assessing Spillover Effects from Fiscal Policy in Europe: A DSGE Approach 
Author: Charlotte Möser (CEPS) (Deliverable No. 25) 
Introduction 
The introduction of the euro in 1999 has led to debate about new challenges for monetary and 
fiscal policy in Europe. In a currency union, countries share a common central bank, which 
responds to union-wide developments. Consequently, macroeconomic policy at the national 
level shifts towards fiscal policy. Whether countries belonging to the euro area should 
coordinate their fiscal policies depends among other things on the existence of spillover effects 
from fiscal policy. Spillover effects of fiscal policy can occur through the common interest rate 
in an integrated capital market and through international trade. In the latter case, fiscal 
expansions lead to increased economic activity, which in turn may also increase imports from 
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however. An expansionary fiscal policy in a few countries may put upward pressure on 
domestic inflation, forcing the ECB to raise interest rates and thereby affecting all countries in 
the euro area. 
Research task  
This study aims at providing evidence on spillover effects based on a structural modelling 
framework that can be applied for policy analysis. To this end, we develop and estimate a 
DSGE model to analyse the sign and extent of spillover effects of fiscal policy both within and 
among countries. To keep the analysis tractable, we set up a two-country model and estimate it 
with French and German time series data. We therefore employ a theoretical and an empirical 
approach at the same time, which is a novelty in the literature on fiscal spillover effects. We 
view our approach as a starting point for a comprehensive analysis of spillover effects of fiscal 
policy in a multi-country DSGE framework covering the entire euro area. 
In contrast with our approach, most of the literature analysing fiscal spillover effects uses 
empirical VAR models. A potential caveat – which we address by developing a structural model 
– is that VAR models are based on a non-structural modelling framework, which is not 
applicable for policy experiments and forecasting exercises.  
Methodological approach used  
We suggest a micro theoretically-founded model consisting of two countries of equal size 
constituting a currency union. In our model, monetary policy is conducted by a common central 
bank, which sets the interest rate for the union. Fiscal policy is implemented at the country level 
through government spending financed by lump-sum taxes. The model includes nominal 
rigidities and both country-specific and union-wide shocks.  
We estimate the model with Bayesian inference techniques using French and German time 
series data. Estimating instead of calibrating the model allows us to make direct use of time 
series data. The Bayesian estimation method also allows us to formalise the use of prior 
information obtained from earlier studies. Including prior information improves the estimation 
of the parameters of a DSGE model when data have a short sample period, as is the case for the 
euro area. In presenting our results, we discuss the parameter estimates and the transmission of a 
fiscal policy shock through impulse response functions. 
Our modelling approach belongs to a new research agenda that has been adopted by various 
policy institutions in recent years. In this research programme, DSGE models building on 
explicit micro foundations with optimising agents are developed to conduct policy analysis and 
forecasting experiments. While the focus of this literature has been on the analysis of monetary 
policy, there have been contributions recently that discuss the role of fiscal policy in models 
similar to the present one. Micro-founded, expectation-based DSGE models provide a 
framework that is more suited to the analysis of macroeconomic policies, because DSGE 
models are able to deliver a structural interpretation of the obtained results. In addition, major 
advances in estimation methodology in recent years allow the estimation of DSGE models that 
are able to compete with time series models, such as VAR models. 
Key results and policy conclusions  
Our results show that a positive shock in government spending increases economic activity in 
France and Germany. Examining the propagation of government spending shocks across 
borders, we find the effect on economic activity to be very small. Moreover, the sign of 
transmission is ambiguous: while a government spending shock in Germany is found to raise 
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response in Germany. The effect arising from the interest-rate channel is clearly negative, 
however – a fiscal expansion in France and in Germany results in a union-wide interest rate 
increase. The results suggest that the spillover effects stemming from the trade channel are 
negligible, whereas the effect from the interest-rate channel is negative. In summary, 
expansionary fiscal policy triggers a tight monetary policy response and thereby spreads over 
the entire euro area. Policy-makers should therefore strictly support the case for consequent 
adherence to the rules of fiscal discipline laid down in the Maastricht criteria. 
3.3.2.5  Structural Reforms in the EU and Political Myopia in Economic Policies 
Author: Kari E.O. Alho (ETLA) (Deliverable No. 21) 
Introduction  
Structural reform has been a longstanding issue in European policy-making and on the agenda 
of the European and worldwide economic research community. Recently, there have been three 
main lines of research in this field. First, research has been conducted on the current situation in 
the EU with respect to reforms, along with their consequences and spillovers within the Union. 
A second line of enquiry has been whether reforms, being beneficial in principle for the EU 
economies as such, are politically and socially viable. Third, consideration has been given to 
how the reforms are indirectly affected by EU policies, notably by the coordination of economic 
policies implied by the monetary union and the SGP with limits on budget balances.  
Research task 
The links between the SGP and economic reforms have been analysed by Beetsma and Debrun 
(2004) using a two-period, political-economic model. In this study, we use a somewhat similar 
approach as Beetsma and Debrun, but seek to discuss economic reforms in a more explicit way 
in terms of their benefits and costs. We evaluate these by building a small model with 
monopolistic goods and labour markets, and distinguish the tax/benefit system. The key factor, 
the effect of which is influenced by political myopia and which creates intertemporal spillovers, 
is the investment behaviour of firms. Here, this factor can be affected positively by reform 
policies. We consider the political bias in economic policies and whether the bias can be 
corrected with an SGP.  
We omit from the study the short-term demand and inflationary effects of policies, in order to 
keep the analysis manageable, but extend the time span to the medium term with supply-side 
dominance. 
Methodological approaches used 
We build a two-period model with imperfections in the goods and labour markets, aimed at a 
medium-term analysis of policies and, consequently, we concentrate on the supply side of the 
economy. The consumers allocate consumption over two periods with the goal of smoothing 
consumption. The monopoly trade union sets its wage so that the after-tax real wage is based on 
the mark-up over the social benefit. The government budget is allocated on social transfers and 
public consumption; the government collects taxes from labour income and uses borrowing.  
Similar to the study by Beetsma and Debrun (2004), at the beginning of the second period there 
is an election and the present government has the probability (p) of winning it and staying in 
power for a further term. We assume that the outcome of the election solely depends on the 
present after-tax real labour income of the median voter and assume that s/he is an employed 
person. We classify the government under four possible types, with variable degrees of myopia 
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The government has a number of options through which it can carry out economic reforms:  
i)  cutting taxes, with taxes on labour solely being considered here;  
ii)  curtailing the welfare system by lowering benefits, 
iii)  driving drown the mark-up in the labour market and reforming it from a monopolistic to a 
more competitive market; and 
iv)  reforming the product market to become more competitive by driving down the mark-up 
factor in this case.  
Taxes on capital income are kept fixed. We use a numerical calibration and solution of the 
policy optimum in the model as a function of the probability (p). In addition, we present 
econometric evidence based on Alho (2002).  
Key results and policy conclusions  
Our general conclusion is that structural reforms are negatively affected by myopia in economic 
policies. So, taxes are higher and the welfare state is larger under myopia than the social 
optimum. Yet, the case for product market reform is quite strong, irrespective of the political 
set-up. On the other hand, it may easily be that political considerations block reform of the 
labour market. Our econometric evidence confirms these findings. The SGP hinders and limits 
the magnitude of a tax reform, but is conducive to a reform of the welfare state and the labour 
and product markets. Even so, given the degree of rigidity of the actual SGP, these effects are 
not likely to be large.  
We reach the following four key conclusions for policy. The optimal tax policy depends 
negatively on farsightedness. This finding implies that the socially optimal tax rate, with p being 
unity, is lower than that chosen by a myopic government and that the international non-elected 
body emphasises a tax reform more than the national decision-makers do. In addition, the 
optimal tax depends negatively on the stringency of the SGP. The intuition is that the SGP 
makes borrowing more costly and therefore calls for higher current taxes. It turns out that while 
in principle the SGP may have a large impact in this respect, the impact is not very large when 
we consider the magnitude of the sanctions stipulated by the SGP. 
The analysis furthermore finds that for the optimal welfare benefit, the more farsighted the 
government is, the lower the level of social spending. This outcome suggests that the socially 
optimum welfare benefit, with p being unity, is less than that chosen by a myopic government 
and that the international non-elected body emphasises a reform of the welfare state more than 
the national decision-makers do. The optimal social benefit level depends negatively on the 
stringency of the SGP, because a reduction of the benefit level leads to a savings in government 
finances. 
As the replacement ratio here is fixed, there is no uniformly ‘best’ (inner point optimum) wage 
level, as is plausible. In empirical terms, considering the political cost and economic benefits of 
reforming the labour market, we are inclined to conclude that in reality the case for a labour 
market reform is not very strong. It is also interesting that the effects of the economic factors on 
the required reaction in the political domain to lead to a status quo do not depend much on 
existing political myopia in economic policies.  
A decrease of the mark-up in the goods market is unambiguously beneficial for both private 
income (and thereby for consumption) and the finances of the public sector. The gain from the 
reform of the goods market is magnified by the larger capital stock in the second period. It 
seems that in general we can find the following dividing line. National decision-makers are the 
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are in general pursuing the right cause, as they continue to call for reforms to the economy. 
Their argument, however, may be even stronger than the social optimum.  
The role of the SGP is not very large, if we take into account its stringency with respect to 
sanctions. Its impact is negative in the case of a tax reform but positive in terms of other 
economic reforms. Thus, we could qualify the result of a negative impact of the SGP on reform 
activity, as reached by Beetsma and Debrun (2004), to apply only to tax policy, but in the case 
of reforming the welfare state, the labour and the product markets, we reach the opposite result. 
This conclusion stems from the fact that these latter reforms lead to an improvement in 
government finances and thereby to a lower effective cost of borrowing. 
The numerical values reached in the solutions are, of course, only indicative. Among the various 
reforms considered in the paper, it turns out that reforming the goods market would have the 
strongest rationale in political and economic terms, and not be hampered much at all by 
considerations of myopia. It also appears that in reality reforms in the EU have been more 
predominant in the goods than in the labour market.  
This medium-term emphasis is likely to lead to the situation in which the reforms of the tax 
system and the welfare state are of the beggar-thy-neighbour type, because they can give rise to 
inward FDI in the reforming country at the cost of the neighbouring EU countries. Therefore, 
there is not that much scope for active coordination, because the prospects for these reforms are 
already limited in a single EU country and the existing bias is towards the status quo. The 
situation in the goods market, however, is the opposite, and thus there is justification for 
coordinating product market policies in the EU.  
We show that overall the political bias in economic policies can have quite a substantial effect. 
A key step would be to reduce the extent of myopia in the political process, and in this regard, 
international organisations such as the OECD and the peer review by the European Commission 
and member states may do a good job.  
3.4  Climate change policies and taxation – The abatement of global 
warming, the emissions trade and the need for European 
coordination (WP 5) 
3.4.1 Summary of WP 5 
Introduction  
The major EU policy challenge in the field of global warming is how to launch global 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emission-abatement activities that would offer a chance of meeting the 
EU objective of limiting during this century the rise in temperature to 2°C compared with pre-
industrial levels. In this respect, both the timing of abatement efforts and the road towards the 
establishment of a global abatement coalition are major and critical policy features.  
The instalment of cap-and-trade schemes is one of the key policy solutions to the abatement 
problem. Yet, other policy measures are being undertaken simultaneously. Such efforts raise 
important policy questions about the interactions among the different instruments deployed. 
Examples of these are the fostering of R&D on cleaner energy technologies, the subsidisation of 
renewable energy and energy taxation. 
Research tasks  
In view of the policy challenges and questions in the field of climate change and taxation, the 
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On post-2012 climate policy development, several issues have been studied: 
i)  Assessments have been made of the timing of global abatement efforts that would be 
optimal in view of the EU’s temperature objective and of the additional costs of late 
action.  
ii)  The road towards a global coalition has been explored as well − in two separate papers. 
The first paper assesses − under various permit allocation rules − the impacts of 
broadening the abatement coalition from the platform of G8 to a relatively small group of 
20 countries that really matter (called the ‘L20’) because they are leading in terms of GDP 
and population and emissions. The second paper explores the impacts of an extension of 
the Californian initiative to the whole of the US. 
Concerning the interactions of policy instruments, two questions have been addressed:  
iii)  In a theoretical paper using an endogenous growth model, the effects of an emissions cap 
on induced R&D are assessed with numerical model calculations. 
iv)  The interactions of the EU emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) with energy taxes have 
been investigated as well, in two separate papers. The first paper analyses, in a partial 
equilibrium framework, the consequences of introducing a unilateral carbon tax within the 
EU ETS. The second one assesses the ramifications of energy tax reforms with the EU 
ETS in place in the context of a general equilibrium model. In particular, this paper 
assesses the benefits of converting existing energy taxes to carbon taxes relative to cap-
and-trade, the overall abatement efficiency of the EU system (delineation of the regulated 
sector) given existing taxes and the benefits of revenue recycling if permits are auctioned. 
Methodological approaches used 
Within WP 5, a variety of methodologies has been deployed. These range from numerical 
calculations with concise theoretical models and detailed partial equilibrium models for the EU-
27 to applied general equilibrium models of a dynamic nature with global coverage. The study 
on the optimal timing of global emission abatement efforts conducts various counterfactual 
policy scenarios using two different applied general equilibrium models. One of these, PACE-
IAM, is of an aggregate nature, yet dynamic in a forward-looking sense and capable of 
generating an integrated assessment of the temperature increase that will go with accumulated 
GHG emissions. The other, WorldScan, is recursively dynamic yet much more disaggregated; it 
is used to show the impacts of the emission profiles generated by the other model in much more 
detail. PACE-IAM is also used to assess the effects of broadening the abatement coalition to the 
group of countries that really matter. WorldScan is additionally used to assess the interactions 
between the EU ETS and energy taxation. 
Key results and policy conclusions 
Because delayed action may induce large excess costs of transitional climate policies, the 
burden-sharing debate may become substantially more critical over time owing to ‘foregone 
action’.  
The simulations concerning coalitions of leading countries suggest that leaders prefer leadership 
under an egalitarian allocation rule. For ability-to-pay and polluter-pays rules, leadership is 
costly to the leaders but these costs can be reduced if unilateral action is limited to a transitional 
phase.  
The impact analysis of an extension of the Californian initiative to the whole of the US shows 
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In the endogenous technology case, research and development in less-polluting energy 
technologies is fostered by high permit prices. 
Introduction of a unilateral carbon tax within the EU ETS will not affect EU emissions; it 
always raises abatement costs (in general especially in the country that introduces the tax) and 
cannot be justified from the standpoint of climate change policy. The implication of the analysis 
is that existing energy taxes for installations covered by the EU ETS are better removed from 
the perspective of abatement efficiency. This finding is also confirmed by the following 
experiment in a general equilibrium context: when permits are auctioned, using the permit 
revenue to slash existing energy taxes within the sectors covered by the EU ETS is welfare-
improving (over and above revenue recycling in a lump-sum fashion). Moreover, the conversion 
of existing energy taxes to uniform carbon taxes is a powerful instrument in terms of both 
emissions reduction and economic welfare relative to cap-and-trade. Nevertheless, the position 
of the NMS deserves special attention in the event that energy taxes are rearranged in this way. 
Given existing energy taxes, the inefficiencies involved in delineating the regulated sector turn 
out to be relatively minor. Revenue recycling is beneficial, relative to recycling in a lump-sum 
fashion. Hence, from this viewpoint, the auctioning of permits is to be preferred to 
grandfathering. 
3.4.2  Summary of the deliverables  
There are altogether six working papers prepared in this work package. 
3.4.2.1  Post-2012 Climate Policies: A Simulation Study with WorldScan 
Authors: Stefan Boeters and Gerard Verweij (CPB) (Deliverable No. 23B) 
Introduction 
After the decision of the US and Australia not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, the process of an 
internationally coordinated climate policy seems to be deeply stuck. The Kyoto Protocol 
commits a group of industrialised countries – the Annex-B countries – to reduce their emissions 
of GHGs in 2008–12 by approximately 5% below their 1990 levels. This is a small step towards 
a stabilisation of the concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere. A focal point in the discussion 
about climate change is a limit on the rise in global temperature of 2°C, which is commonly 
seen as a ‘safe’ temperature level limiting the possible catastrophic consequences of more 
severe changes. With such a target in mind, stricter emission ceilings for individual countries 
and an extension of the group of contributing countries are indispensable, which makes the non-
participation of the US even more worrisome. 
Research task 
In this situation, climate policy research can contribute by pointing out possible further steps 
and analysing their consequences. The discussion can be stimulated by contrasting potential 
paths of the future development, and singling out those that have the highest probability of 
gaining broad support. In this study, we seek to contribute to this discussion by sketching a 
climate policy scenario for the period 2012–20, building on the CPB-RIVM study of Bollen et 
al. (2005). We take the existing climate change policies as a starting point and extend them 
where we consider this politically feasible. There are three important building blocks of our 
post-2012 scenario: the Annex-B countries, excluding the US, form an abatement coalition in 
the form of a cap-and-trade system; the US commits to moderate emission targets, but does not 
partake in the trading system; and non-Annex-B regions contribute in the form of a system of 
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Methodological approach used 
WorldScan (Lejour et al., 2006) is a multi-sector, multi-region applied general equilibrium 
model. It is developed to study long-term global issues, such as globalisation and climate 
change policy. The model builds upon neoclassical theory, has strong micro-foundations and 
solves for the equilibrium that maximises welfare across the entire economy, subject to 
technological constraints, GHG limitations, etc. The model is calibrated on input–output tables 
and trade data from the GTAP 6 database (Dimaranan and McDougall, 2005). The base year for 
the model is 2001. The model version used in this study distinguishes 13 sectors and 19 regions.  
The impacts of policy interference are measured with respect to a baseline, which is a reference 
scenario usually termed business-as-usual (BaU), where no policy changes apply. In order to 
simulate the economic and environmental implications of our post-2012 scenario, information 
on the future BaU development of the global economy is required. The BaU projections forced 
upon the models determine how policy interference, such as carbon emission constraints under 
post-2012 climate policies, will bind the respective economies in the future. The compilation of 
the BaU projections is a key challenge for long-term climate policy analysis. For our 
simulations, we adopt the WEC/IIASA “Middle Course” Scenario B as our reference case. 
Scenario B is based on a cautious approach to technological change and energy availability as 
well as modest economic growth. 
Key results and policy conclusions  
The baseline emissions are relatively stable for the Annex-B regions and rise steadily at 2.7% 
per year for the non-Annex-B regions. Non-Annex-B countries like China and India will 
therefore become large emitters in the next decades. 
In the non-Annex-B regions, the post-2012 scenario only generates a modest reduction of the 
CO2 emissions: –1% in 2020. There is a small reduction, although the commitment of these 
countries is less strict than the benchmark emissions, because CDM is taking place. Yet, the 
volume of CDM is small compared with the total emissions in the non-Annex-B area. 
Furthermore, some leakage of CO2-emitting activities to the rest of the world takes place; here 
the emissions increase by 1% in 2020.  
For the Annex-B regions, there is a more substantial reduction in CO2 emissions compared with 
the baseline: –24% for the US and –16% for the rest of the Annex-B are in 2020. Differences in 
CO2 reduction among the regions exist according to their emissions target and level of permit 
trade. 
Three markets for emission permits exist: the internal market of the US, the common Annex-B 
market and the regional markets for CDM credits. Figure 4 shows the pattern of prices that lead 
to market clearing for these different types of permits. The emission price in 2020 for the US is 
the highest: €32/tCO2. The rest of the Annex-B group has a lower emissions price: €18/tCO2. 
This higher price in the US can be explained when we have a second look at the formation of 
the emission targets. If expressed as a relative reduction compared with the 1990 emissions, it 
seems that the reduction target in the US is considerably less strict than in the rest of the Annex-
B countries (no change vs. –26%). But if this is translated into changes compared with the 
baseline emissions, the order is reversed. The US then ends up with a stricter target (–24% vs. –
20%), which results from the steeper increase in baseline emissions in the US. In addition, the 
US does not participate in CDM, and hence the difference in domestic emission reductions is 
even enlarged to –24% vs. –16%. This translates into the permit price difference of €14/tCO2. 
Joining the Annex-B permit market would thus be beneficial for the US by lowering its 
emissions price.  60 | TAXBEN 
Figure 4. Carbon emission price in €/t CO2 
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Source: Boeters and Verweij (2006). 
For the Annex-B group, Figure 4 shows the positive permit price already present in the Kyoto 
period (2008–10). The price remains below €3/tCO2, however.  
3.4.2.2  Post-2012 Climate Policies: From G8 to L20 
Authors: Christoph Böhringer (ZEW and University of Heidelberg) and Ulf 
Moslener (ZEW) (Deliverable 23A) 
Introduction 
Since spring 2005, the Kyoto Protocol – the first international agreement on climate protection – 
has been in force. It contains legally binding emission targets for industrialised countries to be 
achieved during the commitment period 2008–12. Proponents of the Protocol celebrate it as a 
breakthrough in international climate policy. Yet opponents criticise that its approach, namely 
negotiating targets and timetables for emission reductions within a comprehensive process of 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, is seriously flawed and 
ultimately doomed to fail. In the debate on climate policy architectures beyond 2012, there is 
concern about the effectiveness of the inclusive negotiation procedure associated with a 160-
nation bureaucracy, which underlies the negotiations towards the Kyoto Protocol. The 
(anticipated) minor environmental effectiveness of the Protocol seems to support this 
perception: acknowledging the vast heterogeneity of the 160 nations’ political priorities, the 
veto power of every single nation compromises any ambitious, common reduction target. 
Substantial leverage on negotiation outcomes may be achieved by working with a small number 
of countries representing the major emitters as well as economic and political powers. Such a 
group (perhaps along the lines of the Leaders 20 Summit – L20 – suggested by Canadian Prime 
Minister Paul Martin) may move forward with stringent unilateral emission reduction 
commitments, while the rest of the world does not necessarily have to be part of any legally 
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Research task  
We compare the economic impacts of this leadership against a global commitment that 
maintains the same worldwide emission budget. We investigate the incentives for leadership by 
a limited number of countries under alternative allocation rules for the global carbon emissions 
budget.  
Methodological approach used 
We describe the trade-off between limited and global coverage from an L20-leaders perspective: 
given some worldwide emission limit over the next decades, the pay-off to include other 
countries in a potentially cumbersome UN debate on global burden sharing declines with the 
degree to which the participation of countries outside the L20 reduces the compliance costs of 
the leaders.  
As a cost-effectiveness framework for numerical analysis, we use an intertemporal multi-sector, 
multi-region CGE model of global trade and energy use (PACE-IAM). Beyond the consistent 
representation of market interactions as well as income and expenditure flows, the dynamic 
model setting accommodates an assessment of the adjustment path of economies to exogenous 
policy constraints over time. 
To determine the key players (leaders) in the field of international climate policy there are 
several criteria. Three fairly self-evident and rather prominent criteria are a country’s i) CO2 
emissions, ii) GDP and iii) population. These criteria also serve as a basis for central equity 
rules referred to in the policy debate. Among the most commonly quoted equity rules, the 
sovereignty and the polluter-pays principle are based on (historical or projected) emissions. The 
egalitarian principle calls for identical per capita emissions, thereby emphasising the role of 
population. Finally, the ability-to-pay rule is based on the economic wealth of a country, which 
is generally linked to GDP. The countries identified as potential members of a leaders group 
consist of four industrialised regions (EUR-30, the US, Japan and Russia) and five non-
industrialised regions (Brazil, Mexico, China, India and Indonesia). 
Key results and policy conclusions 
Our simulations suggest that leaders prefer leadership under an egalitarian allocation (ega) rule. 
For ability-to-pay (atp) and polluter-pays (ppa) rules, leadership is costly to the leaders but these 
costs can be reduced if unilateral action is limited to a transitional phase. Figure 5 displays 
welfare implications in percentage terms of the different regimes for both the leaders moving 
forward with ambitious climate policy targets and the rest of the world (ROW). 
We have identified a non-negligible trade-off between limited and global coverage from an L20 
perspective if leadership is assumed to last forever. If, however, leadership is restricted to a 
transitional phase – until 2030 – the welfare implications might be reduced substantially. The 
main driver of the welfare implications turns out to be the income transfer through the carbon 
endowments. While for an egalitarian allocation rule, leaders would prefer an L20 scenario to 
global coverage, for all the other analysed allocation rules the potential leaders would be better 
off if global coverage of reduction commitment is assumed. Additional work on the burden-
sharing debate among the (relatively inhomogeneous) group of leaders would be one interesting 
area of further research.  
Our findings suggest that leadership might be preferred in the case of the egalitarian rule, but 
costly under polluter-pays or ability-to-pay regimes. The cost burden of the leaders might be 
substantially lower if leadership were restricted to a transitional phase. 62 | TAXBEN 
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Figure 5. Welfare implications of a group of leaders moving forward with CO2 abatement 
commitments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: L20 = leadership forever; L20 Tran = leadership restricted to a transitional phase; global = global coverage of 
reduction commitments 
Source: Böhringer and Moslener (2006). 
3.5.2.3 Efficient and Transitional Climate Policies – A Combined Analysis using PACE 
and WorldScan 
Authors: Christoph Böhringer (ZEW and University of Heidelberg), Stefan 
Boeters (CPB) and Ulf Moslener (ZEW) (Deliverable 14)  
Introduction  
The analysis of long-term scenarios of climate policy poses ambitious requirements for the 
scope of the economic models used. On the one hand, they must cover a long time span, and 
there must be a dynamic coupling of all periods to account for the forward-looking adjustment 
of economic agents to future policies. On the other hand, regional and sectoral detail is 
necessary to capture the distributional consequences of such policies, both between and within 
countries. These differential consequences determine the incentives for countries and for 
particular groups within countries to participate in a coordinated international approach to 
emission reduction.  
Research task  
The required detail in several dimensions goes beyond what is currently handled in standard 
CGE models. In this study, we therefore combine information from two models, PACE-IAM 
and WorldScan, to obtain a comprehensive picture of future options of climate policy. 
The strength of PACE-IAM is its intertemporal optimisation set-up, which allows us to 
construct a full time-path of optimal reduction targets. As a tool specifically tuned for this task, 
PACE-IAM uses a relatively coarse disaggregation with respect to regions, time periods and 
sectors. This is the point at which the second model, WorldScan, comes in. It is set up as a TAX/BENEFIT SYSTEMS AND GROWTH POTENTIAL OF THE EU | 63 
dynamic recursive model, so that the economic equilibrium in each period can be calculated 
independently of later periods. This makes a more detailed coverage of regions and sectors 
possible. As the single periods can be individually tuned, the match with the exogenous baseline 
scenario is closer in WorldScan as well.  
We illustrate the complementarities of the two models in an investigation of different optimal 
and conditionally optimal policies. As a background, we start with a policy that establishes 
global where-and-when efficiency for a given temperature target over the entire period until 
2100, derived by PACE-IAM. The consequences of this policy are then broken down by region 
and sector on a year-by-year basis using WorldScan. This overall efficient policy is finally 
compared with different conditional scenarios that follow a politically feasible path until 2030, 
and are then complemented by an efficient path until the end of the period of interest. We assess 
the efficiency loss that these concessions to political feasibility generate. 
Methodological approach used 
In order to investigate the long-term effects and efficiency costs of transitional climate policies 
we make use of both the integrated assessment model PACE-IAM and WorldScan. PACE-IAM 
combines economic aspects of climate change with scientific knowledge of the dynamics of 
climate change. WorldScan complements this with a model set-up that adds regional, sectoral 
and temporal detail, while lacking the climate and intertemporal optimisation aspects. 
PACE-IAM links a dynamic macroeconomic model with a simple geophysical module of 
climate change. The latter corresponds to the climate component of the RICE-99 model. The 
macroeconomic module is formulated as an intertemporal multi-sector, multi-region CGE 
model of global trade and energy use. PACE-IAM in its current version does not attempt to 
translate global warming into market impacts and non-market impacts. The model is, however, 
well suited to derive cost-efficient climate policies given long-term temperature or 
concentration targets and to compare the efficiency costs of alternative policy scenarios. As is 
customary in applied general equilibrium analysis, base-year quantities and prices – together 
with exogenous elasticities – determine the parameters of functional forms that describe 
technological options in production and consumer preferences in consumption. For the base-
year calibration, PACE-IAM builds on the most recent GTAP 6 database. 
WorldScan shares many general features of CGE models with PACE-IAM. The differences are 
in the dynamic set-up of the model and in the aggregation structure. In its temporal structure, 
WorldScan is dynamic-recursive. This does not allow for intertemporal optimisation, which is 
why the time profile of optimal emissions is taken over from PACE-IAM. On the other hand, 
the independence of the periods and the yearly structure allow for a more precise calibration to 
the exogenous time path of GDP and energy use. Regarding regional and sectoral 
disaggregation, WorldScan accommodates much more detail than PACE-IAM. The world is 
broken down into 21 regions. In each of the regions, we distinguish 31 production sectors. 
Key results and policy conclusions 
Figure 6 depicts the carbon emission trajectories across the different scenarios. Under global 
efficiency considerations for a long-term temperature target of 2°C, substantial emission 
cutbacks vis-à-vis the BaU are already required in the transition phase between 2010 and 2030 
accounting for long-term climate dynamics. In our assessment of efficiency costs for transitional 
climate strategies, we consider pragmatic formulations of climate policies up to the year 2030. 
To provide a meaningful cross-comparison of different policy scenarios up to 2030, we 
presuppose that the ‘residual’ policy between 2030 and 2100 will use an efficient intertemporal 
strategy that meets the same exogenous long-term temperature target (+2°C) as the ‘efficient’ 
scenario. ‘BaU_2030’ reflects a situation without effective abatement policies until 2030; 64 | TAXBEN 
afterwards, an efficient climate policy applies to meet the temperature target in 2100. ‘Kyoto’ 
requires industrialised countries (as listed in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol) to maintain their 
Kyoto targets from 2010 onwards, whereas no explicit emission constraints apply to developing 
countries. ‘Kyoto_Plus’ assumes that industrialised countries stick to the Kyoto targets until 
2020 and then decrease these emission limits by 1% per year between 2020 and 2030. 
Figure 6. Global carbon emissions (Gt of C) 
 
Source: Böhringer, Boeters and Moslener (2006). 
Table 1 summarises gross adjustment costs at the world level: adjustment costs are measured as 
Hicksian equivalent variation in lifetime income. 
Table 1. Adjustment costs (% change in Hicksian equivalent variation) 
 BaU  BaU_2030  Efficient  Kyoto  Kyoto_Plus 
World 0.0  -0.89  -0.66  -0.78  -0.77 
Source: Böhringer, Boeters and Moslener (2006). 
WorldScan is used to break down the results of the efficient scenario into regional and sectoral 
effects.  
The efficient carbon reduction scenario is characterised by a relatively mild emissions cutback 
in the beginning and, by contrast, a steep decline towards the end of the simulation period. The 
emissions price is steadily rising, reaching levels in the second half of the century that suggest 
an almost complete switch to some backstop technology. The relative emissions reduction level 
differs among countries, with developing countries reducing considerably more than 
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With respect to the composite scenarios that take political feasibility into account, we can 
observe the following general pattern: low emission targets until 2030 (especially in the 
BaU_2030 scenario) must be compensated by higher reduction achievements towards the end of 
the period. This leads to an emissions price profile that increases even more steeply than in the 
efficient scenario. The overall welfare loss is roughly driven by the looseness of the abatement 
targets in the initial period. The more the path deviates from the efficient one until 2030, the 
higher are the welfare costs to be borne later. 
3.4.2.3  Efficiency Losses from Overlapping Economic Instruments in European Carbon 
Emissions Regulation 
Authors: Christoph Böhringer (ZEW and University of Heidelberg), Henrike 
Koschel (ZEW), Ulf Moslener (ZEW) (Deliverable No. 20A)  
Introduction  
To reduce their carbon dioxide emissions, in addition to the CO2 EU ETS, EU member states 
must apply complementary regulatory measures in those sectors that are not covered by the EU 
ETS. This segmented carbon regulation runs the risk of producing substantial excess costs since 
marginal abatement costs are not equalised across emission sources, which would lead to 
inefficiencies. In many member countries, the allocation to energy-intensive industries has been 
perceived as rather generous at the expense of sectors outside the EU ETS. The burden has been 
shifted from energy-intensive industries with rather low marginal abatement costs to sectors 
with potentially high abatement costs. 
In several EU countries, industrial installations that have to hold emission permits are also 
affected by national energy tax regimes. In contrast to the EU emissions trading directive that 
clearly prescribes which installations are affected by the ETS, the EU energy tax directive 
allows the member states great latitude as to whether EU ETS sectors are taxed or not. Even 
though from a purely theoretical standpoint the use of a mix of policies in order to pursue a 
single policy objective is not useful, it is in the nature of policy design within a federal system 
such as the EU that instruments introduced at the European level are complemented by 
instruments of the member states.  
From a more subtle theoretical point, there are several reasons why a mix of policy instruments 
might even be preferable to a single instrument. Differentiated instruments can be justified if 
there are multiple policy objectives, such as social or technology-related criteria. Second-best 
regimes, which are characterised by initial market distortions or imperfections, provide a 
general argument for differentiated regulation. Such regimes include situations with uncertainty, 
external knowledge spillovers, initial tax distortions, market power or transaction costs. In 
climate policy design, sector-specific differences in transaction costs have been used as an 
argument for, e.g. applying different climate policy instruments to different economic sectors. 
Research task  
We analyse the potential efficiency losses arising from the co-existence of emission taxes and 
emissions trading. The following analysis abstracts to a large extent from market distortions and 
focuses on the static efficiency implications of additional emission taxes imposed on energy-
intensive sectors that are in addition subject to the EU ETS. We show that in this case 
overlapping regulation may induce substantial excess costs: firms under the EU ETS that are 
simultaneously confronted with additional domestic energy or carbon taxes will abate 
inefficiently while other firms within the EU ETS will benefit from lower international emission 
permit prices. In essence, unilateral emission taxes within the EU ETS are ecologically 
ineffective and subsidise net permit buyers. 66 | TAXBEN 
Methodological approach used 
We illustrate the effects of possible overlaps of existing CO2 emissions regulations with the EU 
ETS using a simple emission market model. Each member state is characterised by an 
(aggregate) marginal abatement cost function of the sectors that are subject to the EU ETS, 
including the power sector, oil refining, several energy-intensive industries, and by an 
(aggregate) marginal abatement cost function for the rest of the economy (covering all sectors 
outside the scope of the EU ETS including private households, transport, trade). The ETS 
sectors in each member state receive an emissions budget according to the national allocation 
plans and can trade the permits thereafter. In contrast, the rest of the economy does not 
participate in trade. The member states, however, are required to take complementary action. 
We assume that the emission reductions in the rest of the economy are prescribed by the 
national allocation plans and implemented cost-efficiently by carbon taxes. 
Key results and policy conclusions 
The EU ETS implements any given EU-wide target for the ETS sectors at minimum costs – 
independent of whether the country-specific national allocation plan implies an over-allocation 
or not. An additional tax within the trading scheme cannot change the distribution between the 
ETS and non-ETS sectors ex post. Owing to the segmentation of the economy into ETS and 
non-ETS sectors, however, taxes do not act as an instrument to implement a second-best 
solution: a unilateral emissions tax drives apart the marginal abatement costs within the ETS 
sectors of the different regions and leads to efficiency losses. It increases the EU’s overall 
implementation costs of the emissions target and has no ecological effect. Furthermore, it is 
costly for the (taxing) member state.  
There is an exception to this. The taxing country may gain at the expense of overall cost 
effectiveness only if rather restrictive conditions are met: the country has a large share in the 
permit market, it features comparatively flat marginal abatement costs in the sectors subject to 
emissions trading and is at the same time a net permit importer. In this case, the reduced 
domestic permit demand may lower the EU-wide market price for permits and thereby cause an 
extra reduction of the country’s expenditures for permit imports. Therefore, energy or carbon 
taxes within the segment of the EU economy that is regulated by the ETS should be handled 
with great care and justified by reasons other than implementing the commitments under the 
burden-sharing agreement in a cost-efficient manner.  
3.5.2.5  The EU ETS and Existing Energy Taxes 
Author: Paul J.J. Veenendaal (CPB) (Deliverable No. 20B) 
Introduction 
Under the Kyoto Protocol, the EU has committed itself to reducing GHG emissions over the 
period 2008–12 by 8% below 1990 levels. One of the major tools that have been put in place to 
achieve this commitment is the EU ETS. This cap-and-trade system is currently in its first start-
up phase of 2005–07. It puts a cap on CO2 emissions from large combustion installations with a 
capacity exceeding 20 MW. Together these installations account for nearly half of EU-25 fossil 
fuel CO2 emissions. Emission permits are allocated to firms by national governments (subject to 
approval by the European Commission) and are freely tradable. Most of the permits have been 
grandfathered but the directive allows for permit auctions as well, albeit subject to a maximum 
of 10% in the second phase that coincides with the Kyoto period of 2008–12. The EU ETS 
establishes a uniform emissions price for all installations that it covers throughout the member 
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possible costs. Yet, existing energy taxes may jeopardise this conclusion if they are applied non-
uniformly to the installations covered by the EU ETS.  
Research task 
The aim of this study is to analyse the interactions between the EU ETS and EU energy taxation 
and to assess the importance of these interactions. We distinguish three relationships between 
cap-and-trade systems and taxation. 
First, the cap would alternatively materialise if CO2 emissions were taxed at exactly the level of 
the permit price. Thus, the claim that a cap-and-trade system is cost-effective presumes that 
energy use is not taxed in additional non-uniform ways. Energy taxes are abundantly present, 
however, especially in the EU-15 member states, and vary widely by energy carrier, by user and 
by member state, with the relative magnitude of energy taxes bearing no relation whatsoever to 
CO2 emissions. Hence, the cost-effectiveness of an additional cap-and-trade system is not 
guaranteed. 
Second, although the coverage of the EU ETS (large combustion installations) may be extended 
in its second phase, there is no doubt that the cap will continue to be imposed on only part of the 
economy (henceforth, the ‘regulated’ sectors). Given that according to the EU’s burden-sharing 
arrangement each member state has agreed to a cap on total emissions, permit allocation to the 
regulated sectors implicitly puts a complementary, national cap on emissions from the other 
(henceforth, ‘non-regulated’) sectors. In general, marginal abatement costs of the regulated 
sectors under the EU-wide cap will differ from the marginal costs incurred by the non-regulated 
sectors, while the latter will also differ among member states owing to the burden-sharing 
arrangement. Compliance costs of the non-regulated sectors depend directly on the amount of 
permits allocated to the regulated sectors. The separation of emissions reductions within the 
EU-25 into many different components thus raises questions concerning the efficiency of the 
overall abatement effort. The over- or underallocation of permits to the regulated sectors and 
extension of the sectoral coverage of the EU ETS may have important impacts on marginal 
abatement costs in the non-regulated sectors. Moreover, diverging levels of existing energy 
taxes may drive abatement costs even farther apart.  
The third connection between cap-and-trade and taxation is rather more direct. When emission 
permits are auctioned, the auction receipts can be recycled back into the economy. Although the 
possibilities to do so are numerous, the economic literature suggests that using these receipts to 
slash existing tax distortions improves economic welfare more than a lump-sum transfer to the 
economic agents does. According to the weak double dividend hypothesis, revenue recycling 
through cuts in distortionary taxes improves economic welfare relative to recycling through 
lump-sum payments. The strong double dividend hypothesis suggests that substitution of an 
environmental tax for a distortionary tax will improve economic welfare. Hence, the 
introduction of an environmental tax would not only enhance environmental quality but also 
non-environmental welfare (double dividend). Obviously, verification of the double dividend 
hypotheses requires model simulations in a particular empirical setting. 
Methodological approach used  
In this study, we use a recursively dynamic global applied general equilibrium model, 
WorldScan, as a tool to analyse and assess the importance of the interactions of EU cap-and-
trade systems and EU energy taxes. One should bear in mind that the outcomes from the model 
are of a long-term nature and do not reflect the costs of structural adjustments. As a baseline, we 
adopt the WEC/IIASA “Middle Course” Scenario B. This scenario is characterised by a 
cautious approach to technological change and energy availability as well as modest economic 
growth. It does not include climate change policies or carbon taxation.  68 | TAXBEN 
Key results and policy conclusions  
The possible interaction between existing taxes and cap-and-trade systems raises the question of 
how tax harmonisation in terms of carbon taxation would fare as a device to curb CO2 emissions 
vis-à-vis cap-and-trade. For the assessment, we first install a full cap-and-trade system in the 
EU, which caps the EU fossil CO2 emissions of all sectors and households. Subsequently, we 
convert existing energy taxes to carbon taxes in four different ways: separately by member state 
and for consumers and producers; separately by member state for all agents; EU-wide, yet 
separately for producers and consumers; and EU-wide for all agents. In all these cases, we 
maintain energy tax revenues at baseline levels as a percentage of GDP. It thus turns out that the 
conversion of existing energy taxes to more uniform carbon taxes would outperform the cap-
and-trade system for the next decade in terms of emissions reduction. Second, the conversion 
would also generally outperform the cap-and-trade system in terms of (smaller) welfare losses. 
Moreover, if the energy taxes were converted to a uniform carbon tax for all agents, strong 
double dividends would arise at the levels of the EU-15 and the EU-25. EU-wide 
harmonisation, however, would have adverse impacts on economic welfare in the NMS, as it 
would raise the energy tax burden in these countries over and above baseline levels. Finally, the 
conversion would strongly discourage the use of coal and natural gas and promote the use of 
petroleum, relative to the baseline.  
Although tax harmonisation therefore seems to be a strong alternative to cap-and-trade, the 
political viability of a tax harmonisation strategy may be limited. The distributional impacts on 
welfare in the NMS and on employment in the coal industry may be politically sensitive. Tax 
harmonisation is a difficult process and the fostered use of petroleum seems to be at odds with 
energy conservation and energy security concerns. Hence, the main lesson is that existing 
energy taxes are very distortive, and by the same token, rearranging them may provide 
potentially very powerful instruments within the context of climate change policies. 
As the EU ETS covers only part of the economy, other policy measures must ensure that the 
non-regulated sector reduces emissions as well. This raises the question of the extent to which 
overall abatement efficiency in the EU is sensitive to extension of the EU ETS to all other 
production sectors with the exception of the transport sector. Given existing energy taxes, the 
general conclusion is that extension would not increase economic welfare. Extension of the EU 
ETS to other production sectors will lower the permit price and raise the carbon tax for the non-
regulated sectors.  
The reasons are twofold. First, more reduction opportunities would become available in the 
regulated sector while fewer options would be left in the non-regulated sector. Second, existing 
energy taxes would become even more concentrated in the non-regulated sector. This implies 
that the carbon tax must rise considerably to have an impact on emissions because abatement is 
the result of relative price changes. Hence, the carbon tax must be relatively high when pre-
existing taxes are high and carbon taxation becomes more costly. As a result, the overall welfare 
impacts of extending the EU ETS are slightly negative. This assessment does not take into 
account possible differences in administrative costs. These costs may be lower for an extended 
system. If permits can be efficiently auctioned (and the cumbersome grandfathering process 
skipped), it may be less costly to include a large number of firms in the EU ETS than 
monitoring them separately to check compliance with a large variety of other policy measures.  
The analysis shows − again − that existing energy taxes interact in important ways with cap-
and-trade systems. The higher these taxes are, the higher will be the costs of further emission 
reductions. As the distribution of existing taxes is skewed over sectors and households and quite 
divergent across member states, is seems sensible to limit the EU-wide cap-and-trade system to 
those sectors that are taxed rather mildly. This limited coverage characterises the EU ETS in its 
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enhance overall economic welfare. This welfare assessment, however, does not take into 
account possible differences in administrative costs.  
When permits are auctioned, recycling permit revenue in such a way that existing tax distortions 
are reduced generally increases welfare over and above revenue recycling in a lump-sum 
fashion. Two cases are considered. First, we use the permit revenue to reduce taxes on labour. 
As these are borne by employers in WorldScan, reducing taxes on labour will lower producer 
prices, raise the real net wage and foster labour supply. Second, we use permit revenue to 
reduce both taxes on electricity and existing energy taxation for the regulated sector. Given the 
cap, the decreased taxation of energy carriers in the regulated sector as well as the increased 
demand for electricity will raise the price of permits. The rise, when large enough, might 
facilitate the adoption of cleaner technologies, e.g. in power generation.  
The general conclusion that can be drawn from these revenue recycling policies is that they 
yield a double dividend. The impacts of reduced labour taxation appear to be most beneficial. 
The welfare effects of reduced taxation of energy use by the regulated sector are relatively 
minor, but they are not negligible, especially in the NMS.  
3.5.2.6  Climate Policies and Economic Growth 
Author: Kari E.O. Alho (ETLA) (Deliverable No. 13)  
Introduction 
Climate policies can have important economic effects, while they endeavour to reach a path of 
lower emissions. Of course, giving up climate policies also has important ramifications in 
comparison with the present situation. It is often heard from the environmentalists that strict 
climate policies give rise to such high incentives for R&D in less-polluting technology that the 
burden of environmental policies turns into a surplus.  
This starting point of this analysis is that because of environmental concerns, a country or 
region of countries sign a climate agreement that cuts their emissions stemming from the use of 
one essential factor of production – energy. The aim of the study is to undertake a simple 
analysis of the effects of climate policies on the growth rate of the economy, using numerical 
calibrations. 
Research task 
We start from the basic premise of no international factor mobility and then enlarge it to allow 
for factor mobility, where domestic factors of production can relocate abroad as a result of the 
reduced real reward caused by the scarcity of the energy factor. The main part of the analysis is 
devoted to the matter of endogenous growth, where the rate of innovation in the energy sector is 
endogenous and can react to the climate policies. We study how essential the factors of 
endogenous technical change and R&D in clean energy are from the viewpoint of overall 
economic growth. Our objective is to give more numerical substance to this field of study on 
endogenous growth and energy policies and to explicitly consider the case of an open economy.  
Methodological approach used  
Throughout the study, we take an aggregative view of a single economy, which is so small that 
its policies with regard to the environment and use of energy do not have any effects on the 
world financial or energy markets. GDP is produced by domestic resources and energy. The use 
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In the first part of the analysis, we simply plug this constraint into an aggregative production 
function under fixed domestic resources and where there is ‘carbon leakage’, caused by a lower 
reward for domestic resources as a result of less available energy.  
The main part of the analysis studies endogenous economic growth, such that the less-polluting 
technical change is endogenous, i.e. the relation between emissions and energy input in 
production depends on economic incentives. We first analyse optimal economic growth in a 
command-type of open economy and thereafter formulate the case of a market economy and 
consider environmental policies to reach the social optimum in R&D in energy technology.  
Key results and policy conclusions  
From the basic calculations in the first part of the analysis, under exogenous technology we see 
that the Kyoto target of limiting emissions (0.25% p.a., altogether 6.3% over 30 years) reduces 
the level of output by 0.6-0.7% in the end-point steady state. The adverse effect grows almost 
linearly with the ambition of the climate target, so that a reduction of emissions by 30% would 
roughly cut 3.5% from the long-term level of real GDP.  
Under mobile factors, however, we reach the conclusion that the reduction in domestic output 
would be around 2% from reductions of a ‘double-Kyoto’ size, while with fixed factors it is 
less, at 1.3%. By contrast, the price of energy, i.e. the domestic tax on energy, will behave in 
such a way that its rise is slower, the higher the carbon leakage. This is because as output is 
reduced, the need to cut emissions will dwindle as well. 
The results of the analysis illuminate the extent to which the energy constraint bites into 
economic growth. Under endogenous growth, we are able to illustrate how the position adopted 
by the environmentalists that strict environmental policies lead to a boost in the economy holds 
qualitatively, but in quantitative terms is only a minor remedy. On the other hand, the 
international price of tradable emissions permits has a significant influence on R&D activity 
towards introducing more energy-saving technology. We also derive the optimal subsidy rate 
for R&D and find it to be quite large, but diminishing over time, as the cost of new 
technological inventions decreases over time. 
The environmentalists often claim that strict environmental regulation creates incentives for 
R&D, which outweigh the adverse effects of these environmental policies. This claim does not 
hold empirically here. It is true that R&D activity carried out in the optimal growth path 
increases somewhat under climate policies compared with the absence of such policies, but the 
difference is very marginal. For instance, after 30 years, the share of total labour devoted to 
R&D in energy technology is only 0.07 percentage points higher under the scenario of climate 
policies than under the baseline, and therefore the two R&D allocation paths are almost 
identical. There are two basic reasons for this. The share of energy in output is not so vital and 
the energy constraint considered here is not so binding after all.  
As noted earlier, however, the results show that the international price of tradable permits has 
quite substantial effects. If the tradable permits have a low price, there are, of course, a higher 
number of purchases and accordingly domestic production is clearly higher. In both cases, the 
path of purchases of pollution rights is declining, because the domestic build-up of energy 
technology is a substitute for imported permits. There is less incentive to carry out own R&D in 
clean energy technology when the pollution right has a low value.  
From the results, we first observe that the optimal rate of subsidy is quite high indeed, on the 
order of 90% of the wage cost of R&D activity. Second, the subsidy is higher in the beginning 
than it is later on, as the cost of new technology declines. We also infer that the need to 
subsidise R&D is the lower, the higher the price of tradable emissions permits. This reflects the 
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thereby to a greater allocation of resources to R&D and, consequently, to a smaller need for 
government intervention in promoting R&D activity. 
4.  Conclusions and Policy Implications 
The orientation of the project has been, in line with the research task specified in the concerned 
SSP priority, to produce policy-relevant research at the EU level and the level of the member 
countries. The following key results and policy conclusions have been found. These are 
elaborated in more detail in the respective parts of section 3. 
WP 1 (Employment) 
1)  The CGE models that were built in the project imply that wage formation is essential in 
determining the outcome of the tax/benefit policies and their overall effectiveness. The 
apparent efficacy of certain policies reached under fixed wages may be quite misleading, 
because the ensuing reaction of wages may neutralise much of the positive policy effects. 
At the same time, there are also policy measures whose positive effects are strengthened 
by the reaction of wage formation. The former measures include those affecting labour 
demand, such as cutting the indirect labour costs of firms. The effects of measures of the 
latter type, which reduce wage claims, like benefit reductions, are magnified under 
bargaining while with fixed wages their positive effects are only marginal.  
2)  Under decentralised bargaining, wage–wage competition among trade unions may 
undermine efforts to reduce the non-wage labour costs of low-skilled workers. That being 
stated, under a nationwide income policy the effectiveness of this policy is restored. 
3)  CGE model analysis of different wage formations for the Estonian and Finnish economies 
(market-determined wages and bargained wages, respectively) implies that there is a need 
for different labour market and tax/benefit policies in different EU member states. A 
comparison of the policy scenarios for Estonia suggests that market-determined wages 
outperform bargained wages, with the latter representing the more common type of wage 
formation in the EU. Thus, it is not advisable for the NMS to adopt EU-15 approaches to 
their labour market policies.  
4)  The labour supply of low-skilled workers in the NMS under all types of wage formation is 
best increased by lowering the marginal income tax rate. Combining this step with 
strategies for improving employment in general, e.g. lowering employers’ social security 
contributions, could potentially improve the labour market position of those with lower 
skills.  
5)  Statistical analysis reveals that the quantitative impact of tax/benefit systems on 
employment in the NMS is more vigorous than in the EU-15. 
6)  The French system of a minimum wage and payroll tax reductions for low-wage earners 
is near the social welfare optimum, if endogenous productivity related to on-the-job 
training is taken into account.  
7)  With its fixed benefits, the UK unemployment benefit system is preferable in terms of 
employment to the French and Continental systems, whose benefits are linked to prior 
income.  
WP 2 (Tax competition and corporate taxes)  
8)  CGE model analysis reveals that even a unilateral reduction of the corporate income tax 
rate is not beneficial for all EU countries if they have to finance the tax reduction through 72 | TAXBEN 
an increase in the tax rates on labour or consumption. The reduction in the corporate tax 
rate attracts FDI and foreign profits. But the increase in the taxes on labour or 
consumption dampens the impact on employment, GDP and welfare, and might even 
offset it. 
9)  Econometric analysis of FDI reveals that competition in social policies has a more 
powerful effect on FDI than tax competition. This conclusion is based on the observation 
that FDI depends more on differences in employment protection and union bargaining 
coverage than on differences in statutory or effective corporate tax rates.  
10)  The largest gains from a common, consolidated, corporate tax base (CCCTB) might be 
expected if all enterprises, domestic and multinational, are treated equally. Proposals for 
consolidation that exclude some of the firms, such as domestic ones, introduce uneven 
competition. This approach might induce extensive restructuring both within and among 
EU member states. 
11)  CGE model analysis underscores that the full benefits from tax base consolidation can 
only be reaped if all firms participate in a common tax base that applies to them all. If 
domestic firms are excluded, the EU average gains in terms of GDP and welfare from 
CCCTB equal respectively 0.08% and 0.03% of GDP in the long run, with the most 
favourable apportionment formula. The gains would be much larger, with additional gains 
for both GDP and welfare of about 0.10%, if not only multinational enterprises, but all 
firms were to participate. 
12)  Formula apportionment distorts the investment and labour demand behaviour of 
multinational enterprises. The incentives for reallocating production or the production 
factors are minimised if apportionment depends on the share of production by 
multinationals in each EU member country. The largest distortions are introduced if 
apportionment is based on a single production factor, for example employment or capital. 
13)  A CCCTB to which only multinationals may apply creates GDP and welfare gains in EU 
member states with a broad tax base, but harms countries with narrow bases. 
14)  The economic and welfare effects of a CCCTB are unevenly distributed. Simulation of 
the CCCTB, in which apportionment is based on employment, capital and production in 
equal proportions, gives the result that the change in welfare ranges from a reduction of 
0.4% of GDP to an increase of 0.6% of GDP. The change in GDP also ranges from a 
reduction to an increase, both of which are 0.7%. 
WP 3 (Productivity and catching up)  
15)  According to pooled panel data estimations and cross-country comparisons of the OECD 
countries, the growth rate of labour productivity has been affected positively by the 
following factors: higher fixed investment, lower inflation, higher R&D investment and 
ICT investment as a percentage of GDP, a higher share of young adults with at least upper 
secondary education, reduced product market regulation and increased exports. In most 
specifications, taxes and gross replacement rates have no statistically significant effect on 
productivity growth rates. We found a negative effect from taxes and a positive one from 
gross replacement rates when they appear together with fixed investment or inflation. 
Nevertheless, with this evidence we conclude that taxes and gross replacement rates are 
unlikely to have had an effect on productivity growth. 
16)  At the same time, the taxes-to-GDP ratio has had a significant negative effect on the 
number of hours worked by the working-age population. Furthermore, we find a negative 
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market regulation and gross replacement rates, on the other. Income inequality and trade 
union density do not correlate with the number of hours worked, but collective bargaining 
coverage has a negative correlation. There is also a negative correlation between the ratio 
of collective bargaining coverage and trade union density on one side, and the average 
number of hours worked, on the other.  
17)  Theoretical analysis shows that powerful trade unions or higher labour costs associated 
with increases in, e.g. unemployment compensation, the payroll taxes paid by employers, 
the taxes paid by workers or the cost of employment protection, cause more 
unemployment and a slowdown of economic growth. A coordinated bargaining process 
increases employment at the price of a lower growth rate.  
18)  These theoretical predictions are consistent with the empirical analysis on convergence 
using data on regions in the EU-15. The tax wedge and unemployment benefits are found 
to reduce the growth rate and increase the unemployment rate. Employment protection 
increases unemployment rates, without a significant effect on the growth rate of GDP per 
capita. The coordination of wage bargaining reduces the growth rate and the 
unemployment rate. The growth rate of total factor productivity (TFP) increases the 
growth of GDP per capita and decreases the unemployment rate.  
19)  Econometric evidence shows that the faster productivity growth rates in the new EU 
member states owe more to catching up from their lower initial levels of output per 
worker than to policy choices regarding the design of labour market institutions.  
20)  Theoretical modelling of an open economy shows that the equilibrium unemployment rate 
depends negatively on labour taxes, but not on the capital income tax, as a higher rate of it 
only leads to a lower level of productivity and income. On the other hand, a permanent 
change in labour taxes only has a long-term negative impact on employment, but not on 
productivity.  
21)  VAR analysis for the EU-15 shows that labour taxes have a marked and statistically 
significant negative effect on employment, while the effects of corporate taxes are more 
neutral with respect to productivity and employment. The results also show that in the 
short term there is a trade-off in the EU between the two key economic goals of 
productivity rises and employment. This tension is less severe in the long run, and while it 
does not fully disappear, over time it becomes statistically insignificant. By contrast, this 
trade-off does not hold for the US, where there is price flexibility. This situation calls for 
more flexibility in the EU labour markets to adjust smoothly to technological changes and 
possible negative supply shocks. Simulation of an econometric model for the Finnish 
labour market shows that in the medium term, there may be important employment gains 
from the acceleration of productivity, while in the long run there is no connection between 
them. 
WP 4 (Macroeconomics of tax systems)  
22)  Theoretical modelling of the EMU shows that if the economies are mainly hurt by 
demand shocks, then flatter tax systems tend to destabilise output whereas the indexation 
of taxes on prices tend to stabilise it. If the economies are mainly hurt by supply shocks, 
then the progressiveness of taxation has little impact on output stability. On the whole, the 
move towards flatter tax systems would likely lead to more unstable output in the euro 
area. 
23)  Given that i) the European Central Bank smoothes the interest rate, ii) net tax shocks do 
have supply-side effects, and iii) spending shocks may have a declining impact on 
aggregate demand owing to financial liberalisation, we conclude that the positive 74 | TAXBEN 
spillovers produced in the euro area today by public spending expansions may be 
decreasing compared with the past, while tax cuts may now be producing negative 
spillovers. 
24)  Estimation of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model shows that a positive 
spending shock in Germany has a positive, Keynesian impact on German GDP and a 
positive but small spillover on French GDP. A positive spending shock in France has 
symmetrical effects. Spillovers among EMU countries are small because of a significant 
reaction of the common interest rate to spending shocks in any of the countries. 
25)  VAR analysis of the EU countries shows that both the domestic and cross-border effects 
of German tax shocks have tended to weaken over time. Even so, they have remained 
positive, i.e. an expansionary shock in Germany has a positive impact on partner 
countries, especially neighbouring ones. The impact on the interest rate was found to be 
weak, however. In empirical research, tax shocks were found to be generally more 
effective in spurring domestic output than government spending shocks in the euro area. 
This result might stem from the fact that tax policies may give rise to potential growth in 
the long run, especially when distortionary taxes are removed, thus increasing economic 
efficiency and competitiveness. When the VAR estimation is performed recursively over 
samples of 17 years of data, it emerges that GDP multipliers drop drastically from the 
early 1990s onwards, especially in Germany (tax shocks) and in the US (both tax and 
government spending shocks). Furthermore, the conduct of fiscal policy seems to have 
become less erratic, as documented by a lower variance of fiscal shocks over time. Fiscal 
‘surprises’ – in the form of unexpected reductions in taxation and expansions in 
government consumption and investment – have become progressively less successful in 
stimulating economic activity at the domestic level. This finding indicates that in the 
framework of the EMU, policy-makers can only marginally rely on these discretionary 
instruments as a substitute for national monetary policy.  
26)  Political myopia has a negative impact on the willingness to reduce labour taxes, and the 
stability and growth pact (SGP) reinforces this pattern since excessive deficits lead to 
sanctions. Political myopia also reduces the willingness to reduce the welfare state, but 
this time the SGP has a positive impact on the willingness to reform. Myopia has little 
impact on the readiness of governments to reform labour and goods markets, but the SGP 
produces the missing incentive. Given that all reforms but those to the goods markets 
have a negative impact on neighbouring countries, EU countries should continue to 
coordinate product market reforms but leave the reforms of the welfare state and of the 
labour markets to peer pressure, with the SGP acting as a positive catalyst.  
WP 5 (Climate change and energy taxation) 
27)  An extension of the Californian initiative of curbing emissions to the whole of the US 
shows that the US would tend to gain from free permit trading with the EU.  
28)  Implicit in the policy goal to limit the rise in temperature to 2°C up to 2100 is that delayed 
action may induce large excess costs of transitional climate policies and the burden-
sharing debate may become substantially more critical over time owing to ‘foregone 
action’. 
29)  In global climate change policies, there is a non-negligible trade-off between limited and 
global coverage from a perspective of 20 core countries taking the lead in moving forward 
with stringent, unilateral emissions-reduction commitments, if the leadership is assumed 
to last forever. If, however, leadership is restricted to a transitional phase – until 2030 – 
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30)  Using two large-scale models of the global economy in combination shows that in an 
optimal emissions policy over the next 100 years, developing countries reduce their 
emissions considerably more than industrialised countries do. This result is mainly driven 
by the share of coal in the baseline fuel-use mix. The reduction in production differs 
between sectors, with a similar pattern in all regions. Plausibly, the fossil fuel sectors are 
most affected, whereas the non-energy sectors hardly decline at all. 
31)  A unilateral energy tax will not affect EU-wide emissions and always increases abatement 
costs in general, but especially in the country that introduces the tax; thus, it cannot be 
justified from the view of climate change policy. The implication of the analysis is that 
existing energy taxes for installations covered by the EU emissions trading system are 
better removed from the standpoint of abatement efficiency. 
32)  The conversion of existing energy taxes to uniform carbon taxes is a powerful instrument 
in terms of both emissions reduction and economic welfare relative to cap-and-trade. The 
position of the NMS deserves special attention when considering changes to energy taxes. 
Existing energy taxes are highly distortionary, but by the same token, new arrangements 
may provide potentially very powerful instruments within the context of climate change 
policies. 
33)  Revenue recycling is beneficial relative to recycling in a lump-sum fashion. There is 
accordingly a double dividend in climate policies.  
34)  In the endogenous technology case, R&D on less-polluting energy technologies is 
fostered by high permit prices, but it nonetheless requires a large initial subsidy for 
technology. Carbon leakage may entail a substantial extra cost to the EU in terms of 
economic growth. 
5.  Dissemination of the Results 
The strategy for disseminating the project findings involved the elements presented below.  
1)  The project’s website (http://www.taxben.org) was created and updated, onto which all 
the deliverables and the key presentations at the project seminars have been uploaded. In 
addition, the research documents have been made available on the websites of the 
respective partner institutes. 
2)  A policy-oriented final conference was arranged and held on 27 November 2006 at CEPS 
in Brussels with around 100 participants. The presentations by the work package leaders 
of the TAXBEN project stimulated comments and discussion by key EU officials in the 
field among others.  
3)  Other seminars were organised that also involved the presence of key representatives of 
the European Commission: 
–  A seminar on WP 2 (tax competition) was held on 17-18 December 2004 in Prague. 
The seminar was also devoted to policy issues. There was a view of taxation in the 
EU-15 and in the new member states. Then, the pros and cons of the EU proposal 
concerning the harmonisation and consolidation of tax bases were discussed. The 
workshop ended with a roundtable on tax coordination;  
–  A kick-off meeting of the project was held on 21 January 2005 in Brussels; 
–  A seminar on WP 1 (employment) was held on 29 June 2005 in Tallinn; 
–  The first full project workshop was held on 9 September 2005 in Helsinki; 76 | TAXBEN 
–  A seminar on WP 4 (macroeconomics of tax systems) was held on 19 January 2006 
in Paris;  
–  A seminar on WP 3 (EU convergence) was held on 20 January 2006 in Paris; 
–  The second full project workshop was held on 15-16 June 2006 in The Hague; and 
–  A seminar on WP 5 (climate change and energy taxation) was held on 9 October 
2006 in Brussels. 
4)  Related publications and articles were produced. In addition to the deliverables (see 
appendix 1), other publications were produced by the project team: 
–  Based in part on the results reached in WP 1 and WP 3, the team at ETLA also 
published the study by K. Alho, V. Kaitila and M. Kotilainen, Employment and 
Productivity  − An Assessment of the Effects of Economic and Labour Market 
Policies (in Finnish), Employment Studies No. 317, Finnish Ministry of Labour, 
2006. 
–  A report was presented to the Estonian Ministry of Social Affairs by A. Võrk and 
A. Paulus, Eesti sotsiaaltoetuste ja maksude mõju inimeste tööjõupakkumise 
stiimulitele [Analysis of labour supply incentives in the Estonian tax/benefit 
system], PRAXIS, Tallinn, 2006 (available at http://www.praxis.ee/ 
data/VorkPaulus_PRAXIS_Stiimuliteanalyys.pdf). It included the presentation of 
the preliminary results of Deliverable No. 7A. 
–  L.J.H. Bettendorf, J. Gorter and A. van der Horst published the report, Who benefits 
from tax competition in the European Union?, as CPB Document 125, CPB, The 
Hague, 2006. 
–  L.J.H. Bettendorf and A. van der Horst wrote the report, Documentation of 
CORTAX, as CPB Memorandum 161, CPB, The Hague, 2006. 
–  Deliverable No. 11B, “Short-term fiscal spillovers in a monetary union” by A. 
Bénassy-Quéré, was presented in “Focus”, CEPII Newsletter, No. 31, 4
th Quarter, 
2006 (available at www.cepii.fr). 
–  Deliverable No. 24, “Changing Patterns of Domestic and Cross-Border Fiscal 
Policy Multipliers in Europe and the US” by A. Bénassy-Quéré and J. Cimadomo, 
was also presented in “Focus”, CEPII Newsletter No. 31, 4
th Quarter 2006 
(available at www.cepii.fr). 
–  K. Alho and V. Kaitila wrote two articles on the preliminary results of the project 
for the Prima magazine of the Confederation of Finnish Employers (Nos. 4 and 7, 
2005). 
5)  Other conference and seminar presentations were organised, as listed below. 
–  The results of the project were presented by K.E.O. Alho from ETLA at a 
conference organised by the Finnish Ministry for Labour in September 2005 and at 
a seminar of Finnish economists working in employer organisations in October 
2005, in Helsinki. Results of Deliverable No. 4 were presented by K.E.O. Alho at 
ETLA seminars in May 2006 and November 2006. 
–  The work by PRAXIS was presented in the public lecture by A. Võrk, “Töötamise 
stiimulid Eesti maksu- ja sotsiaaltoetuste süsteemis” [Incentives to work in the 
Estonian tax/benefit system], at the Estonian Ministry of Finance on 13 September  
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2005. The lecture referred to the TAXBEN project and presented the preliminary 
results of Deliverable No. 7A (available at http://www..praxis.ee/data/PRAXIS 
taxben_employment.pdf).  
–  Horst from CPB gave the presentation, “Corporate income taxation in Europe”, to 
the Dutch Ministry of Finance on 23 May 2006, in The Hague. He also gave the 
presentation of the same title at the “Conference on Subsidiarity in Europe”, on 9 
November 2006 in Brussels. 
–  J. Gorter from CPB gave the presentation, “Mondialisering en 
vennootschapsbelasting” [Globalisation and the corporate income tax] on 28 
September 2006 at the University of Groningen. 
–  S. Boeters from CPB presented his work, “Autonomous energy efficiency increases 
and marginal abatement costs in long-term energy-economy scenarios”, which 
elaborates on some methodological aspects of WP 5, at the “Workshop on 
Economic Policy Modelling”, on 22-24 January 2007 in Oslo. 
–  Deliverable No. 24, Changing Patterns of Domestic and Cross-Border Fiscal Policy 
Multipliers in Europe and the US by A. Bénassy-Quéré and J. Cimadomo (also 
available at www.cepii.fr), was presented at a seminar at ECARES – Free 
University of Brussels, in February 2006 in Brussels. It was later presented at a 
seminar at the Centre for European Integration Studies (ZEI), in June 2006 in Bonn 
and at the “Annual Conference of the French Economic Association”, in September 
2006 in Paris.  
–  In addition, A. Bénassy-Quéré has used the various outcomes of TAXBEN (not 
only those derived by CEPII) in her speeches at the French Ministry of Finance, in 
the media and elsewhere. 
6)  After completion of the project, there is an aim to further disseminate the project’s results 
through various working paper series, if not yet published in this form, and in journal 
articles. In particular, so far, the following submissions have been made: 
Adjemian, S., F. Langot and C.A. Quintero Rojas (2006), “Growth, Unemployment 
and Tax/Benefit Systems in European Countries: Theoretical and Empirical 
Investigations” (Deliverable No. 16B), CEPREMAP, Paris, to the Journal of 
Evolutionary Economics.  
Chéron, A., J.-O. Hairault and F. Langot (2005), “A Quantitative Evaluation of 
Payroll Tax Subsidies: A Structural Approach, a Reform of the French Tax/Benefit 
System” (Deliverable No. 6A), CEPREMAP, Paris. This paper has been accepted 
for publication in the Journal of Public Economics in 2008 under the title “A 
Quantitative Evaluation of Payroll Tax Subsidies for Low-Wage Workers: An 
Equilibrium Search Approach”. 
––––––––– (2006), “Labor Market Institutions and Unemployment in France vs. in 
the UK: A Wage Posting Investigation” (Deliverable No. 6B), CEPREMAP, Paris, 
to Labour Economics. 
Boeters, B. “Autonomous Energy Efficiency Increases and Marginal Abatement 
Costs in Long-Term Energy–Economy Scenarios” (which elaborates on some 
methodological aspects of WP 5), to be submitted to the Energy Journal. 
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Bénassy-Quéré, A. “Short-term Fiscal Spillovers in a Monetary Union” 
(Deliverable No 11B), to be submitted to the Journal of Policy Modelling. 
Delbecque, A. and A. Lahrèche-Révil (2007), “Do EU Member States Compete on 
Social Systems?” (Deliverable No. 9B), submitted to the Spring Meeting for Young 
Economists (SMYE) in Hamburg in May 2007 and to the “Annual Conference of 
the Research in International Economics and Finance (RIEF)” Network in Rome, 
June 2007. | 79 
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